PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM

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MAOISM: A SYMPOSIUM

Stuart R. Schram • *Arthur A. Cohen*

Commentaries by Benjamin Schwartz, Mostafa Rejai, Joseph R. Levenson, Leonard Shapiro

WHITHER RUSSIA?

Giorgio Galli • *Robert Conquest*
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1956-1966

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What is Maoism?

A Symposium

EDITORS' NOTE: The massive purge currently sweeping Communist China in the guise of a "great proletarian cultural revolution" has focused increased attention on the personality and, more particularly, the "thought of Mao Tse-tung," now being exalted as never before in Chinese propaganda media as the quintessence of Marxist-Leninist truth and a "guiding light" for all mankind. With a view to identifying the principal characteristics of the Maoist brand of communism, the editors several months ago initiated the present symposium, inviting Messrs. Schram and Cohen, both long-time students of Mao's ideas, to submit papers discussing five specific questions (1) What are the key operative factors in Mao's political thought? (2) What is Mao's view of the role of intellectuals in a "socialist" society? (3) How can one describe Mao's political "style" as reflected in his leadership of the Chinese Communist Party? (4) What is the practical significance of Mao's approach to international relations, especially with regard to "liberation wars"? (5) What is the relative weight of Chinese and Marxist-Leninist components in shaping Mao's motives, thought and personality? Each of the two authors chose his own approach to the questions, Mr. Schram preferring to deal with them in a somewhat different order and in a more generalized fashion, while Mr. Cohen addressed himself specifically to the questions as stated above. Several prominent scholars were then invited to comment on these basic papers, and finally Messrs. Cohen and Schram were asked to reply to each other's original articles as well as to the comments of the other discussants. Although their original articles were written before the current "cultural revolution" in China had assumed such massive proportions, the two authors touch on the significance of these new developments in their concluding remarks. Comments from our readers on the symposium are cordially invited.

The Man and His Doctrines

By Stuart R. Schram

This article is an attempt to define the essential characteristics of Mao's personal contribution to the ideas and methods of Communist China. In it I shall employ certain generalizations—some might say "abstractions"—regarding the nature of Mao's thought and its historical role. There are those who consider all such discussions as airy speculations, and who recommend limiting the analysis of Mao's ideas to his "operational code" and the immediate experience from which it emerges. Unfortunately, this approach often leads those who adopt it to

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conclude simultaneously 1) that Mao is a hard-bitten revolutionary and nothing else, and 2) that he is above all a "chauvinist." It will be for the reader to judge whether the speculations in which I shall now indulge throw any light on the links between these apparently unrelated attitudes.

The starting point for any attempt to elucidate the nature and significance of Mao's thought must be the fact that he is *both* a Leninist revolutionary and an Afro-Asian nationalist. On the one hand, he pursues radical social change as an end in itself; on the other hand, he is intent on the restoration of national independence and national dignity after the humiliation of Western domination. Being simultaneously a revolutionary and a nationalist, he finds a further justification for revolution in the belief that the nation can be restored and made to flourish only by a change in the social and political system. His aims are thus broader and more radical than those of such revolutionary nationalists as, say, Nasser, Sukarno, or Nkrumah, who do not subscribe to Leninism, and who regard revolution merely as a means of strengthening the nation, and not as an end in itself. But psychologically he also has a great deal in common with them.

The above abstractions do not carry us very far in the understanding of Mao's thought, but they do guide us toward certain basic questions: 1) What is the precise nature of Mao's "nationalist" and "revolutionary" tendencies? 2) How do these strains combine, and what is their relative importance in his thought and action?

These are not easy questions to answer. But to ignore either of the two aspects of Mao's personality, to treat him on one hand as a new Liu Pang or Genghis Khan, or on the other as a "pure" Leninist revolutionary (whatever that may be), is to make certain in advance that everything one says will be at least half false.

Chinese and Leninist Traits

Contrary to what might be assumed at first glance, this is not merely another way of formulating the problem of the relation between the revolutionary and nationalist aspects of Mao's thought. Mao's "Chineseness" is not the same thing as his nationalism. Chinese traditions and Chinese patterns of thought frequently color and shape his modes of reasoning even when his conscious concern is with problems of Leninist theory or with the world proletarian revolution. And conversely, his image of China and his evaluation of the Chinese heritage are cast to a large extent in Leninist categories. There is thus a subtle counterpoint and not a simple coincidence between the dichotomies "Chinese-Leninist" and "nationalist-revolutionary."

Leaving till the next section a discussion of Mao's "Chineseness"—understood in the sense of an identification with China above all, and therefore as another name for nationalism—what is the importance of the Chinese *form* of Mao's thought in general? Is it merely a matter of folklore and local color, of Chinese decorations pasted on an intellectual edifice basically similar to that of any Russian or European Leninist, with due allowance for the differences resulting from the peculiar tactical problems with which Mao has had to deal?

Undoubtedly there *is*, in Mao's writings, an element of *mere* local color, a conscious exploitation of traditional metaphors and examples, because he knows this will appeal to his countrymen and make it easier for them to assimilate a foreign system of thought. But there is much more to the problem than this. If Mao adapts his mode of expression to the habits of thought of his compatriots, he does so not merely to please them, but also to please himself. An extreme but nonetheless significant example is his composition of poems in classical forms, some of which I analyzed in an earlier issue of this review.[1] Mao could clearly have made himself far more accessible to the majority of today's citizens by writing his poems in the modern spoken language, as others have been doing for nearly half a century, and as he himself advises young Chinese to do. If he did not follow his own advice, it is because he *likes* to write in these forms, and also possibly because in this way he strengthens his image as a leader set apart from his contemporaries, speaking through barely comprehensible oracles. Neither of these motives could be justified in terms of Leninist ideology.

Nor is it merely a matter of the forms of expression which Mao chooses to employ. Not only the form but the substance of his thought is profoundly affected by his Chinese background. One example is the concept of *fu-ch'iang* (literally "rich and powerful"—a contraction of a phrase meaning "to enrich the country and make it strong militarily") which Mao absorbed from the late 19th-century nationalists who influenced him as an adolescent. As recently as 1957, during his visit to Moscow, he hailed the October Revolution for having shown

[1] "Mao as a Poet," *Problems of Communism*, Sept.-Oct. 1964, p. 38.

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China the road to "emancipation and *fu-ch'iang*." Both he and Liu Shao-ch'i have often indulged in a type of moralizing which owes more to the Confucian ideal of self-cultivation than to Lenin, for whom that which was moral was simply that which was useful to the revolution. The idea, launched by Mao in 1958, that it was a good thing the Chinese people were "poor and blank" because they could thus be reshaped at will, is totally foreign to the spirit of Marxism, with its insistence on the unique value of Western culture and the importance of a high level of social and intellectual development as a precondition for socialism. While I cannot attempt in this small space to define the antecedents of this notion with any precision, it is certainly more compatible with the traditional Chinese dialectics according to which extremes are transformed into one another, than with Marxist dialectics even as interpreted by Mao. Moreover, the very style in which the Chinese "apply" Marxism—as exemplified by the use of a few sentences from Marx quoted out of context to justify the totally un-Marxist enterprise of the communes—is not unrelated to the handling of quotations from the classics in the Chinese tradition.

Operative Factors

First on the list of the basic operative factors in Mao's thought must be placed his nationalism, not because it is necessarily the most important, but because it is chronologically and psychologically primary in Mao's thought. That it is chronologically primary is clear: Mao was a nationalist (and a relatively conservative one) long before he was a Communist or revolutionary of any kind. But, to a large extent, it is also psychologically primary, both for Mao and for the millions of Chinese who take his thought as their guide. In the complex structure of Mao's mind and personality as a whole, the nationalist components are to be found more or less on the visceral, and the revolutionary components on the cerebral, side. It has been affirmed that to emphasize Mao's nationalism is meaningless, inasmuch as all national leaders in this world are nationalists. Since World War II, France has been governed both by General de Gaulle and by, say, M. René Pleven. Would anyone suggest that the kind and degree of nationalism manifested by the one and the other was of no practical importance?

Another fundamental concept in Mao's intellectual world, which is at the same time a symbol for mobilizing political support, is that of the "people." Mao's "populist" tendency—the notion that the overwhelming majority of the Chinese are basically progressive and capable of participating in the revolution—is probably the most important single device by which he reconciles the nationalist and revolutionary halves of his personality. It is, of course, true that Lenin showed him the way by developing the idea that the bourgeoisie, in backward and dependent countries, could collaborate in the revolution during a certain period. But Mao enormously enlarged the scope of this thesis. On the one hand, he extended the definition of the forces in Chinese society which might play a positive role to include, at certain times, not only the whole of the bourgeoisie ("compradores" as well as national bourgeoisie), but even "patriotic landlords." He has repeatedly affirmed, in a series of utterances stretching over the last 40 years, that 90 or 95 percent of the Chinese people were on the side of the revolution. Secondly, he has proclaimed that collaboration among the four classes (proletariat, peasantry, petty bourgeoisie, and national bourgeoisie) constituting the "people," as defined since 1949, can continue throughout the whole period of the socialist revolution until all class differences finally disappear. Even if, since 1955, this formula no longer corresponds to any significant reality, it has an important symbolic function. For if virtually all Chinese (except for a handful of reactionaries and traitors) are basically revolutionary, then in defending the cause of China one is in fact advancing the world revolution. This is clearly what Mao and his disciples do believe today.

Another key factor in Mao's thought is an insistence on the importance of changing the mentality of the Chinese people as an indispensable condition for the modernization of China. Although Mao is proud of the achievements of traditional Chinese culture, and although his own mind is deeply marked by traditional modes of thought, he has been, for nearly half a century, in violent revolt against the stifling effects of such Confucian principles as submission to the authority of the family or the notion that man should adapt himself to the forces of nature rather than seeking to dominate nature. For a brief period in his youth, his revolt against the tyranny of nature and authority took an individualist form. The idea of the emancipation of the individual has, of course, long since been subordinated in his thinking to that of the collective emancipation of the Chinese people, but he has never lost sight of the importance of the individual. The citizen must act in the way required by the exigencies of the system and the aims of the govern-

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ment, but at the same time he must act consciously and not merely by rote.

The revolution which Mao has undertaken to carry out in the mentality of his compatriots in order to fit the Chinese nation for survival in the modern world has two aspects which are summed up in the famous phrase "red and expert," used since the period of the "Great Leap Forward" to define the ideal of excellence in China today. On one hand, Mao wants his compatriots to be expert—that is, to master modern ways of thinking about nature and modern techniques for dealing with nature, as developed in the West. But on the other hand, he wants them to be "red"—that is, filled with revolutionary passion and animated by the conviction that the action of the masses can ultimately triumph over all objective difficulties. To use Mao's own language, the flagrant opposition between these two exigencies is no doubt the "principal contradiction" in his thought.

Mao's Leadership Style

The principal traits in Mao's leadership style grow out of his personality and experience. Perhaps the most important and most characteristic is linked to what I have called his "military romanticism." By this term, I mean to designate not only Mao's fondness for warfare as such, but his tendency to envisage political, economic, and even philosophical problems as forms of combat. It is in warfare, he declared in 1938, that men give the full measure of themselves. He would like to infuse the same qualities of heroism and drama into every aspect of human activity.

This attitude has naturally been shaped by Mao's twenty-year experience of guerrilla warfare, but it also corresponds to the orientation of his personality from the beginning. In the earliest authoritative document available, the article on physical culture which he published in 1917, he appears already as first and foremost a warrior. Mao's taste and talent for this type of pathos and this style of leadership were unquestionably of immense value to him in the course of the struggle for power. Since 1949, they have been of more dubious utility, at least as regards internal affairs. In the present context, when it is desired to mobilize the population, and to rely on China's own efforts and resources for modernization in the face of the denial of Soviet aid, this ethic may again be of some use; but at the same time, like the emphasis on "redness," it may be a hindrance to rational economic construction. There are apparently those in the Chinese Communist Party who realize this. Mao himself stated in 1958 that a certain number of comrades regarded the effort to make steel by relying on mass enthusiasm as a "guerrilla habit." But he has given no sign that he is capable, or even desirous, of modifying his personality and outlook.

For the rest, Mao's style of leadership is in large part a projection of the emphasis on conscious action which marks his thought as a whole. While Mao is resolved that all Chinese shall think alike, and think as he wishes, he wants them to do so spontaneously. To the outside observer, this ambition seems contradictory and absurd, but it is nevertheless a reality in Mao's mind. It perhaps reflects a nostalgia for the ideal of individual liberation which he espoused in his youth; most certainly, it is inspired by the belief that human beings act effectively only when they act with conviction.

Mao's recipe for achieving the desired combination of spontaneity and discipline consists, of course, in transforming the attitudes of his fellow-citizens by methods which vary considerably according to the situation at a given moment, the social category involved, and the aims pursued, but which can be broadly designated by the term "thought reform." As is well known, violence is by no means absent from the techniques employed to change the thinking of the Chinese, but it is a means rather than an end. Ideally, the citizens should not be kept in line indefinitely by sheer fear of police terror; terror is used, in conjunction with various methods of indoctrination, in order to transform their minds and personalities to such an extent that the desired modifications in their behavior will be enforced by internal rather than external sanctions.

This enterprise has so far been neither a total success nor a total failure. Terror and constraint are by no means absent from China today. "Mao Tse-tung's thought" has certainly not been adequately assimilated by all Chinese, and at various times, notably in the difficult years after the failure of the "Great Leap Forward," there has clearly been considerable opposition and hostility to the regime. But at the same time, there is probably more consensus, and less blind obedience, than in the Soviet Union at the corresponding stage in its development.

A technique related to Mao's emphasis on "conscious action," and to his desire to show that he enjoys the enthusiastic support of the masses, is his practice of allowing policy decisions to filter out at first only partially and indirectly, through

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anonymous newspaper editorials summarizing the essential points of his speeches and directives, and his parallel practice of publishing his own words only after a delay of weeks, months, or even years, during which an attempt is made to give the appearance that a movement is developing spontaneously. Examples of this aspect of his leadership style are legion. To cite only two, his speech of February 27, 1957, on the correct manner of resolving contradictions among the people was not published until June of that year, and then in a form revised to take account of the intervening developments; similarly, his speech on art and literature, delivered in May 1942, was not published until October 1943. To be sure, delays in the publication of important documents are not unknown in other countries, particularly the Soviet Union, but they are usually explicable in terms of a desire for secrecy rather than as a deliberate technique for encouraging apparently spontaneous action by the masses to give the impression that the regime is acting in harmony with the masses.

The Role of Intellectuals

"Intellectuals" is here understood in the sense usually employed in talking about Communist countries, that is, to mean any more or less educated and technically competent person. Mao's attitude toward this category is intimately bound up with his desire to effect a cultural revolution which will make the Chinese both "red" and "expert." As the carriers of expertness, intellectuals are indispensable if China is to be turned into a powerful modern nation. But in a great many instances expertness does not go hand in hand with redness, and those who are more red than expert may come into conflict with those who are more expert than red. For the moment, it is necessary to live with this "contradiction" in the reality of Chinese society—a contradiction which reflects a similar contradiction in Mao's thought. Though, on the whole, authority belongs to those who are "red," the hard lessons of 1959-61 have taught Mao and his colleagues that experts must have a certain amount of freedom to do their job. In the long run, however, such a compromise, such a sacrifice of principle to efficiency, is certainly intolerable to Mao. To admit that managers and engineers are (1) inherently skeptical, and (2) inclined to seek comfortable lives for themselves, to admit that they must be humored indefinitely to some extent in order to keep them working efficiently, would be for him the height of immorality—a surrender to that very restoration of capitalism which he denounces in the USSR and which he has declared must be fought to the bitter end in China itself.

As for intellectuals in the narrow sense of the word—writers, artists, philosophers, historians, etc.—Mao finds the dilemma even harder. More than average citizens, people in these categories must act consciously and with conviction if they are to play an effective role in society. At the same time, they cannot be allowed to plant "poisonous weeds" instead of flowers in the socialist garden. In the course of the past decade, Mao has repeatedly swung from one extreme to the other, from the liberalism of the "Hundred Flowers" to the extreme regimentation prevailing in recent years, in an effort to find a method of reconciling individual awareness with social harmony. It does not appear that a solution is in sight, but Mao is certainly not prepared to admit defeat. Whenever the choice is between stifling opposition, with force if necessary, and tolerating dissidence which challenges such basic principles of the regime as the predominance of the Communist Party, Mao will choose repression, as his reaction in the latter half of 1957 made perfectly clear. Yet he will never abandon his efforts to persuade people to believe what in his view they ought to believe, so as to avoid having to constrain them to act as though they believed it.

Mao and the World

It is perhaps in the field of global strategy that the interaction between revolutionary and nationalist impulses in Mao's personality weaves the most fascinating counterpoint. A decisive question that poses itself here is whether we are in fact dealing with only two factors, or with three. It is clear that Mao has three concentric loyalties: to China; to the liberation of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America; and to world revolution as the joint enterprise of the proletariat of the developed countries and the "oppressed peoples" of the underdeveloped countries. Should this concern with national liberation movements be regarded as a partially independent factor in Mao's thought? Or is it a projection of his commitment to Chinese nationalism, to world revolution, or to both? No doubt, it is all of these things at the same time. Mao's feeling of solidarity with other non-European peoples struggling against "imperialism" undoubtedly exists in its own right as a spontaneous reaction. But his formulation of the principle of

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solidarity, and his application of it, are shaped by both nationalist and revolutionary considerations. His attitude is marked by nationalism, because to support revolutionary movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America means to extend Chinese influence in these areas. It is transmuted and rendered more virulent by Mao's commitment to revolution everywhere as a value in itself.

But just how abstract and general is Mao's love of revolution? On the face of it, the anti-imperialist theme appears to be an example of perfect harmony between nationalist and revolutionary motives, for it is at once a basic tenet of Leninism and an emotional necessity for the peoples of Asia and Africa. Yet, though Mao has been a believer in Marxism-Leninism for some forty years and has had a fairly good knowledge of it for some twenty-five, it is not easy to say what this ideological commitment actually means to him. He has given us a clue by affirming: "There is no such thing as abstract Marxism, but only concrete Marxism. What we call concrete Marxism is Marxism that has taken on a national form. . . ." [2] If Mao now proposes to encircle the "cities" of Europe and America from the "countryside" of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, is this out of abstract devotion to world revolution—or to gain final revenge for the humiliation which, for over a century, the "cities" inflicted on the "countryside," and on China in particular? Does he really have a feeling of comradeship with the workers of Europe and the United States, and hope for their support at a later stage? Or does he regard them as hopelessly degenerate, cowardly, and *embourgeoisés*, paying lip service to their role in the world revolution only in order to give revolutionary legitimacy and wider appeal to an enterprise which in fact owes more to Chinese tradition than to Lenin?

Some clues regarding these questions can be obtained by considering the actual Chinese attitude toward the Soviet role in the world revolution and comparing it with the attitude that would result from a "leftist" position rooted in fidelity to the letter of Marxist doctrine. Recent Chinese statements do not merely criticize the Soviet leaders for their "revisionism" and betrayal of Marxist principles; they virtually exclude the Soviet Union from estimates regarding the future course of events. Mao and his comrades regularly denounce the Soviet Union for failing to support "national liberation" movements in Vietnam and elsewhere, but they show no signs of genuinely desiring such action on the part of Moscow, either now or in the future, for it might jeopardize their own professed position as the sole hope and sole guiding center of the oppressed peoples throughout the world. This attitude is in sharp contrast to that of Trotsky, who continued right to his death to denounce in the most scathing terms the "Thermidorean Reaction" existing under Stalin's dictatorship, but who nevertheless affirmed that the Soviet Union was a "workers' and peasants' state," however degenerate, and must therefore be supported in all circumstances. It seems clear than an ultra-leftist view inspired by doctrine alone would today take this same line, proclaiming that the Soviet Union, however timid and selfish its leadership, remains the principal bulwark of the "anti-imperialist" struggle on the world scene. If Mao does not reason in this way, it is because his view of the world is rooted less in theory than in emotion. The assault on "modern revisionism" is a Marxist-Leninist justification for Chinese resentment over the arrogant and high-handed treatment inflicted on China by the Soviet leaders and their refusal to be guided by Chinese counsels, just as anti-imperialism is the expression in ideological terms of resentment against the West.

This does not imply that Mao's ultra-revolutionary verbiage is *nothing* but a fig leaf for the visceral reactions of a Chinese and/or an Asian. In recent years, there has been a tendency, in the interpretation of Chinese communism and the Sino-Soviet dispute, to move from one extreme, which held that ideology was everything, to the opposite extreme, according to which it is nothing. As emphasized at the beginning of this article, I do not subscribe to either view. Nationalist and revolutionary impulses must both be taken into account. In terms of their relative weight, it seems clear that on the world scene, even more than in internal affairs, nationalist passion comes first and revolutionary ideology second. But ideology nevertheless serves a double and important function. It provides a justification in abstract terms for anti-western sentiment, and thereby makes it more virulent. And it dresses up Chinese experience and aspirations in a garb of universality, thereby making it possible for Mao to appeal not only to his compatriots but to the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America as a whole.

[2] Mao's report of October 1938, as translated in the author's *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung*, New York, Praeger, 1963, p. 114. (This passage has been removed from the current edition of Mao's *Selected Works*.)

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In both these roles, Mao's version of Leninism is effective to a certain, no doubt considerable, extent. But in both roles its ultimate effect is problematical. As regards the appeal to other non-European countries, the "Sinification" of Marxism, while bringing it closer to the traditions and experience of the Chinese, may make it more foreign to other peoples. Even more important in this respect than the Sinocentrism of Mao's thought is the Sinocentrism of his action. The open pursuit of specifically Chinese goals may produce a disillusionment on the part of other Asians and Africans anent the purity of Mao's anti-imperialist motives, doing even more to undermine his pretentions to universality than the citations from the Chinese classics with which Peking's ideological utterances are studded.

Is Mao's thinking about foreign policy sufficiently coherent and consistent at the present time to enable one to sum it up in a few clear sentences? I have already said that China is at the center of his world, and I have suggested that the advanced countries of Europe and North America play very little part in his calculations except as enemies to be struggled against or played off against one another. But how does Mao conceive of the relation between China and the other peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America? Does he regard Peking first and foremost as a revolutionary Mecca, even though, consciously or unconsciously, he may wish to propagate revolution primarily in order to increase Chinese influence in the world and not merely out of abstract devotion to "proletarian internationalism"? Or is he inspired by nostalgia for China's traditional position as an empire surrounded by client states?

In the long run, the two goals are obviously related in his mind, for only a Communist state (run, of course, by a genuine, non-revisionist Communist party) could be expected to maintain unwavering solidarity with China as the leader of the genuinely revolutionary forces in the world. But both the ideological line and the actual policies that Mao has pursued over the past fifteen years have tended to indicate that for a relatively long time he would be satisfied with "bourgeois" governments provided they were oriented toward Peking. Last fall's unsuccessful coup in Indonesia, it is true, raised new doubts on this score. If Peking wanted to overthrow Sukarno, the champion of the "New Emerging Forces," what non-Communist Asian or African leader, however revolutionary, could consider himself safe? The contradiction between this action and Mao's foreign policy as a whole is so flagrant, however, that one is led to wonder whether the Indonesian events were not in fact the result of a miscalculation inspired by Sukarno's very bad health rather than the first manifestation of a new ultra-left line in Peking. This interpretation is supported by China's consistent support of Marshal Ayub Khan's Pakistan as a revolutionary force in the world.

In fact, the foreign policy of Mao's China, like its domestic policy, suffers from an acute contradiction between the style and the substance. In internal affairs, a frantic insistence on the study of Mao Tse-tung's thought as the key to everything has recently gone hand in hand with a relatively realistic economic policy. In foreign affairs, the constant affirmation of implacable hostility to "US imperialism" has not led to any large-scale involvement in the Vietnamese conflict, and Mao appears to be guided primarily by considerations of Chinese interest and Chinese dignity. Of the two, dignity would appear to be the more important to him. But even this may conceivably be changing. An interesting and suggestive example is that of Chinese policy toward Cuba. At first sight, the clumsy and tactless handling of Fidel Castro would appear to reflect above all an exaggerated susceptibility to behavior which Peking judges to be disrespectful. But the decision to reduce sugar purchases may also have been motivated by a desire to bring China's foreign aid commitments into line with her economic capacity. Any such tendency to be guided at least in part by interests rationally understood rather than by nationalist passion or revolutionary zeal would be a hopeful development both for China and for the world.

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The Man and His Policies

By Arthur A. Cohen

The political thought of a national leader can be gauged accurately only from his political practice. The key operative factors in Mao's thought are, therefore, the operative factors in his policies.

Mao's policies suggest, first of all, his belief in the efficacy of the human will. He acts on the view that man's will, expressed by deliberate political intervention, is the effective determinant of all social change. This view is reflected in his Stalinist dictatorial rule and imposition of the revolution "from above," in his use of military action to attain political power and military discipline to retain that power, and in his present conviction that, as the only reliable agent of the redemptive Communist historical process in China, he can interfere in all areas of human activity.

Mao's belief in the energized will is revolutionary. That is, it is based on the non-Chinese doctrine of Lenin, who interpreted Marx as having emphasized the *conscious change* of physical reality. Mao has accepted Lenin's enormous stress (in *What is to be Done* and elsewhere) on the "conscious element" of one-party ideology. Today Mao's lieutenants attack the "practicism" of party cadres—the custom of conducting day-to-day work without regard to ideology, more specifically to the "thought of Mao Tse-tung," which alone is said to give that work a revolutionary meaning and the cadres a determination to prevail against all obstacles.[1]

Mao rejects the view that material conditions play the major role in determining change, and he plays down the importance of economic determinants. Marx, in his later years, had tried to achieve a balance between the objective blade (economic "productive forces") and the subjective blade ("man's will") of the dialectical scissors. However, Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin, among others, viewed the subjective blade as the sharper, regarding voluntarist man as the demiurge of revolution and social construction. For Mao, too, revolution must be stimulated rather than awaited, and the most difficult economic goals become attainable provided the will of the masses is mobilized ideologically and politically. His penchant for stressing man's will over material conditions often leads him into absurd extremism—*e.g.*, during the "Great Leap Forward" of 1958, when he tried to substitute highly "conscious" and regimented manpower for modern agricultural machinery, and millions of "revolutionized" backyard iron smelterers for rational professionals.

Mao's dedication to man's revolutionary will also has an ascetic aspect in his view that human nature is at its truest and most intelligible when vexed by

Mr. Cohen is an American student of Chinese Communist affairs and author of The Communism of Mao Tse-Tung (*Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1966*).

[1] CCP cadres are told that "Only when the red line of Mao's dialectical views runs through our thinking and practice can we continue to discover, invent, and create things and make progress." *Chieh-fang Jih-pao* (Shanghai), April 8, 1965.

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major difficulties. *Jen-min Jih-pao* (People's Daily) expressed this attitude clearly in the summer of 1960, shortly after Khrushchev ordered the withdrawal of Soviet technicians from China:

Where does revolutionary vigor come from? One generally acquires it when one is forced to deal with difficulties. . . . It also comes from being bullied. . . . Anger is a very good thing. Anger is a motive force leading to action. . . . If we have the revolutionary will and spirit of exerting ourselves, no difficulties can prevent our advance.[2]

If there can be said to be a Maoist philosophy of life, it is this: what matters most to a man's happiness is his activity in political and military contention. A young man is soft if he has not been tried in battle, and failure to sensitize youth to the continuing class struggle would open the way to national corruption. In Mao's view, struggle is not only a political goal; it is a desirable state—"struggle is happiness." [3]

Mao's concern with the preservation of the spirit of revolutionary struggle underlies his reversion in recent years to certain policies of the austere Yenan days. In particular, he has revived the concept of equalitarianism, which meshes well with his view that a spiritualized people should go on behaving as if they still were active revolutionaries, shunning material possessions and the satisfactions of an easy life. In contrast to Stalin's denunciation (in 1931) of the "leftist practice of wage equalization," Mao insists that wage differentials should be narrowed.[4] Departing also from the rank system introduced in the Soviet Red Army by Stalin and copied for a time in the Chinese Communist armed forces, Mao has reinstated the military equality of the Yenan period through the abolition of titles and insignia of rank in the People's Liberation Army on June 1, 1965. This is clearly intended to revive and preserve the revolutionary spirit of the PLA.

Mao's view that men are more important than weapons in war ties in nicely with his predisposition to stress will over matter. In recent years, he has extended this proposition to include even nuclear weapons, although his position on this point is not clearly spelled out and retains an element of equivocation. On first consideration, Mao's position seems to mean that nuclear weapons cannot kill *all* men and living things, nor can they destroy all Chinese on the mainland; hence China need not fear a nuclear attack.[5] This was the position he took with Nehru in 1954. On second consideration, however, Mao seems to be saying that nuclear weapons can kill "millions" and therefore, "If one must fight, one should confine oneself to conventional weapons." [6] Seen in this more subtle light, his position implies that since nuclear weapons are indeed massively destructive, Communist China should avoid provoking a nuclear attack against herself; but that indirect and limited involvement in small guerrilla-type wars is safe because nuclear weapons will not in fact be used.[7] Thus, Chinese Communist boasts that bayonets can "defeat" nuclear weapons are based on the assumption that the latter will not actually be used.

The Maoist dogma of the superiority of politically-awakened, voluntarist man over modern weapons has recently been raised to the level of a new irrationalism. The political indoctrination of PLA officers and men now revolves around the proposition that "the best weapon is not aircraft, artillery, tanks, or atom bombs, but the thought of Mao Tse-tung." [8]

The policies of Mao today seem to reflect an almost nostalgic desire to revive the climate of the early years of the Communist regime, when revolution "from above" and intensification of the class struggle sustained an atmosphere of national tension. Thus, efforts are being made to fabricate new targets of class struggle. For example, Mao has caused the establishment of "poor and lower-middle peasant associations" to discover and struggle against new "landlords" in the countryside—in effect, a partial return to the successful but bloody

[2] Aug. 13, 1960.

[3] This view is attributed to Mao by a writer in *Kung-jen Jih-pao* (Peking), July 22, 1964.

[4] "The system of high salaries for a small number of people should never be applied. The gap between the incomes of the working personnel of the party, the government, the enterprises, and the people's communes, on the one hand, and the incomes of the mass of people, on the other, should be rationally and gradually narrowed and not widened." *Jen-min Jih-pao*, July 14, 1964.

[5] This position is essential to Mao's effort not only to convince the United States that Communist China *does not* fear the American nuclear-weapons capability, but also to convince the Chinese and the PLA that they *should not* fear this capability.

[6] Interview with Edgar Snow, January 1965. *New Republic*, Feb. 27, 1965.

[7] "American imperialism cannot stop the people's revolutionary struggles [*i.e.*, small wars] of various countries by means of nuclear weapons. The reason is that, politically, recourse to this kind of weapon would place American imperialism in a position of extreme isolation and, militarily, the massive destructive power of nuclear weapons limits their use, for in civil wars and wars of national liberation, where the lines are zig-zag and the fighting is at close range, the use of nuclear weapons of mass destruction would inflict damage on both belligerents." *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Sept. 1, 1963.

[8] *Ibid.*, Jan. 3, 1966.

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land reform drive of 1950-52, in which associations of poor peasants were organized by the Communists to harass and execute landlords.[9] This backtracking suggests that Mao hopes to recreate the earlier atmosphere in which enthusiasm for all his programs was more easily stimulated. With the same end in view, he seeks to inject a military-like spirit of dedication and discipline into economic work:

All our economic, industrial, agricultural, and commercial departments must study the methods of the PLA, must establish and strengthen political work, and then, in this way, we can stimulate the revolutionary spirit of the millions and tens of millions of cadres and the masses on the entire economic front.[10]

In short, Mao is attempting to keep the minds of all Chinese artificially "revolutionized" in a situation where revolution no longer exists.

On the Intellectuals' Role

The role and function of an intellectual in "socialist" China is vastly different from that of his counterpart in Western democratic societies. Instead of acting as a critic who probes and exposes social and political evils, he is required to disengage himself decisively from personal beliefs based on "old" Chinese or on Western values, to become imbued with the thought of Mao, and to participate in the political process by accepting any party-assigned task that requires his mental ability and technical skill—as well as some tasks that do not.

Mao's distrust of intellectuals was made apparent in 1942 when he demanded a Leninist "political standard" and party spirit in literature and art.[11] In 1951, he linked the "ideological remolding" of intellectuals with the achievement of the regime's economic goals.[12] And in recent years, Stalin's idea of intensifying "class struggle" has formed the basis of Mao's program for "revolutionizing" the teaching of political theory as well as of philosophy and history.[13]

Active dissenters have been silenced. In July 1954, the writer Hu Feng dared to suggest that writers should not confine themselves to writing about workers, peasants, and soldiers (as Mao had directed in 1942), that they need not study Communist dogma, and that they should not be subjected to the degradation of thought reform. The party's response was to denounce him publicly as a "counterrevolutionary," to reject his public recantation, to compel his friends to surrender all personal letters written by him,[14] to dismiss him from all his posts, and to direct the Supreme People's Procurator to deal with his "crimes." He was arrested in 1955 and is either still in detention or has been executed. The ensuing arrests and persecution of other intellectuals on charges of being "counterrevolutionaries" underlined the Stalinist-Zhdanovite orientation of Mao's policy.

In 1956 and the first part of 1957, it is true, Mao departed from this policy in order to utilize the intellectuals as aides in the rectification of party cadres. In January 1956, Chou En-lai even suggested bringing more intellectuals into the CCP. But after the "hundred flowers" campaign suddenly revealed the reservoir of hatred for the CCP stored up among the intellectuals, Mao reverted once more to Stalinism. By June 1957, dissenters were being warned that "unless they fundamentally change their attitude toward socialism, they will become an utterly isolated, pitiable group."[15] Large-scale arrests and public denunciations of alleged "rightists" followed. Students of graduating classes in all schools of higher learning were subjected to stringent political investigation,[16] and ideological indoctrination was intensified throughout the school

[9] Chang P'ing-hua, first secretary of the Hunan Provincial CCP Committee, conceded in 1964 that Mao had revived the landlord-hunt of the early 1950's. See *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Nov. 2, 1964.

[10] *Hung Ch'i* (Peking), quoting Mao. March 31, 1964.

[11] *Speech at the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art*, May 1942.

[12] "The ideological remolding, first of all of the different types of intellectuals, is one of the most important conditions for completing our democratic reforms in various fields and for the gradual industrialization of our country." Mao's speech of October 23, 1951, in *People's China* (Peking), November 1, 1951.

[13] ". . . the teaching of political theory courses must not be separated at any time from realistic class struggle. . . . Teachers of political theory must teach in the manner of a proletarian warrior with strong class feelings . . ." (*Jen-min Jih-pao*, Dec. 17, 1964.) Philosopher Feng Yulan wrote: "I am beginning to realize that the study of the history of philosophy is a revolution." (*Hsin Chien She* [Peking], July 1965.) And the party's theoretical journal insisted that "there is no historical research which is above class." (*Hung Ch'i*, Dec. 6, 1965.)

[14] On May 13, 1955, *Jen-min Jih-pao* simultaneously published Hu's confession, an old associate's criticism of Hu as anti-Communist, and an editorial note warning other associates to turn in all letters written by Hu "rather than retain or burn them."

[15] *Jen-min Jih-pao*, June 12, 1957.

[16] This policy was formalized by a directive of the State Council issued on July 17, 1957. Suspect students were placed on probation for "observation" periods of up to three years, during which they engaged in physical labor while undergoing thought reform. Students classified as "counterrevolutionary" were sent to labor camps for "reform through labor." New China News Agency (NCNA) report, July 19, 1957.

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system. Nor did the regime hesitate to use more ruthless forms of Stalinist intimidation to stamp out student unrest. On September 6, 1957, Peking announced that three leaders of a student demonstration at Wuhan in June had been executed.

As the "anti-rightist" campaign progressed, Mao's chief policy spokesman in intellectual affairs, Lu Ting-i, emphasized the need to build up a new body of intellectuals of "laboring-class origin" instead of relying primarily on "remolding" the existing ones of bourgeois background. At the same time, the latter were warned that mere passive acquiescence was not enough:

As the tide of socialist revolution sweeps forward, it is wrong and indeed impossible to "act cautiously to save one's skin," to "come to terms with the present," or to "straddle the fence." There is only one way, and that is to accept socialist transformation actively.[17]

The problem of dealing with the intellectuals was closely reexamined at the Third Plenum of the CCP Central Committee in September 1957. Pointing to intellectuals of bourgeois origin as "the main force that can challenge the proletariat," Central Committee Secretary-General Teng Hsiao-ping said that their mental transformation might take ten years, and he therefore reiterated the necessity of recruiting a new body of intellectuals from among the workers and peasants so that the CCP would have its "own" reservoir of reliable technical cadres, professors, teachers, scientists, writers, and Marxist theorists. He complained that hitherto the party had relied on too many intellectuals "who had not participated in productive labor nor been steeled in actual struggle," and he urged that intellectuals henceforth be required to participate in physical labor—a policy which had already been instituted only for party cadres.[18]

The renewed Stalinist line in literature and art was laid down in early 1958 by CCP cultural spokesman Chou Yang, who assailed individualism as "the root of all evil" and admonished literary workers to make a complete break "with traditional ideas."[19] At the same time, all intellectuals were directed to engage in a movement of "self-transformation," which was duly set in motion on February 24, 1958, by a resolution of 17 scientists in Shanghai, who challenged their colleagues to become truly "red" experts. This example was dutifully followed by other non-Communist members of the intelligentsia, who pledged to transform themselves into "laboring-class intellectuals who would be ideologically socialist and professionally expert." This policy was the forerunner of the "red and expert" movement of the early 1960's.

Plus Ca Change . . .

The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party notes that the literary journals *Zvezda* and *Leningrad*, published in Leningrad, are conducted in an entirely unsatisfactory manner.

In the journal *Zvezda* in recent times, along with significant and successful works by Soviet writers, ideologically harmful works have appeared. The gross mistake of *Zvezda* is the placing of a literary tribune at the disposal of the writer Zoshchenko, whose works are alien to Soviet literature. The fact is well known to the editors of *Zvezda* that for a long time Zoshchenko has specialized in writing shallow, empty and vulgar stories, in preaching decadent banality and neutrality in ideology and politics, designed to confuse and poison the consciousness of our youth. . .

—From Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee, published in Partinaia Zhizn (Moscow), No. 1, 1946.

Art and Literature, the only art and literary magazine in Peking City, had become the tool of Teng T'o and his black gang . . . and was used to criticize the present by means of the past. . . . The magazine used poet Tu Fu's story [Tu Fu, the famous T'ang dynasty poet] to oppose viciously the party and socialism. . . . It described what Tu Fu saw on his way home: "People were so miserable that they cried and wept everywhere". . . . The editor permitted only anti-party, anti-socialist elements to release poison from the magazine he controlled . . .

—From Jen-min Jih-pao (Peking), May 20, 1966.

[17] Speech by Li Wei-han, published in *Kuang-ming Jih-pao* (Peking), Nov. 16, 1957.

[18] *Report on the Rectification Campaign* (Sept. 23, 1957). Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1957.

[19] *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Feb. 28, 1958. This was a revised version of a speech delivered by Chou before the Union of Chinese Writers in September 1957.

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Thus, by the time the regime was ready to launch its grandiose "Great Leap Forward" and commune programs, the intellectuals, including scientific and technical personnel, had been cowed into submission or silenced, and they accepted the economic irrationalities of those programs without overt protest. They were simply expected to bow to the infallibility of Mao's leadership in these as in all other matters, regardless of whatever doubts they might feel about the viability of the commune system or the economic wisdom of producing steel in backyard blast-furnaces.

Following the disastrous economic reverses caused by the excesses of the Leap and the communes, the more rational policies of retreat pursued during 1959-62 allowed the intellectuals a modest degree of freedom to express their views on technical (*i.e.*, non-political) matters. This temporary relaxation, however, was jettisoned by the Tenth Plenum of the CCP Central Committee in September 1962, and brainworkers were again subjected to intensified indoctrination and political controls. By the spring of 1963, Mao again called for the building of a new intelligentsia, a "large detachment of laboring-class intellectuals who serve socialism and who are both 'red and expert,' *i.e.*, who are both politically conscious and professionally competent." [20] This statement obviously implied that the regime had not yet succeeded in developing a new, "laboring-class" intelligentsia in adequate numbers to meet its needs, or else that it was not confident that the rising generation of intellectuals was sufficiently dedicated to its goals.

For the intellectuals on the mainland today, there remains no feasible alternative to accepting any task assigned them by the party and undergoing intense indoctrination and rigid political control if they wish to advance themselves in China's "socialist" society. Thus, the "great majority" of postgraduate research fellows admitted to advanced mainland research facilities in 1964 (1,200 in all) were members of either the CCP or the Young Communist League.[21] Mao's insistence on politicizing even scientific and technical research [22] may not detract from the technical competence of Chinese scientists to any serious extent, but because the mandatory study of Maoist political doctrine necessarily eats into their research time, many of them may well agree—at least tacitly—with the denounced philosopher, Feng Ting, that "class struggle is a waste of human labor and spirit." [23]

On Mao's Political Style

While Mao is certainly no less of a totalitarian dictator than Stalin was, he appears to have softened the latter's methods of wielding power in two respects. First, whereas Stalin imposed his will mainly by means of brute force and physical terror, Mao has relied to a significantly greater degree on mental suasion—*i.e.*, on periodic campaigns to "rectify" and cleanse the thoughts of party members. Secondly, though Mao has crossed "the blood line" (departing from Lenin's dictum on avoiding physical violence against comrades), he has generally been less vindictive than Stalin in dealing with opponents or rivals within the party leadership, permitting some of them to live out their lives as political corpses and "living lesson-books."

The first party "rectification" movement in the early 1940's was a relatively mild affair, but it was enough to create an environment of tension which the party leadership has—except during the brief interlude from 1956 to mid-1957—deliberately sought to sustain. "Criticism and self-criticism" were applied on a massive scale to stifle opposition and increase cohesion, and Stalinist terminology was Sinified by citing Confucius and Mencius on the need for "self-examination." Liu Shao-ch'i called for "Bolshevik toleration" in handling errant comrades but also demanded vigilance in sifting out enemy agents from the party." [24]

In the second party "rectification" movement of 1950-53, the "cleansing" of improper thoughts and behavior through the methods of criticism and self-criticism was again emphasized, but there was

[20] *Jen-min Jih-pao*, July 14, 1964.
[21] NCNA report, Oct. 22, 1964.
[22] On the place of ideology in scientific work, see articles in *Hung Ch'i*, Oct. 1, 1964, and Jan. 6, 1965; and *Jen-min Jih-pao*, June 4, 1965. According to *Hung Ch'i* (Jan. 6, 1965), "in class society, the science laboratory definitely is not a 'separate world of peace' isolated from class struggle, and scientists and technicians cannot be 'detached scholars' standing outside the class struggle."
[23] *Hung Ch'i* (Nov. 21, 1964) attributed this remark to Feng, who was also attacked for suggesting a non-revolutionary way of life. "The kind of life advocated by Comrade Feng Ting, which would provide good things to eat and wear, good places to live in, and cordial relations between husband and wife and between parents and children, does not conform to the Communist ideal." *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien* (Peking), Oct. 31, 1964.
[24] Liu Shao-ch'i, *On the Innerparty Struggle* (July 1941); and *Liquidate the Menshevik Ideology in the Party* (July 1943).

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also a threat of sterner measures against "those who have great defects and are unwilling to correct them even after receiving education." [25] Participation in criticism meetings was virtually mandatory, and accusations were often irresponsible and unfounded. Nevertheless, An Tzu-wen, director of the Central Committee's organization department, cited Stalin to the effect that "even if criticism is only 5-10 percent true, one must accept it . . ." [26] The rectification drive resulted in large-scale expulsions from the party, followed by some arrests and even some executions of party members. The rationalization for crossing "the blood line" was that the culprits had "lost their party stand," "betrayed the party and state," and become transformed into "criminals." [27]

Under the influence of destalinization in the Soviet Union, the third "rectification" launched in April 1957 began quite differently from its predecessors—that is, as a bold attempt to improve the party's popular image by inviting non-Communists to participate in criticizing the "work style" of party cadres in the spirit of Mao's "hundred flowers" slogan. This move apparently reflected Mao's confidence that it was now safe to risk outside criticism of the party as a means of building closer ties with the masses. At the same time, the methods of rectification within the party were to be softened: *i.e.*, "large-scale criticism or struggle meetings" were to be replaced by "comradely heart-to-heart talks" and fair-minded "exchanges of views between individuals." [28] In short, Mao was prepared to experiment with non-fanatical procedures for enforcing purity in the party ranks.

The unexpected outburst of violent anti-party criticisms from outsiders, however, impelled Mao to turn back to Stalinism. Party instructors who had been told to deal with critics in "comradely" fashion were now suddenly accused of molly-coddling "betrayers" of the party; they were criticized for being "tenderhearted towards certain veteran party members who should have been classified as rightists . . . men who had changed their nature, betrayed the party . . . and who are not worthy of our pity." [29] Liberally-inclined cadres were warned "to realize that this party of ours is a revolutionary fighting organ, not a sentimental faction." [30]

The latest process of "rectification" within the CCP has been going on since 1963. It involves a rigorous weeding-out of cadres lacking in revolutionary consciousness, a thought-cleansing of others, and close surveillance and control over all who are retained. One method of surveillance utilizes peasant informers to watch and criticize the behavior of suspect cadres in the rural areas.[31] By early 1965, cadres were complaining that these peasant policemen had reduced their authority in day-to-day operations.[32] Nevertheless, in October 1965 there was a purge of county-level cadres accused of lacking proper revolutionary motivation,[33] and by January 1966 their places were filled by "outstanding young cadres" promoted to local party committee posts as secretaries and deputy secretaries.[34]

Regarding Mao's "style" in purging high-ranking party leaders, it is worth noting that, ever since Khrushchev's 1956 revelations of Stalin's brutal treatment of CPSU opponents, Mao has removed his own Politburo antagonists without naming them publicly. But like Stalin, he has not hesitated to cover up his own mistakes by making scapegoats of associates whose main offense was that they had been right when Mao and his radical followers were wrong. Thus, certain members of the leadership were purged in 1959, apparently because they had dared to criticize Mao's Great Leap and communes programs of 1958 as "unrealistic" and "utopian." [35] Events proved these critics right, but it was they who were purged, while other leaders who reaffirmed their support of Mao were rewarded with better positions in the official hierarchy. For example, Lin Piao, who made a highly unusual public

[25] *Jen-min Jih-pao*, July 1, 1950.
[26] *Ibid.*, Feb. 12, 1953.
[27] An Tzu-wen, in *Jen-min Jih-pao*, July 1, 1953.
[28] CCP Central Committee directive on "rectification," dated April 27, 1957, *Jen-min Jih-pao*, May 1, 1957.
[29] *Jen-min Jih-pao*, September 11, 1957.
[30] *Ibid.*
[31] In a report of June 1964, Hu Yao-pang revealed the employment of poor-peasant contingents "to conduct supervision over cadres and prevent some of them from degenerating." *Jen-min Jih-pao*, July 7, 1964.
[32] Seymour Topping dispatch from Hong Kong, *The New York Times*, March 28, 1965.
[33] *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Oct. 11, 12, and 13, 1965.
[34] According to *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Jan. 20, 1966), the new incumbents were promoted because of "vigorous revolutionary spirit and zealous effort in their work and in studying and applying Chairman Mao's works."
[35] See communique on the 8th Plenum of the CCP Central Committee, *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Aug. 26, 1959. That Mao's 1958 policies encountered such opposition within the party leadership may also be inferred from defensive statements which appeared in the party press, such as *Jen-min Jih-pao*'s denial (Dec. 21, 1958) that the policies were "utopian" and *Hung Ch'i*'s insistence (Jan. 1, 1961) that Mao's attitude in 1958 had been "realistic."

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pledge of allegiance to Mao, was elevated to the post of Defense Minister.[36]

The CCP leadership is "collective" only in the sense that Mao's lieutenants are collectively responsible to him. In this respect, he appears to wield substantially greater internal party authority than the present top Soviet leaders. His policy blunders have not weakened his dominant position, and his craving for adulation as reflected in the unabated continuation of the "cult of Mao" has not been effectively criticized in the party.

The Cult of Mao

A revolutionary leader like Comrade Mao Tse-tung, who has undertaken such protracted, complex, acute and many-sided struggles, is rare in history, just as Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin were. . . . The thought of Mao Tse-tung is Marxism-Leninism inherited and developed with genius, creatively, and in an all-around way . . . it is the summit of Marxism-Leninism in the present era; it is living Marxism-Leninism at its highest. Comrade Mao Tse-tung is the greatest Marxist-Leninist of the present era.

—Jen-min Jih-pao (Peking), July 1, 1966.

WUHAN—Chairman Mao Tse-tung, the great leader of the Chinese people, was relaxed and easy as he again swam in the Yangtze River here on July 16, 1966, braving winds and waves. . . .

Starting from near the mouth of the Wuchang dikes, Chairman Mao swam downstream to cover a distance of almost 15 kilometers. When he boarded the boat, he was vigorous and showed no signs of fatigue.

The great event . . . stirred the hearts of all people. The cheering of "Long Live Chairman Mao!" on both banks lasted well over four hours. This moving scene was expressive of the infinitive love and respect of the Chinese people for their great leader, Chairman Mao. Under the guidance of the brilliant thought of Mao Tse-tung, the 700 million Chinese people train their eyes on the future and are riding the wind and breaking the waves on their forward advance!

—From New China News Agency account of Mao's swim, as broadcast in English from Peking, July 25, 1966.

On Mao's World Outlook

Mao's foreign policy is distinctively centered on promoting international tension and revolutionary armed struggle.[37] This militant orientation has obliged the Soviet leaders to sustain a certain degree of hardness in their own foreign policy, primarily as a hedge against Mao's accusations of revolutionary softness. It has prevented a Sino-American accommodation and has encouraged radical-minded Communists in some of the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America to launch or carry on small guerrilla wars. It has hamstrung efforts to develop peaceful international relations and to reduce East-West hostility from the level to which it was raised by Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin.

Mao's stand in regard to "wars of national liberation" is so extreme that it made Khrushchev's position appear moderate by comparison.[38] When, in the fall of 1959, Khrushchev recognized the peaceful intentions and "sober-mindedness" of the US leadership, Mao and his lieutenants insisted that Washington's professed desire to relax tension was only a ruse designed to undercut popular revolutionary movements. And in response to Khrushchev's warning against "testing by force the stability of the capitalist system" (September 1959), the Chinese asserted that revolutionaries are not cowards, and that the specter of a *major* war must not be raised to discourage insurrectionists from conducting *small* wars. They insisted that Lenin was right in holding revolutionary wars against imperialist powers to be inevitable.

[36] Lin pledged the "unconditional loyalty of the PLA to the party and Comrade Mao Tse-tung" against the opposition of the "right opportunists." (*Jen-min Jih-pao*, Sept. 31, 1959.) P'eng Te-huai, who probably led this opposition, was not named.

[37] According to Chilean Communist sources, Chinese leaders in Peking told visiting Latin American Communists in 1959 that international tension was useful for furthering revolutionary struggles. See Harry Gelman, "The Sino-Soviet Conflict: A Survey," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1964.

[38] In January 1961, Khrushchev was obliged to make some concessions to Mao's position to the extent of admitting that armed uprisings must occur in some instances. Mao insists, however, that they must occur sooner or later in every case. Despite the Soviet concession, Moscow still places far less emphasis than Peking on the need for small wars in underdeveloped areas, and far more emphasis upon alternative methods of influencing events in those areas. See Harry Gelman: "Russia, China, and the Underdeveloped Areas," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, September 1963, p. 136.

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While Mao has acknowledged that "peaceful coexistence" may be possible at times between socialist and imperialist countries, Peking denies that coexistence means termination of anti-imperialist struggles; on the contrary, it holds that such struggles (through positive support of anti-imperialist "wars of liberation" in Asia, Africa and Latin America) must continue wherever possible.[39] This policy, of course, clearly reflects Communist China's national interest. The Peking regime finds itself forced to recognize that it cannot challenge superior American military power in the Far East directly; hence, it seeks to stimulate pressures on the United States *elsewhere* through revolutionary wars whose cumulative effect, the Chinese hope, will be to weaken and diffuse "imperialist" strength. As Marshal Lin Piao put it in his widely-publicized statement of Maoist world strategy in September 1965, when imperialism is "hard-pressed in one place, it must loosen its grip in others." [40]

For waging the kind of localized revolutionary wars which Peking seeks to encourage, Mao claims to have provided the formula *par excellence* in the doctrine of "people's war." Though the North Vietnamese Communists have also claimed their own share of credit for devising and "creatively applying" "the military art of people's war," [41] Chinese Communist spokesmen have jealously defended Mao's position as the sole originator of and pre-eminent authority on this form of military strategy and tactics. In his statement cited above, Marshal Lin Piao reaffirmed that the doctrine of "people's war" was "formulated" by Mao, that it is valid for revolutionary wars "throughout the world," and that the present conflict in Vietnam is merely "the most convincing example" of the use of Mao's doctrine to defeat superior forces.[42]

Yet Peking's efforts to propagate Maoist dogmas as a revolutionary guide for the peoples of the underdeveloped world have hardly produced any resounding successes—and in some instances have even boomeranged by arousing anti-Chinese suspicion. The Congo rebels have not proven these dogmas applicable to a faction-ridden newly-established government. Underdeveloped conditions in Africa do not necessarily mean revolutionary conditions, and the leaders of more and more of the newborn African states are now becoming wary of Maoist influences. They have not joined a Peking-led united front against Soviet "revisionism" and US "imperialism," nor did Afro-Asian leaders follow Sukarno out of the United Nations. The Indonesian Communists' ill-timed and ill-executed coup, apparently encouraged by Peking, did not move Indonesia farther into Peking's camp; on the contrary, it turned the clock back ten years in Sino-Indonesian relations and led to the virtual obliteration of the Indonesian Communist Party as a political ally. More recently, even Castro has spoken out in criticism of Peking.[43]

Mao's response to these setbacks has not been that of a man willing to revise his calculations in the light of realities, but rather that of a dogmatic old revolutionary who insists that his lieutenants rationalize all failures. Thus, Chou En-lai tried to imply that recent Chinese reverses abroad were the result of spontaneous shifts in national alignments, avoiding the obvious fact that some of these shifts were stimulated by Mao's revolutionary hard line. "The world," said Chou vaguely, "is going through a process of great upheaval, great division, and great reorganization." [44] Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi also resorted to circumlocution in saying that "adverse currents have appeared in certain areas of Asia and Africa," adding that the road of revolution "is never straight; it is bound to be wave-like." [45]

The plain fact is that so long as Mao and his lieutenants retain revolutionary goals as the core of their foreign policy, their diplomatic efforts will be impeded. Revolution and diplomacy simply do not mix well. This contradiction was unwittingly underlined by the Chinese themselves in the fall of 1965 when they sought to reassure certain African and Middle Eastern leaders that the common enemy "at present" is "imperialism," and that Peking does not call for "socialist" (*i.e.*, Communist-led) revolution *in the present historical stage.*[46] This quali-

[39] "The socialist countries are able to coexist peacefully with the imperialist countries at particular times through struggle, and through struggle alone; and what is more, sharp complex struggles *continue under conditions of peaceful coexistence.*" *Hung Ch'i*, April 30, 1965. (Emphasis added.)

[40] *Ibid.*, Sept. 3, 1965.

[41] See *Hoc Tap* (Hanoi), September 1964. North Vietnam's top military leader, General Vo Nguyen Giap, has published a book entitled *People's War, People's Army*, which the Chinese Communists have studiously avoided praising—or even mentioning.

[42] *Loc. cit.*

[43] Castro directed some thinly-veiled barbs at the Chinese in his speeches of October 3, 1965, and January 2, 1966, but spoke out most bluntly in his speech of February 6, 1966.

[44] *Jen-min-Jih-pao*, Nov. 30, 1965.

[45] Interview with correspondent of the Japanese Communist newspaper *Akahata*, Dec. 30, 1965.

[46] *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Oct. 28, 1965.

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fication as to the timing of Communist revolution obviously defeats the diplomatic intention to give reassurance, tending to heighten rather than assuage the suspicions of non-aligned leaders regarding Peking's future aims in their countries. If Mao continues to insist on the ultimate goal of Communist revolution (however veiled by qualifications or Aesopian language), distrust and suspicion of Peking's diplomacy will inevitably increase among the nonaligned nations.

On "Chineseness" vs. Marxism-Leninism

The most that may plausibly be said about the confluence of "personality" and thought in a man's formative years is that "personality" predisposes an individual to be receptive to certain ideas and to reject others, and to embrace ideas either fanatically or dispassionately. It is a questionable proposition that ideas can shape a man's "personality" (passions, impulses, and idiosyncrasies), though it is credible that "personality" may incline a man toward certain ideas. In any case, the word "personality" cannot be stretched so as to stress unconscious motives—a mystical flight—at the expense of conscious and deliberate political thought and practice. Although we can directly perceive and provide valid evidence for Mao's personal predisposition to glorify guerrilla warfare, to make revolution an operative factor in foreign policy, and to nourish a Stalinist cult exalting his own qualities of leadership, we are denied full access to the darker realm of an individual's psyche where the light of purposive reflection does not directly penetrate.

In addition to the problem of "personality," the question poses a further difficulty in referring to "Chinese" components without defining the meaning of this term. It would be simplistic to say that Mao's communism is "Chinese" because he is. It would be declamatory rather than evidential analysis to hold that Mao's inflexible policies are influenced by the Chinese Legalist tradition, and his more flexible policies by Taoist and Yin-Yang relativism.

It would be more accurate, in the author's view, to say that the *operative* traditional component in Mao's thought is chauvinism. There is considerable valid evidence suggesting that national resentment, or national egotism, is an active element in Mao's foreign policy and in his view of foreigners and their cultures. As for its early integration with Communist concepts in China, I agree with Professor Schwartz's statement that "while Marxism has been accepted in Russia in its original cosmopolitan garb, Marxism-Leninism was widely received in China only after it had already been bent to the uses of a resentful nationalism." [47]

Turning to certain other factors, it is true that the Confucian idea of moral "self-examination" has been used by the CCP to impose discipline and improve cohesion in the party ranks, but it is swallowed up by the central political purpose of Leninist-Stalinist "criticism and self-criticism." Heavily stressed rote-learning and numerical sloganeering are traditionally Chinese in style, but in substance they are techniques for conveying the content of Leninist-Stalinist political directives. Peasant revolt is also traditional in China, but an elite party possessed of its own apparatus of revolutionary power and its own doctrine of world revolution is a nontraditional political organization.

Finally, the question avoids the matter of the specifically Stalinist—as distinguished from Marxist-Leninist—components in Mao's practice. Aside from explicit CCP statements regarding Mao's study of Stalin's policies and his role as Stalin's "comrade-in-arms," [48] Mao's practice indicates the extent of his debt to the Soviet dictator. For example, the propagation of an extreme cult of Mao's personality, thought, and words,[49] the imposition on the CCP of an elaborate and rigid system of bureaucratic controls (and through the party on the PLA), and the continuing use of forced-labor camps in China [50]—these practices bear an unmistakable resemblance to the self-centered and apparatus-oriented methods of Stalin.

Most political action is guided by some conception of what is good for society and the most efficacious means of achieving it. Mao or any other political leader has to be judged not solely by his desire (or motive) to achieve certain goals, but also by the practice, or means, he accepts as valid for advancing toward them. It would be an exercise in creative imagination to speak primarily of Mao's "motives" and sincerity, while underrating his practice and policies. The latter can be documented.

[47] Benjamin I. Schwartz, "The Intelligentsia in Communist China," in *Daedalus* (Cambridge), Summer 1960, p. 618.

[48] Mao is depicted thus in *Jen-min Jih-pao*, April 3, 1953.

[49] "Chairman Mao's words are words at the highest level, with the highest authority, having the greatest force, true to the last word, and each word equals the strength of 10,000 words of others." *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Jan. 3, 1966.

[50] A former Chinese Communist security officer reported in 1962 on the number of prisoners in several camps in Heilungkiang Province. See Chao Fu, *Djakarta Daily*, Dec. 29, 1962.

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Commentaries

Stalinism or "Chineseness"

By Benjamin Schwartz

At first glance, one is struck by the wide area of agreement between Mr. Cohen and Mr. Schram. Both stress the overriding importance of nationalism in Mao's vision of the world. Both agree on the extreme (recently well-nigh hysterical) stress on the "subjective," "conscious" factor in Maoism. Both point to the Maoist propensity to view the whole of human existence as a kind of military engagement. Their account of China's present posture in the world arena and their assessment of its prospects in the immediate future are remarkably similar.

What, then, is the point at issue? Presumably it concerns the source of these components of Maoism. Mr. Cohen seems to insist on subsuming most of them under the category of Stalinism, while Mr. Schram seems to stress their "Chineseness." Yet a close scrutiny of both statements indicates that neither has fully committed himself to the proposition that Chinese realities can be wholly comprehended within the possibilities offered by these alternatives. Mr. Cohen does not derive Mao's nationalism from Stalinism (as he might conceivably have done). On the contrary, he sees in Mao's chauvinism "the only operative traditional component in Mao's thought," while Mr. Schram (more accurately, it seems to me) states that "Mao's 'Chineseness' is not the same thing as his nationalism." However one defines nationalism, it is a force which cannot very easily be confined in the box of either Stalinism or "Chineseness."

Both Mr. Cohen and Mr. Schram emphasize the obsessive hold of the Yenan experience—or rather the canonization of this experience in the writings of Mao—on the thinking of the Maoist group. Yet the Yenan experience cannot be reduced to an abstract category. It was a concrete historic constellation—a concrete historic moment. It was certainly "Chinese," but if the word "Chineseness" refers to the whole *Gestalt* of traditional Chinese culture, its relationship to that culture was problematic and complex. Similarly, while Stalinism enters into the experience, few would now say that it was nothing but a case of applied Stalinism.

In spite of all these complications (implicitly acknowledged by both authors), there is a persistent tendency on the part of Mr. Cohen to comprehend most of the "operative factors" of Maoism under the metric of Stalinism. Without for a moment denying that the practice and formulas of Stalin have played a crucial role in the historic development of Chinese communism, the question remains whether the term "Stalinism," with its particular cluster of associations, provides us with the best guide for understanding the recent history of Communist China or for projecting the future. Until fairly recently the insistence that the Chinese Communists were essentially Stalinists bore with it a plethora of implications. It implied that the Sino-Soviet alliance was firm and monolithic. It implied a wholesale and slavish application of the specific Stalinist model of political and economic development. It implied a continued acknowledgment of Stalin's ideological preeminence. None of

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these implications is any longer valid. What the term now seems to imply in general is a tendency toward extremism, harshness, and obtrusive totalitarianism.

Extremism and totalitarianism, however, also have their modalities. It can indeed be argued that in some areas the Chinese have gone far beyond anything anticipated by Stalin. If Stalin kept Soviet literature in a tight vise, the Chinese at the moment seem to be making a frontal assault on the very notion of the eminent individual author and the accepted forms of literary production. If Stalin's terror and purges created a sense of insecurity among his professionals, managers and experts, he nevertheless nurtured and even pampered them, while Mao and his closest disciples seem to find it difficult to reconcile themselves to any concept of a role for the expert and professional. If Lenin and Stalin both emphasized the "subjective blade," they still would be quite astonished by the present Chinese doctrine that the prolonged existence of a "socialist" social structure is powerless to shape the minds of men unless accompanied by a frenzied, unremitting thought reform campaign. When one carries a tendency beyond anything anticipated by the original proponents, is one continuing the tradition or diverging from it?

While agreeing entirely with Mr. Cohen that one cannot understand present Chinese communism without reference to the evolution of Marxist-Leninist communism, one still wonders about the insistence on the term "Stalinism." It encourages the belief that one can comprehend the specificities of current developments in China by looking back to the Soviet Union of the 1930's. It also fosters the misconception that the modalities of "extremism" and "moderation" in the Communist world of the 1960's can be understood in terms borrowed from the 1930's and 1940's, and thus obscures the titanic, unprecedented crisis now taking place in that world.

On the side of "Chineseness," Mr. Schram does not imply, I take it, that all of Mao's ideas are simply based on unconscious habits of thought and behavior derived from the culture of the past. He explicitly acknowledges both the Leninist and nationalist components of Maoism, and does not attribute either to the Chinese past. Many of the factors he discusses derive, as noted above, not from the millenial culture of China but from the specific history of China in the 20th century; these factors are "Chinese," but they are rooted in a period of enormous cultural crisis. As Mr. Schram has indicated, however, both predispositions inherited from the cultural past and the imperatives of China's "objective" situation have certainly combined to form the style and substance of communism in China and will no doubt continue to do so in ways unanticipated by Mao himself. Marxism—Leninism, "Chineseness," the imperatives of modernization, the impact of external events—all have entered into the shaping of events, but the present cannot be traced in simple lines to any of them. There can be no substitute for a concrete study of the specificities of the living present.

The Need for a Redefinition

By Mostafa Rejai

I can take no exception to the treatment by Messrs. Cohen and Schram of Mao's view of the role of the intellectuals, his leadership "style," and his approach to international politics. Their analyses of the key operative elements in Mao's thought and the relationship between its "Chinese" and "Leninist" components, on the other hand, present certain difficulties.

The only element of Mao's thought on which Messrs. Cohen and Schram appear to agree relates to the necessity of creating and perpetuating Communist revolutionary enthusiasm among the Chinese people. Beyond this, Mr. Cohen stresses Mao's "chauvinism" and his belief in the primacy of the "political" and the efficacy of the "energized will,"

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while Mr. Schram emphasizes Mao's "populism" and "nationalism." [1] There is, admittedly, substantial evidence to support the validity of each of the operative elements identified by Messrs. Cohen and Schram, but the point that needs to be stressed is that neither individually nor collectively do these elements serve to set Mao clearly apart from other expositors of communism. Messrs. Cohen and Schram do not specify *that* aspect of Mao's thought which is *distinctively* "Maoist," in contrast to those aspects which may be "Leninist," "Stalinist," and so forth. In what way, for example, does Mao's "nationalism" (or even "chauvinism") set him apart from, say, Stalin? In what manner does Mao's "voluntarism," his faith in the "energized will," represent a development, say, of Lenin's formulation of "revolutionary situation"? In what sense can one distinguish Mao's "populism" from very similar notions developed by Lenin and Stalin? In short, while the operative elements identified by Messrs. Cohen and Schram throw considerable light on the thought of Mao Tse-tung, they do not bring out that feature of his thought which is uniquely "Maoist."

It must be said in fairness that at two points Mr. Cohen hints at what I believe to be the distinguishing characteristics of the thought of Mao, but unfortunately he does not develop them. In the opening paragraph of his paper, he implies a close relationship between Mao's thought and practical policies. This suggests an important (perhaps *the* most important) feature of "Maoism," namely, the constant interplay between philosophy and action. Beyond this, Mr. Cohen makes reference to what he terms the "Maoist philosophy of life," defined as an obsessive preoccupation with contention and struggle. This, I would suggest, brings into focus the centrality in Mao's thought of the concept of "contradiction."

These two points—both involving Marxist philosophy—provide the basis for delineating what to me is the special feature of the thought of Mao. It is striking that neither Mr. Cohen nor Mr. Schram pays any attention to the importance of Marxist philosophy in Mao's thinking. Mr. Schram merely notes, for example, that "though Mao has been a believer in Marxism-Leninism for some forty years . . ., it is not easy to say what this ideological commitment actually means to him." In my view, what is unique about Mao's revolutionary thinking is that it is underscored by a distinctive approach to Marxist philosophy.

The thought of Mao Tse-tung, I would submit, is not sheer ideology. For Mao, Marxism-Leninism comprises a series of precepts—social, political, military, economic, *and* ideological—all of which are fused together in an overriding and all-inclusive philosophical system. Mao, in other words, has a commitment to Marxist philosophy *per se*. It is the unrelenting emphasis on the philosophical underpinning of revolutionary action that gives "Maoism" its unity, coherence, and consistency.

Mao, it should perhaps be stressed, is not viewed here as a Marxist philosopher, but as a student and interpreter of Marxist philosophy. Mao's basic importance lies not so much in the content of his philosophy as in the way in which he approaches and utilizes a particular philosophical system. As Mr. Cohen and others have shown, there is nothing in Mao's thought that can qualify as an "original" contribution to the *substance* of Marxist philosophy. But to say—and this is crucial—that Mao is not original in his substantive exposition of Marxism is not to deny his originality in applying it to the concrete conditions of the revolutionary movement in China.

The significance of Marxist philosophy, according to Mao, derives precisely from its ability to direct revolutionary action. Philosophical precepts, he insists, must find objectification in revolutionary practice. All abstract thought must be tested in objective reality; all theory must have an aim. He writes: "There is only one kind of true theory in this world, theory that is drawn from objective reality and then verified by objective reality; nothing else is worthy of the name of theory in our sense." [2] Knowledge for its own sake, theory for the sake of theory—these, Mao maintains, are slogans of bourgeois ideology. Marxist philosophy is meaningless unless based on considerations of time and place and addressed to concrete conditions. Man's knowledge of the world, capsulized in terms of "contradictions," must be placed in the service of changing the world.

[1] It is interesting to note in passing that while rejecting the position of "those" who characterize Mao as simultaneously "chauvinist" and "revolutionary" (implying inconsistency between the two), Mr. Schram proceeds to insist that Mao is "*both* a Leninist revolutionary and an Afro-Asian nationalist" (his italics). Nor does he make clear why he considers Mao an African as well as Asian nationalist.

[2] "Rectify the Party's Style of Work" (February 1942), *Selected Works*, Vol. III, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1965, p. 40.

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"Contradiction," it must be stressed, is a concept of central importance in Mao's thought, a more complex and undeviating idea than is commonly recognized. Mao Tse-tung is a man obsessed with the "dialectic"; he never deviates from viewing the world in the Marxist philosophical perspective. The dialectical mode of thought is so deeply embedded in his mentality that as early as 1936, in an interview with Edgar Snow, he actually described his family relations in terms of "dialectical struggles" and "united front." [3]

"Maoism" must be redefined and cast in a mold more comprehensive than "nationalism," "chauvinism," "populism," and "voluntarism." Any adequate understanding of the intricacies of the thought of Mao Tse-tung must go beyond the problem of his "originality" and consider the fusion of political philosophy and political action in the circumstances of a revolutionary movement in a "colonial and semi-colonial" country.

[3] See Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China*, New York, Grove, 1961, p. 125. Snow comments, in a note on page 126, that "Mao used all these . . . terms humorously in his explanations, laughing as he recalled . . . incidents." This, however, does not alter the fact of Mao's basically dialectical bent of mind.

The Persistence of the Old

By Joseph R. Levenson

Nothing is more humdrum than that old bromide, the golden mean: the rejection of proffered poles in favor of some of this, some of that. I'm afraid I hum and drum this tune, and so I feel more in harmony with Mr. Schram than with Mr. Cohen, because only the latter stakes out a pole for Mao. Mao came to communism over quite a different road from that of Lenin—their respective nations' relations to "the West" were markedly different—and if for "Lenin" we substitute "the Communist essence," Mao is too particular to conform. Yet, he really did come to communism, not just staying at home with Confucianism, the usual candidate for "Chinese essence."

I agree with Mr. Cohen that the "red and expert" slogan has to be seen in a Marxist, not a Confucian, context: it makes more sense as anti-bourgeois than as a survival of Confucian generalism. Mao's "feudal" (Confucian) targets have been well-enough riddled by time; it is the "bourgeois" who are still alive and who claim title to science as vigorously as the Marxists do. In a world where science cannot be gainsaid, mere experts, practitioners of science, have to be bent to Marxist authority, or Mao, the latest Marxist in line, would lack authority himself. Ideology, the correct ideology, must dominate the ostensibly nonideological expert. For, as Mao has proclaimed in his precepts for art and literature, the very profession of ideological unconcern ("art for art's sake") is a classic product of bourgeois ideology.

Still, the impulse to redness over expertise has a peculiarly Chinese significance in China; it is not just the local application of a universal principle, with Lenin or Stalin dispensing authoritative doctrine to Mao. After all, it is the expert side of things that hints at cultural conversion. Nineteenth-century Russian radicals could feel that Russia was backward, in science as well as politics. However, this backwardness implied to them a need to grow or leap into the ultimate promise of *Russia's own* civilization, for Russia was part of the West. But China was all of China. Mere success in science, if it came, would make China part of the West—and for her this would be not a victory, but a cultural defeat. China had to be part of the *world*, not of the West. Ideology, installed as queen of the sciences, could give China its world part: China, as Mr. Schram suggests, would play proletariat to the imperialists' bourgeoisie. The nation becomes a class. And Chinese bourgeois, if they seem determinedly unaffected by "the thought of Mao Tse-tung," can be damned as de-nationalized. The internationalist term "proletariat" becomes the vindicator of nationalism.

Red over expert means man over machines. Both authors in the symposium discuss Mao's passion for voluntarism—the revolutionary will—and Mr. Cohen discusses the atomic factor in international

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affairs. More can be said to relate these to China's international position. When China comes into the world as red and expert, instead of just vanishing into the West as expert alone, it is a proletariat among proletariats—a vanguard, in fact—facing the phalanx of bourgeois imperialism. China, moreover, cannot accept her own revolution as the last one on the agenda. An atomic freeze perpetrated by the industrial superpowers, however, would make it just that, or might even reverse the results thus far. Therefore, when the Chinese press quotes "Engels on the Rifle" at the "modern revisionists," the aim is clear: to banish what seems an apolitical awe of the history-making (or history-ending?) potential of the atom. Maybe the hydrogen bomb represents a qualitative rather than quantitative advance over the rifle. Mao, however, does not seem to think so. Just as naturalism in literature is held to be hyper-deterministic, overemphasizing the determining role of environment, so voluntarism, the direction of human will against the constellation of social forces, will still be decisive. Revolutions ought to be pushed, not restrained, whatever the weight of atomic machines against them.

Such paeans to the revolutionary spirit have a bearing on what Mr. Cohen describes as Mao's effort "to keep the minds of all Chinese artificially 'revolutionized' in a situation where revolution no longer exists." Does Mao, since the Hundred Flowers fiasco, really think he has to resort to artifice? In the 1950's Mao seems to have been convinced of the fact—it remains the ideal—of the underlying unity of the Chinese people, a unity divined during the 1930's and expressed in the politics of "united front." Paradoxically, the Hundred Flowers revelation of restlessness within the framework of the united front proved Mao both right in his premise and wrong in his conclusion.

That is to say, what was officially described as "the storm in the universities" confirmed rather than impugned the broad scope of the Communists' victory. Critics of the regime were not invoking the values of a pre-Communist Chinese past, not suggesting that the Kuomintang should never have been defeated. The criticism was in a liberal spirit, a spirit flouted just as seriously by the traditionalistic Chiang Kai-shek of *China's Destiny* as by Mao. In the late 1940's, the Kuomintang establishment had been live enough and formidable enough to make its destruction a common cause for both disgusted democrats and dedicated Communists. A clash between liberals and Communists was then lower on both sides' agenda than the elimination of Chiang; hence a united front between them, laying their differences to rest temporarily, was possible—just as an earlier version of united front (1937) had frozen the Kuomintang-Communist civil war until the elimination of the Japanese, who were rivals to them both, was assured. When the Japanese had gone (or even before, when the United States had become committed to Japan's defeat), the reason for fusion also was gone, and the Kuomintang and the Communists-plus-Democratic League could again acknowledge fission between them. Similarly, in the later Hundred Flowers period, fission between liberals and Communists reflected the fact that the Kuomintang—like Confucian China, dead and gone—was no longer anyone's idea of a live option.

Mao believed that "antagonistic" contradictions had been resolved by the Communist victory and that only "non-antagonistic" contradictions remained—that is, non-crucial tensions which might relax in an atmosphere of "blooming and contending." What the event showed, however, was a mirror-image of Mao's theory of contradictions. "Non-antagonistic" contradictions—in the form of a conflict between liberals and Communists which was not allowed to become mortal—existed not after but *before* the Communist victory, when there was a context of shared interest among all Chinese disaffected with the Kuomintang and the old society. It was the Communist victory itself which opened the way for the emergence of a new, modern antagonism; for victory made the cleavage in the anti-Kuomintang side, even if not as wide as the great gulf between new and old, visible and rending.

Modern liberalism made little headway in China as long as traditionalism or reaction was the main alternative defining it, thus forcing an arrangement between liberalism and communism. The old had to be put down—by the victory of the Communists—before definition by the new alternative, communism, could restore to a modern non-Communist faith a possible field of action in a new phase of history. Mao had—and could see that he had—modern non-Communist foes in his erstwhile allies; they were anti-feudal like himself, but the "feudal" issue was almost a dead letter. Consequently, he focussed his sights on "bourgeois" critics. Revolutionary struggle, against a living foe, could go on.

Something in Mr. Schram's paper casts light on this question of life and death (culturally speaking) in Communist China, and it brings us back to China in the international web. The "Sinification of Marxism," while it certainly beclouds any "Com-

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munist essence," also clearly has little to do with "Chinese (Confucian) essence." Mr. Schram mentions "the citations from the Chinese classics with which Peking's ideological utterances are studded." He remarks that among other Asians and Africans such citations help "to undermine his (Mao's) pretensions to universality." Or, the way back is the way out: these citations may Sinify, but they do the reverse of Confucianize. For in a genuinely Confucian China, a China that *was* the world, to cite the classics was the very method of universal speech. The Confucian classics were the repositories of Value in the abstract, absolute for everyone, not just of Chinese values relevant to China alone. When the classics make China particular instead of universal, it is a China *in* the world—still China, but really new, even as it invokes (indeed, *precisely* as it invokes) what connects it to the old.

Totalitarian Traditions

By Leonard Schapiro

Ignorant as I am of Chinese communism, I have learned a great deal from both of these excellent articles. I am particularly struck by the fact that while the emphasis and method of approach of the authors differ so considerably, their characterizations of the practice and the doctrine of Mao are basically so similar. Allowing for all differences of view, I see three essential characteristics of Mao's *Weltanschauung* emerging from these very distinct essays. First, the great importance in the Chinese leader's outlook of the voluntarist element —the primacy of the human will over material circumstances. Secondly, that what Mao has developed in his own system of thought and tactics is above all a combination of the main principles of political, revolutionary action as evolved by Lenin with a national, indeed strongly nationalistic, Chinese tradition. Thirdly, that while Mao has developed a system of essentially one-man rule which in many ways approximates that of Stalin, the Chinese leader has more often tended to rely to a greater extent on persuasion and to a lesser extent on force than did the late Soviet dictator.

With this somewhat oversimplified framework as a background, each author's approach certainly appears very different. Cohen, more practical in his analysis, tells us a great deal more about the concrete policies which Mao has pursued. Schram, the more theoretical analyst of the two, seems to me to complement Cohen by a deeper discussion of a very complex Chinese nationalist. What also emerges from Mr. Schram's essay more than from Cohen's is the tenuous, indeed almost nonexistent, link between "Maoism" and Marxism—in any normal interpretation of this somewhat elastic doctrine.

Actually, neither author uses the term "Maoism" —for which I, for one, am profoundly grateful. I have found in my general study of communism that I have grown increasingly impatient of the "isms": "Leninism," "Stalinism," even, Heaven help us, "Khrushchevism"—let alone "Titoism" and "Castroism." This free use of the "ism" seems to me to confuse ideology with tactics and the effect on tactics of national circumstances and of the style and character of the particular autocratic ruler concerned. It may well be that some faith of an ideological nature acts in the first instance to drive a particular revolutionary to seize and to hold power because he believes that he alone can put the tenets of that faith into practical effect. Thus, Lenin may have believed that he was putting into effect the doctrines of Marx and Engels in the only way in which it was possible to do so in Russia; and that, furthermore, no one but he could be trusted to do so. Stalin was more concerned to utilize the organizational tactics devised by Lenin in order to fulfill and justify his inordinate ambition for sole power and his appetite for self-adulation.

The determining factor in producing the variety of policies which different revolutionary dictators show in practice is not, however, some new doctrine devised by the individual concerned, but rather the personality and political style of the particular autocrat. Mao seems in this respect to lie somewhere in

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between Stalin and Lenin. His vanity and his appetite for power, though considerable, are less gargantuan than Stalin's. On the other hand, if it is true—as it seems to me—that Mao was influenced much more by Lenin's organizational doctrine than by Marx's theoretical analysis of capitalism (which seems singularly irrelevant to China), he also seems, unlike Lenin, to be dominated by lust for personal power, by intense nationalist pride, and by bitter resentment against the West.

If this view is right, then three reflections seem to follow. First, that Mao is committed much less to a doctrine or to an ideology than to a method or tactic—which is what Leninism essentially is. Naturally, the application of the technique devised by Lenin for Russia has necessitated at times different courses in China. But this has been due not so much to innovations in the doctrine as to the personality of the ruler, and to the particular national circumstances of the country, China, in which he has asserted his rule. Indeed, how little these variants from "Leninism" or "Stalinism" have been related to any new doctrinal faith, or ideology, is amply proven by the evidence adduced by each of the two authors of the readiness with which Mao has been prepared, whenever tactics made it expedient, to depart from his own doctrines.

The second inference is that the experience of Mao's rule in China has served to prove the extent to which "Leninism" is primarily an organizational technique for establishing one-man rule with the aid of an élite, or party; for mobilizing mass action both in order to support and in order to preserve this form of one-man rule; and to achieve the rapid industrialization of a backward country.

The final reflection which a reading of these essays evokes in me is that we should exercise caution in generalizing about any peculiarity of the Chinese form of communism, let alone in predicting (as some of my Sinologist friends sometimes do) that the death of Mao will not lead to a power struggle because "China is different." Of course it is different. But it is different precisely because of the personal imprint which Mao has left on it. Once he is gone, as a result of death or acknowledged incapacity, I can see no reason to assume, one way or the other, that the familiar infighting for the succession which has hitherto characterized almost all Communist parties in power will, or will not, take place in China. It seems to me probable that it will, but given our scant knowledge of the political style of the actors who will be involved on the stage at the crucial time, I believe that it would be erroneous to make any firm predictions on this score. (At the moment of writing, it looks very much as if the struggle for the succession to Mao may indeed have begun already, even before his death. But the strange events now taking place in China seem to me, on the basis of any analysis that I have seen, too complicated to admit of any one simple explanation.)

Of course, I agree that in all political analysis of China, as of any other country, one has to take into account the national circumstances. The national circumstances of China are, of course, a factor in Chinese communism—as both authors show. But the more important element in the analysis is still the technique of communism, and as one of the authors at any rate stresses, the particular method of rule associated with communism—the monopoly of power enjoyed by a party elite under the rule of one man—has nothing to do with Chinese tradition at all.

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Concluding Remarks

The first and most striking conclusion which emerges from this symposium, as several of the participants have noted, is the number of points on which there is substantial agreement. Combining the lists of Professors Schapiro and Schwartz, we arrive at four traits which, in the views of both Mr. Cohen and myself, distinguish Mao's brand of communism: extreme voluntarism; the use of thought reform in addition to sheer force as a technique for obtaining popular compliance; nationalism (which Mr. Cohen prefers to call chauvinism), and Mao's propensity, derived from his guerrilla experience, to view the whole of existence in military terms. Mr. Cohen and I disagree, on the other hand, about the importance of these characteristic traits when weighed against the attributes that are common to all Communist regimes.

Most of the comments center around this area of divergence. The only exception is the comment of Mr. Rejai, who is convinced that neither Mr. Cohen nor myself has grasped what is really the distinguishing characteristic of Mao's thought. This lies, according to him, in "the constant interplay between philosophy and action." I have read Mr. Rejai's comment several times in an effort to understand how he can describe as characteristic of Mao an axiom of Marxism laid down by Marx himself in the "Theses on Feuerbach." I confess that I have not succeeded.

"The political thought of a national leader," writes Mr. Cohen, "can be gauged accurately only from his political practice." If he were saying merely that a man's thought could not be accurately interpreted without taking full account of his practice, no one would contest this. But, in fact, the sentence seems to be meant literally. For Mr. Cohen, the *only* serious criterion for evaluating a man's thought is his practice. In his view, any attempt to get at Mao's motives is likely to be merely "an exercise in creative imagination" or, worse still, "a mystical flight." Mao's "practice and policies," on the other hand, "can be documented"; therefore, the wise man will stick primarily to the analysis of these.

Despite this caveat, however, Mr. Cohen himself attempts to define Mao's "philosophy of life," and even ventures to speculate on certain "nostalgic desires" which may inhabit his psyche. His idea of Mao's philosophy of life, which he epitomizes in the words "struggle is happiness," is virtually identical with mine. "One might sum up the difference between him [Mao] and his Soviet counterparts," I wrote in 1963, "by saying that whereas their utopia is one of rationality, his is one of struggle." [1] Apparently, because my judgment was derived from a study of Mao's own writings over the past half century, Mr. Cohen would regard it as an "exercise in imagination," whereas his own, because it is supported by a reference to an article (not by Mao) in *Kung-jen Jih-pao* of July 22, 1964, is documented and therefore objective. Would it not be preferable to recognize that Mao's ideas and behavior are a very complex subject which can usefully be investigated from more than one perspective?

If we turn to matters of substance, the principal divergence between Mr. Cohen and myself pertains, as already indicated, to the relative importance attributed to the unique, or special, as against the universal elements in Mao's variant of communism. Here, the authors who have taken the trouble to comment on our articles have made a most useful contribution to clarifying the terms of the debate. Professor Schapiro has stressed the im-

[1] *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung,* New York, Praeger, 1963, p. 82.

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portance of the political methods and power structure associated with communism as the primary source of the fundamental resemblance among all such regimes, including that of China. He is quite right to do so, and recent events appear to justify his view that "the monopoly of power enjoyed by a party elite under the rule of one man" tends to produce "infighting for the succession." But if this type of power structure has its own implacable logic, Leninism also projects a view of the world, and a will to change it, which gives to Communist leaders broader goals than the simple preservation of their own power. And as Professor Levenson points out, this Leninist ideology could not have the same meaning, in the context of the Chinese tradition and China's situation, that it did in Russia. As for "Chineseness," Professor Schwartz has brought together the various meanings scattered throughout the other contributions: not only "the millennial culture of China," but "the specific history of China in the 20th century" and "the imperatives of China's objective situation."

Mr. Cohen, for his part, sums up the Communist or Leninist component in Mao's thought and behavior under the epithet "Stalinism." No one doubts that Mao received his political apprenticeship during a period when the ideas and methods employed in all Communist parties were largely derived from Stalin's teaching and Stalin's example. It is clear that Mao is still marked by this heritage —indeed he proclaims this loudly and with pride. But this does not mean that his version of Leninism, or his way of applying Leninism, can be adequately characterized as "Stalinist."

If the Marxist component in Mao's thought and behavior is not simply Stalinist, what is its nature, and how does it combine and interact with the "Chinese" components in his motivation? Developments in China since Mr. Cohen and I submitted our articles half a year ago make it possible to pose this problem in a new light. The picture which emerges from the incredible mass of radical statements now emanating from Peking suggests that a fundamental shift in the Chinese ideological line may be under way, marking the beginning of a new phase in the history of Chinese communism. These developments may be the work of an aging despot resolved on one more desperate effort to ensure the permanence of his revolutionary achievements after he is gone; or they may be promoted by others in the name of an already largely incapacitated leader. In any case, they are relevant to our discussion of Mao's methods, for these current policies are a recognizable outgrowth of the radical tendencies which have prevailed in China since 1958, even though they also mark a rupture with what has gone before.

Two distinct but related trends seem to indicate a basic change in Mao's position: the enormously increased emphasis on classes and on "class struggle" against the bourgeoisie, and the aggressive rejection of nearly everything in traditional Chinese culture. Both can be traced back several years, but recently they have attained an intensity which gives them a new significance. On the face of it, they seem to mark a shift toward the predominance of ideological over national factors in Chinese communism. This is no doubt the case to some extent. But the situation is, in my opinion, more ambiguous than appears at first sight.

The onslaught on traditional culture is obviously in total contradiction to Mao's attitude in the past,

A YUGOSLAV COMMENT

Caption (not shown) reads: "One of us is not following the teachings of Mao Tse-tung."

—*From* Politika *(Belgrade), June 5, 1966.*



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when he wrote: "We are Marxist historicists; we must not mutilate history. From Confucius to Sun Yat-sen we must sum it up critically, and we must constitute ourselves the heirs of all that is precious in this past." [2] But the fact that Mao now rejects precisely the kind of amalgam between Marxism and Chinese culture which he has been promoting for a quarter of a century does not mean that his new and apparently ideologically-inspired approach corresponds to Marxism as understood by either Lenin or Stalin. In the years following the 1917 revolution, Lenin sharply condemned the apostles of "proletarian culture," and Stalin likewise rejected the view that the cultural heritage of a nation could be regarded as the exclusive possession of the formerly dominant classes. And, as Professor Schwartz points out, though Stalin kept the authors in line and purged the managers and experts, he never thought that he could get along without them.

Thus, though the language of the current ideological developments in China is superficially Marxist, the substance of Mao's policy (or the policy of those who speak in his name) is neither Leninist as Mao himself claims it to be, nor Stalinist as Mr. Cohen would have it. If one seeks antecedents for these tendencies, they are to be found rather in certain left-wing currents in the history of the Soviet Union and of European socialism whose adherents believed, unlike Lenin, that it was possible to eliminate the division of labor without a long period of transition. In my opinion, Mao's motives here are rather "Chinese" than "Marxist," but only to the extent that, by "Chinese" factors, we mean—to borrow the words of Professor Schwartz—factors rooted in "the imperatives of China's objective situation."

Viewing this situation from the standpoint of a man passionately convinced that China should occupy a preeminent place in the world, Mao appears to have concluded that the survival of the traditional cultural universe—even purified of its "feudal dross"—necessarily constitutes a dual obstacle to the achievement of his aims. Within the country, it inhibits the assimilation by the average man of the ideas and attitudes necessary for modernization and rapid economic growth; abroad, as suggested in my article, it undercuts the affirmation of the universality of Chinese revolutionary experience, which can only be made in the language of Marxism. A move toward the "de-Sinification" of Chinese Marxism—though not toward the total rejection of the past—might thus be quite legitimate in Marxist terms. But, as already suggested, behind the Marxist language Mao is doing something totally un-Marxist—or in any case un-Leninist—namely, suggesting that the workers and peasants are capable, in the immediate future, of replacing the "authorities" and "scholars" in every domain, from scientific research to literary creation.

This policy represents a new metamorphosis of the extreme voluntarism and the accent on "conscious action" which have long characterized Mao's style of leadership. In this perspective, the invitation to the workers and peasants to grasp their pens with one hand and their guns with the other serves a function analogous to that of the mass meetings and campaigns which accompanied the various stages of agricultural collectivization—namely, to convince the formerly illiterate and downtrodden masses that they have the right and the capacity to participate actively in shaping their own lives. In the long run, I wrote in my article, the sacrifice of "redness" to "expertness" would no doubt prove intolerable to Mao. The long run has in fact turned out to be the short run: once more, as in 1958, the demands of technical rationality are rejected in favor of reliance on the omnipotence of the masses.

The result will no doubt be a new and catastrophic disorganization of the Chinese economy—but that is beyond the scope of this symposium, which is dedicated to analyzing Mao's policies, not to predicting their effects. At the same time, it must be pointed out that despite the wildly irrational excesses of the current "great cultural revolution," the study of "Mao Tse-tung's thought" is not merely a school in fanaticism. If we look closely at the "philosophical articles" written by workers and peasants who claim to have benefited from this study, we discover that "assimilating Chairman Mao's dialectics" means looking at all sides of a problem, and that "revolutionary zeal" means working hard. In other words, "Mao's thought" is also a slogan and a sanction to justify the inculcation of certain attitudes long current in the West and useful for promoting experiment and economic growth.

I have spoken of a new phase in the history of Chinese communism. Will this orientation characterize the policies of Mao's successors "for centuries to come," as Peking would like us to believe? Is China fated to become more and more Leninist and Western, and less and less Chinese, until national differences ultimately fade away within the

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 113.

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socialist bloc? Will there never be a revival of the traditional Peking opera of which Mao himself has always been so passionately fond? A symbolic answer might be found in the fact that, at the height of the current "great cultural revolution," amidst the struggle against "bourgeois" influences, Mao's poems in classical form, studded with traditional imagery, are constantly quoted and sung and are regarded as the quintessence of proletarian truth. The contradiction remains open; I would not presume to say which is its "principal aspect," or how it will be resolved.

Stuart R. Schram

It would be difficult to find a better illustration of intuitionism as applied to political research than the essay of Mr. Schram.[1] Logical inference from the facts of Mao's "immediate experience" is abjured and replaced by speculation and generalization. Yet of what value are personal certitude and "self-evident truths" when pitted against reasoning from valid factual evidence? Facts and generalizations, after all, exist on a plane of democratic equality, and arguments advancing generalizations are as strong or weak as the facts used to support them.

Mr. Schram offers his generalizations with considerable conviction, but his supporting evidence is piteously meager. He insists, for example, that the communes were a "totally" un-Marxist enterprise, that Mao's feeling of solidarity with other non-European peoples opposing imperialism is "undoubtedly" genuine and spontaneous, that in foreign policy he is guided more by "Chinese dignity" than by "Chinese interests," and that in China there is probably "more consensus, and less blind obedience, than in the Soviet Union." He does not provide a sustained argument for any of these categorical assertions, inasmuch as he pretends to know Mao's thought intuitively.

Many of Mr. Schram's generalizations are logically incongruous. He says, for example, that Mao's desire to make all Chinese think alike, but spontaneously, "perhaps reflects a nostalgia for the ideal of individual liberation." That is, Mao rejects mental autonomy only to "liberate" the minds of his subjects. This peculiar explanation of totalitarian regimentation has an all-too familiar apologetic ring; more importantly, it reflects a defiant desire to defend propositions that appear to be "contradictory and absurd" (Mr. Schram's phrase). But the law that A equals A—that is, that terms must not be shifted in the process of writing—cannot be jettisoned with impunity. Two contrary propositions cannot logically be defended in the same argument. To offer yet another example, what are we to infer from a procedure which leads to the conclusion that Mao's nationalism is *not* necessarily "the most important" factor in his thought, but that it *is* chronologically and psychologically "primary" in his thought?

Methodological problems aside, Mr. Schram's interest is narrowly centered on the old issue of the late 1940's—namely, whether Mao is more "Chinese" than "Communist." By focusing on this hoary issue, he contributes little to our understanding of Mao's concrete practice today; and his answer is naturally the same as that offered by specialists in 1949: Mao is both, and it is therefore accurate to refer to him as a *Chinese* Communist.

By neglecting the facts of "immediate experience," Mr. Schram remains free to give us an ersatz Mao—a romantic and liberal totalitarian who "never" has lost sight of the importance of the individual. In his essay and in his earlier published book, he concedes the obvious—that Mao uses terror whenever he chooses. But he immediately assures us that Mao's tyranny is essentially benevolent, that despite his ruthless exercise of power, Mao is "basically a romantic, if not an individualist." [2]

The Communist dictator is also dramatized as a man passionately torn by a Faustian struggle over mental transformation. Rather than acknowledge that Mao's policies indicate his contempt for the autonomy of individual human reason, Mr. Schram would have us believe that "Mao's passionate desire to transform man has a curious mixture of human-

[1] Intuitionism—the doctrine that there are self-evident truths, instinctively known, which form the basis of human knowledge—at one time had a strong following in Western philosophy. Henri Bergson, the eloquent defender of "absolute intuition," disparaged the interests of practical life and elevated intuitionism to a new irrationalism. This procedure was harmless for the metaphysician, but it would seem almost gratuitous to point out that it is disastrous for the political analyst.

[2] Stuart R. Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung* (New York, 1963), p. 82.

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istic and totalitarian motives." [3] Because Mr. Schram finds it impossible to defend Mao as a semi-humanist on the basis of concrete policies, he tries to do so with peripheral remarks about Mao's "motives."

Unfortunately, the penchant for divining rather than examining concrete policies yields only illusory results. For example, Mr. Schram defends Mao's arrogant handling of the arrogant Castro with the conjecture that Peking may have reduced its Cuban sugar purchases in order to rationalize foreign aid commitments. As a matter of fact, Mao had treated the Cuban leader with his customary arrogance on a number of occasions preceding his final act of political retribution. Mr. Schram also implies that Peking was probably not involved in the Indonesian coup to bring down Sukarno, and he buttresses this conjecture by citing China's support of Pakistan's Ayub Khan. The analogy, however, is specious; the Pakistani Communists are *not* a legal organization, and their underground workers do *not* constitute anything like the powerful force that the Indonesian Communists once were. In any case, we are thus presented with a portrait of a political leader whose relations with foreign leaders, including the Russians, are characterized by dignity and tact—a portrait which conveniently leaves out the staggering fact that *Mao's arrogance* in the Sino-Soviet dispute has been so extreme and so crude as to outrage even his prospective supporters—the Japanese and Rumanian Communists, as well as the Cubans.

Regrettably, Mr. Levenson's handling of a concrete policy also reveals an inability to grasp the essence of Mao's political behavior. For example, in analyzing the "hundred flowers" policy of 1956-57, he drastically whittles down the very real denunciation of *Mao*'s dictatorship by Chinese intellectuals, inserts an attack on *Chiang*'s pre-1949 dictatorship, and comes to the amazing conclusion that the anti-CCP attacks "confirmed rather than impugned" the scope of Mao's victory. Actually what the "hundred flowers" policy made clear was the embarrassing fact that many intellectuals despised *Mao*'s dictatorship as an oppressive tyranny and said so openly at the cost of their personal freedom. What serious scholar would retreat to an attack on the Tsar in analyzing the Russian intellectuals' criticism of today's CSPU dictatorship?

Mr. Levenson asks if Mao has to resort to "artifice" to keep the minds of young Chinese within proper revolutionary channels. The answer emerges from the current purge: Mao needs *open terror* even more than "artifice," primarily because his more subtle methods of thought control have failed to destroy the autonomy of reason among China's intellectuals.[4] Artificial revolutionization of the youth had been "blocked," according to the CCP, by pragmatists, who are now warned that the party is "fully prepared to kill all the roadblocking tigers." [5] In what sense, then, has Mao's dictatorship provided liberalism with "a possible field of action?" Prof. Levenson should know that philosophic inquiry needs privacy, and that literature and art cannot thrive without freedom of expression. And privacy and freedom of expression are not possible in Communist China because Mao is aware that any bow to liberalism would undermine the conformity, rigor, and ubiquitous nature of his totalitarian rule.

When Mr. Schram tells of Mao's concern for individual liberation, we must turn from poetic imagery to the sober reality of Mao's rule. We see one man persecuted for saying that "the individual's spare time is his free world," [6] and another man attacked for discussing Western liberal concepts of "personal liberty and freedom of thought, speech, press, travel, and others, such as election rights and parliamentarianism"—not one of which is tolerated by Mao.[7] It is a departure from intellectual sobriety to say that Mao's destruction of the liberty of conscience, "which above all other things ought to be to all men dearest and most precious," [8] perhaps reflects "a nostalgia for the ideal of individual liberation."

Writing with characteristic open-mindedness, Professor Schapiro does not becloud the technique of Communist rule, which, he says, has nothing to do with Chinese "tradition." He suggests that Mao is somewhere between Lenin and Stalin—whereas

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 55.

[4] Demanding that party and nonparty intellectuals must now be terrorized in a very sharp "class struggle," the Peking *Kwang-ming Jih-pao* on May 9, 1966 quoted Mao: "If the meat is cut with only a blunt knife, blood will not flow freely." Suicides of terrorized intellectuals are reported in *London Sunday Times*, July 17, 1966.

[5] *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Peking), June 18, 1966. Another unambiguous threat stated: "Anyone who opposes Mao Tse-tung's thought, now or in the future, will be an arch-enemy of the revolution and the people . . ." (Peking, *Jen-min Jih-pao*, July 1, 1966). The "people" are mentioned because Mao, like Stalin, is after all a "populist" leader who imposes arbitrary and extra-legal restraints on anyone or any group in the name of everyone.

[6] Peking Radio Broadcast of May 10, 1966.

[7] *Hung Ch'i* (Peking), April 29, 1966.

[8] John Milton, *The Ready and Easy Way to Establish a Commonwealth* (1660).

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Mr. Schram pictures Mao as a combination of Lenin and Garibaldi [9]—and that the Chinese leader is committed more to an organizational method for establishing one-man rule than to a doctrine. Mr. Rejai might consider the last point. I take it to mean (1) that when Lenin *institutionalized* dictatorship, he dealt a severe blow to Marx's original idea of a temporary "dictatorship of the proletariat" and to democratic socialism; and (2) that this institution provided Stalin and Mao with the means to satisfy a deep "lust for personal power" (Mr. Schapiro's phrase).

By contrast, Mr. Schwartz's essay lacks a sustained point of view. Its heavy criticism of my stress on the Stalinist heritage in Mao's policies is not balanced by criticism of Mr. Schram's complete silence on this important point. There is no doubt in my mind that a realistic grasp of Mao's policies cannot be achieved without viewing them against the backdrop of Stalinism, just as a meaningful understanding of the Soviet dictator's policies is inconceivable without taking into account the Leninist heritage. On the other hand, any attempt to view Maoism as yet another manifestation of the "Chinese tradition" inevitably leads us into a verbal morass in which real policies are completely lost sight of. For example, Mr. Schwartz implies that Mr. Schram's obscure formula, "Mao's 'Chineseness' is not the same thing as his nationalism," conceals an important truth. But the only truth which emerges is that Mao likes to write classical poetry and uses Chinese verbal contractions (which is irrelevant but right), and that the communes were "totally" un-Marxist (which is relevant but wrong). It is curious that Prof. Schwartz is so uncritical of a method which, through excessive emphasis on "Chineseness," leads to an incorrect portrayal of *important policies*.

Nevertheless, Prof. Schwartz makes one valid point: Mao's contempt for the autonomous intellectual is even more extreme than was that of Stalin. The almost insane purge that is currently sweeping the Chinese mainland also indicates that Mao, very much like Stalin, will not tolerate, even among his closest lieutenants, any lack of zeal in carrying out his policies. Published Chinese Communist material suggests that Maos anti-professional policy was subtly resisted by professionals in the army and the party, and that when Mao probed down to the source of this resistance, he found it lodged in the very organizational structures of the PLA (People's Liberation Army) and the CCP. Chief of Staff Lo Jui-ch'ing disappeared in November 1965, when professionalism in the PLA was under sharp attack, suggesting that Lo was reluctant to accept the extreme form of Mao's anti-professionalism.

P'eng Chen may have fallen because he did not purge his subordinates after they were attacked by Mao for resisting the new "cultural revolution." [10] Lu Ting-i and Chou Yang may have been removed because Mao requires scapegoats for his own previous policy of relative relaxation (1959-62) and because he now feels that they permitted open criticism of his personality cult. Provincial and municipal propaganda department secretaries in the CCP are now caught up in a heresy-hunt, and each party command is probably required to fulfill an arbitrarily fixed quota of party victims. That is to say, many CCP officials are no doubt being "framed." The similarities between Mao's present purge and those of Stalin are only too striking; those who look for the "Chinese ingredient" may perhaps find it in the practice of denouncing party committee secretaries through the medium of "big-character posters," written with a Chinese brush, and prominently displayed on public buildings. . .

One-man rule provided Stalin with the power to demand "socialist realism" in literature and art, just as it now provides Mao with the power to insist on an even cruder "socialist revolution" in literature and art.[11] One-man rule enabled Stalin to establish a bibliolatry in the name of the CPSU *Short Course;* Mao learned from his Georgian mentor how to erect a new bibliolatry in the name of the *Selected Works*. The Chinese leader's craving for adulation is even more demanding than was Stalin's and its influence on foreign and domestic policies overwhelming. With due respect to my distinguished colleagues, there is nothing "Chinese" about proclaiming, as Mao's lieutenants do, that Mao is the one and only "leader" of all truly Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries the world over.

The cult of Mao has now reached heights of irrationalism that put even Stalin's exercises in

[9] Schram, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

[10] "If *Ch'ien Hsien*, Peking *Jih-pao*, and Peking *Wan-pao* were really willing to expose Teng T'o, you still had a little initiative at that time, but you did not do so." (Peking *Hung Ch'i*, May 15, 1966). "What has the Peking Municipal CCP Committee been doing all along? Why have you pretended not to have heard anything and done anything, or even clarified your stand about the frenzied attacks on the party and socialism by your secretaries, department directors, and official organs and periodicals?" (Sining Radio Broadcast of May 21, 1966)

[11] Mao's June 1964 attack on literary workers' opposition to his anti-intellectual cultural policies is cited in *Chieh-fang Chün-pao* (Peking), June 6, 1966.

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self-adulation to shame.[12] But it was Stalin, not Lenin, who showed Mao the way to institutionalize —in the period *after* the revolution—the cult of self-idolatry, the distortion of party history, the ruthless destruction of small farmers (erroneously depicted as "kulaks" by Stalin in the late 1920's and "landlords" by Mao in the early 1950's), and the ritualistic purge within the party which has come almost two decades after the Communist victory on the mainland. The parallels are not always exact, and, to be sure, Mao has innovated in all these matters, but whether the innovations represent a continuation or a divergence from Stalinism is a point for academic disputation. We may quarrel about the precise degree of Mao's originality in applying the ritual of forced confession to CCP officials today, but it is an analytical blunder to ignore the crucial Stalinist heritage of this insensate policy.

Arthur A. Cohen

[12] To realize the unprecedented pretentiousness of the Mao cult, let us take the matter of the magical quality of Mao's works. The rector of Sian University was accused by the *Shensi Jih-pao* of having called the study of Mao's works "vulgarization" and of having declared: "If man cannot climb a pole, and someone else reads him a citation from the Chairman, then he still will not be abe to climb it." This was denounced as a hidden attack on Lin Piao's thesis that the study of Mao's works gives "immediate results." (Cited in *Pravda*, June 26, 1966). An agricultural researcher stated: "Every peanut-pod added by means of my method carries in it the quality of Mao Tse-tung's thoughts." (Tsinan Radio, July 14, 1966.)

The All-Powerful Thought of Mao

We applied Comrade Mao Tse-tung's philosophical thought, concretely analyzed concrete matters, and grasped the main contradiction. As a result, we were able to find correct ways of solving problems in such complex natural phenomena as the internal revolution [sic] of molecules, thus further developing the theory of internal revolution.

—From statement by Tang Ao-ching, Vice-President of Kirin University, quoted in Hung Ch'i (Peking), Oct. 1, 1965.

Cooks in a certain PLA [People's Liberation Army] unit raised high the red banner of the thought of Mao Tse-tung . . . and reduced the time needed for cooking rice. Thus, their kitchen duties required only four hours instead of ten hours per day.

—From an article in Jen-min Jih-pao (Peking), April 14, 1965.

CANTON—A delicate operation successfully removed the piece of shrapnel that was embedded in the skull of the heroic Mai Hsien-te. It was the latest of a series of operations performed on the Chinese hero who was badly wounded in a victorious battle last August against two intruding US-built warships of the Chiang Kai-shek gang. . . . The medical staff attending him regard the operation as another triumph of Marxism-Leninism, of Mao Tse-tung's thought.

—From New China News Agency International Service in English, July 25, 1966.

The *People's Daily* of June 21 carries on page 3 a summary of a report by Comrade Chang Hung-chih [a Taching oilfield worker] to workers of organs of the Ministry of Petroleum Industry entitled "Train the revolutionary rank and file with Mao Tse-tung's thought." He said: The key to operating an oilfield efficiently is to train workers with Mao Tse-tung's thinking to give them a high revolutionary character. This is the fundamental step in political work.

—From Radio Peking Domestic Service in Mandarin, June 20, 1966.

Facts prove once again: the best weapon is not the airplane nor the gun, not tanks nor atomic bombs, but Mao Tse-tung's thinking. The greatest fighting power is courage, death-defying spirit, men who are armed with the thought of Mao Tse-tung.

—From editorial in Jen-min Jih-pao (Peking), Jan. 18, 1966.

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Whither Russia?

EDITORS' NOTE: The following articles offer some further viewpoints and perspectives on the nature of the Soviet political system, continuing a discussion launched in the November-December 1965 issue of this journal. Among earlier key commentaries referred to below are Zbigniew Brzezinski's "The Soviet Political System—Transformation or Degeneration?" (January-February 1966) and Michel Tatu's essay-review, "The Beginning of the End?" (March-April 1966).

A Bureaucracy Under Fire

By Giorgio Galli

In one of the main essays that has appeared in this discussion, Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski observed:

The Soviet system is now controlled by a bureaucratic leadership from top to bottom. In that respect, it is unique. Even political systems with highly developed and skillful professional bureaucracies, such as the British, the French, or that of the Catholic Church, have reserved some top policy-making and hence power-wielding positions) for non-bureaucratic professional politicians.

It is precisely this "unique" Soviet characteristic that makes it difficult to draw historical or sociological comparisons between the Soviet system and other systems or situations that do, after all, have something in common with the USSR of 1966. The difficulty of finding terms of comparison in turn makes the task of forecasting the future development of Soviet soicety particularly complex.

Michel Tatu writes in another contribution to the discussion, a commentary on Michel Garder's *The Death Struggle of the Soviet System:*

It is not a bad idea occasionally to leave the beaten path and, even at the risk of oversimplification, to unfold a fearless vision of the future.

Envisioning the future, however, requires as precise as possible an idea of what dynamic forces have already begun to operate in a particular system. In the Soviet situation our knowledge is somewhat limited; and while we must try to acquire an understanding of the forces at work, their role as "preceptors of the future" is made difficult by the enormous weight of the system's conservative structures. On the latter subject, Garder himself comments that "the most

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conservative Western bourgeois is a revolutionary next to the [Soviet] *apparatchik*." With perhaps less "oversimplification," Brzezinski maintains:

It is doubtful that any organization can long remain vital if it is so structured that in its personnel policy it becomes, almost unknowingly, inimical to talent and hostile to political innovation.

It is true that the more a political system keeps talent out of its structure, the more explosive force against the system will accumulate (the observations made by Pareto in this regard remain as valid as ever). On the other hand, a "unique" bureaucracy may also have unique capabilities to endure—that is to say, it may be able to maintain a certain system for quite a long period of time, despite the illogicality of its administration, and despite a conservatism so extreme that it paralyzes not only the political system but the entire society.

In the writer's opinion, Soviet Russia is nearing this stage of paralysis. The recent 23rd CPSU Congress exposed to public view a political class that is standing still. Few leaders addressed the Congress. China was barely mentioned. The names of Stalin and Khrushchev were not heard at all. Those who were instrumental in bringing about the downfall of Khrushchev did not even dare to claim credit for it, referring to the event in bureaucratic terms as "the Central Committee's decisions of October 1964." This peculiar attitude of silence indicates the extent of immobility that has taken hold of the all-powerful bureaucracy of the Soviet Union: it has lost not only the ability to act, but also the ability to speak.

Still, this enormous static mass dominates the scene, suffocating by its sheer weight every dynamic trend that makes itself felt in the Soviet Union. Among these trends, the one that has found most public expression—the intellectuals' attempt to describe the real Russia as against the nonexistent Russia of the official pamphlets—has so far been ruthlessly blocked. Yet such suppression takes its toll of the ruling bureaucracy. In order to understand this problem let us examine in turn the various dynamic forces at work in Soviet society.

History shows that talent, when shut off from the field of politics, often turns to the world of culture. Here different forms of talent can find room for expression, become polished, unite with one another, expound ideas, to the point of evolving into an indirect political force. This social process has been a familiar feature in closed societies: it operated throughout the Tsarist era in Russia and is still characteristic of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe (consider, for example, the Hungarian situation of 1955-56 and that of Czechoslovakia today).

The intelligentsia, a Russian term expressing a Russian reality, has always been a cause of concern to Soviet leaders, as reflected in the recurring waves of repression launched by Stalin in the early 1930's, by Zhdanov in 1946, by Khrushchev at the beginning of 1963, and by his successors just before and during the 23rd Congress. In spite of these repressions, the intelligentsia retains channels of communication with the citizenry and with public opinion, reaching some millions of people. In addition to the official magazines, there is a system of clandestine circulation. The intelligentsia also undoubtedly has contacts with university student groups, which (especially in Leningrad) appear to compose a social faction that exerts antibureaucratic pressure. Khrushchev was probably not bluffing when he remarked three years ago that if the "Petöfi clubs" (in which Hungarian intellectual dissent was centered) had been established in the USSR, he would have used a firm hand in repressing them. Therefore, we can surmise that the totalitarian bureaucracy must make use of a great deal of its static strength to subdue the intellectual opposition.

A second dynamic force in the USSR is composed of the managers of enterprises, the technocrats. Their enemies are the same totalitarian political bureaucrats. Some of the talented people who turn their backs on politics because it rewards only conformism go into industry or take up a career in business. Having developed their capabilities and reached a certain managerial level, the technocrats find themselves confronted by an enormous and costly political bureaucracy which blocks every initiative or innovation. This group had a precedent in the "industrial party" that came into being during the final period of Lenin's life, but the conflict that ensued between political and industrial interests was stamped out with the launching of the Five-Year Plans, introducing Stalin's "command economy." Today there is no such simple solution, precisely because the centralized controlled economy can no longer promote the economic development of the USSR.

Even Stalin—along with Lenin and Trotsky—recognized that the spread of bureaucracy could pose a possible barrier to economic growth in the future. By the time Khrushchev had entrenched himself in power, the huge bureaucratic structure—embracing millions of nonproductive persons receiving payment to make production more difficult—had long since become a serious burden on the economy. Khrushchev's eco-

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nomic reforms of the late 1950's attempted to cope with this problem, but they failed—mainly because the political bureaucracy hampered their implementation and prevented their success. In the process the needs of the business technocracy, today's "industrial party," were ignored.

The stronghold of political bureaucracy is, of course, the party. Khrushchev's reform of the party structure (nowadays treated as one of his gravest sins) was probably, at the end of his parabolic rise, an attempt to demobilize the "sanctuaries" from which the totalitarian political bureaucracy was firing point blank against the economic reforms that he was attempting to launch.

In the post-Khrushchev era, the exigencies of economic development at first led the new regime to promise a decentralization reform that would increase the power of enterprise management; this promise was voiced by Kosygin toward the end of 1964 and more decidedly in September 1965. Predictably, the type of reform proposed was attacked by the Chinese Communists as a patent example of the orientation of the "post-Khrushchev revisionists" toward capitalism. Within the USSR, the political bureaucracy obviously rallied its forces to fight back. At the 23rd CPSU Congress earlier this year Kosygin took a more cautious stand, appearing to imitate the Khrushchevian tactic of two steps forward and one step backward. Meanwhile the party bureaucracy repealed the prudent rules of the 22nd Congress, which had assured a minimum of internal regeneration through a process of rotation in party offices.

Once again, then, the political bureaucracy is opening fire from its "sanctuaries" against economic reforms. But for this it will pay a high price: disorder and stagnation in the Soviet economy, waste, failure to make use of new energies and potential, and inability to satisfy the growing needs of consumers. How will the "industrial party" react against a party bureaucracy that is more conservative than the most conservative Western bourgeois, in that it blocks and paralyzes the economic development of the USSR? Most probably, the industrialists will keep pressing for application of the reforms that have been promised for the last ten years. We may assume, therefore, that the totalitarian bureaucracy will have to employ a great deal of its static strength to combat technocratic as well as intellectual pressure.

This same bureaucracy, so lacking in efficiency, so set against the intellectuals and the technocrats, must also take into account the grave problems of the international Communist movement. It must listen (though for the time being it is afraid to reply) to the very harsh accusations of the Chinese Communist Party. It faces continuing difficulties in its relations with the "people's democracies," arising out of such problems as the "austerity" program in Hungary, the increasingly independent attitude of Rumania, growing economic difficulties and intellectual ferment in Czechoslovakia, the struggle between the Gomulka regime and the Church, and the pressure on Ulbricht from West Germany. A conservative political bureaucracy whose only purpose is to enjoy its privileges in peace now finds itself continuously forced to face the problems of a world that is undergoing a process of rapid evolution.

The situations that have been summarized are relatively well known. They indicate where dynamic tendencies against bureaucratic immobilism may gain impetus—in the opposition of the intellectuals, in the needs of the technocrats, in the difficulties posed by mounting Chinese criticism and growing problems in the "people's democracies." But in addition, the political bureaucracy may find itself facing a storm that has received relatively little attention in forecasts.

At this point I will accept Michel Tatu's suggestion "to leave the beaten path," and offer some conjectures on how the bureaucratic political system might be affected by those elements that have brought about a great deal of change in the West in the last twenty-five years: mass consumption, mass education, mass communication, leisure time, leisure pursuits, even fashions. In a broad sense, the political influence of these elements has frequently been overlooked in the West, except for the superficial interpretation of a certain self-styled Marxist group, which maintains that all these elements were introduced surreptitiously by the capitalist bourgeoisie in order to lead the class conscience of the proletarian masses astray.

Actually, mass consumption and communication, use of free time, styles in dancing and singing and dress—all these have contributed to creating what probably is the first "planetary" type of culture in the history of mankind, as the French sociologist Edgar Morin has defined it in *L'esprit du temps*. New cultural patterns that belong uniquely to the second half of the 20th century predominate in all of the advanced industrial countries and have penetrated the so-called "Third World." While they have been stopped at the borders of China, they have certainly infiltrated the Soviet Union.

In the USSR millions of young persons below the age of 30 attempt to follow, aspire to follow, or at least accept the patterns of the "consumer civiliza-

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THE BATTLE AGAINST "DECADENT" WESTERN INFLUENCES

— Простите, я, видимо, по ошибке попал на пляж. А где же учреждение?

Caption: "Excuse me, apparently I came to a beach by mistake. *And where is the institution?*" (Sign on door reads "Director."

—From Krokodil *(Moscow), No. 14, 1966*

МАКАКОФОНИЯ

Caption below: Monkeyophony. *Upper right:* Those who direct some of the jazz music in the West pursue only one aim—that of arousing in the listeners primitive, animal instincts.

—From Krokodil *(Moscow), No. 17, 1966.*

tion." In the West, the same tendency on the part of the younger generation causes reaction and apprehension among many of the bourgeoisie, who are still attached to the values of the period preceding the explosion of "mass civilization." Yet the Western bourgeoisie is almost revolutionary compared to the Soviet political bureaucracy, which purely and simply lacks the conceptual elements that might enable it to understand what is taking place in the world.

When the facade of political language used by the Soviet bureaucracy is stripped away, it becomes apparent that its whole view of society is shaped by a few narrow preconceptions and entrenched habits. Dogmatic notions of the elders; glorification of the "Old Bolsheviks"; abuse of history; insistence on "social" art; and a moralism that stresses the reward of virtue, the punishment of evil, the joy of labor, and the wickedness of parasites: these are the elements that make up the connecting tissue between the thinking and the spoken word of the bureaucracy. While these concepts are expressed in terms taken from the scoria of Marxist-Leninist revolutionary verbiage, they have come to represent the essence of rigid conservatism.

It is true that many members of the political elite in the West have similarly conservative and self-righteous convictions. But these people do not aim at molding the whole of society in their own image, reducing it to the dimension of a "single bureaucracy" (in the sense that Brzezinski uses the term). Political leaders in the West leave room for the young, the artists, the technocrats, and the rebels. By contrast, the ultra-conservative Soviet party bureaucracy clings to patterns that, despite their Marxist camouflage, date back to the Victorian age, trying to impose them on the exuberant, multiform Russian society of today, whose younger generation is now in contact with the new mass civilization, with its pastimes, its dances, its way of life, even its negative features. How can this new mass impact be offset by the patriarchal patterns and habits of a world that has completely disappeared since the advent of industrial society?

In my opinion, the lazy and superannuated bureaucracy of the Soviet Union's Communist Party, busy as it is in fighting the intellectuals, in restraining the technocrats, in warding off the attacks of the Chinese Communist Party, in coping with the "people's democracies," has neither the time nor the perspicacity to realize that the society it governs is undergoing ineluctable changes; indeed, these changes are completely beyond its imagination. Moreover, by imposing restrictions that have prevented up-to-date psychological and sociological research,

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the party has deprived itself of the very instruments that could help it to comprehend the evolutionary trends now gathering momentum in the society.

In sum, the Soviet political bureaucracy is "unique," but it is also static. Being "unique," it may immobilize Russia for a longer time than any other previous political elite has managed. But it is hard to conceive of inertia in human affairs. Perhaps the intellectuals and technocrats will one day find, among the masses set in motion by the impact of the new global civilization, the lever necessary to force the bureaucracy to share its power.

Immobilism and Decay

By Robert Conquest

"Die Politik ist keine exakte Wissenschaft," as Bismarck once reminded the Prussian Chamber. In this area, we are in the position of having to proceed, not according to any fully-established laws, but by the application of historical experience in a more intuitive way: that is, in effect, by analogy. But no analogies from the past can be wholly applicable to the Soviet situation. We are, after all, in the presence of a modern technological economy that is subject to change at a totally different sort of tempo, and with qualitatively different effects, from those which characterized *politically* comparable societies in the past. Nor are analogies from the present wholly applicable either, since the Soviet political structure is critically different from that of *economically* comparable societies.

Most analyses seem to exaggerate one or the other factor. We are all familiar with recent writings about Soviet and American development in terms of "convergence"—*i.e.*, the view that there is really not much difference between the two societies in the first place, and that what difference does exist is gradually disappearing. In its crudest form, this thesis is easy enough to reject, but there is a more sophisticated and subtler version of it which, in the last analysis, amounts to much the same thing. We are told, in effect, that the "essentials" of the two societies are very similar, that while there are temporary divergences in "inessentials"—often, admittedly, striking enough in a superficial way—they are not to be taken much into account by serious fellows.

On the other hand, if we concentrate purely and solely on the political, we may find ourselves implying that the only significant reality in Russia is the "Byzantine" structure of top-level politics. In saying this, I naturally do not want to urge anyone to ignore this factor. In fact, it is crucial in the sense that, as it is the only kind of "politics" that currently exists in the USSR, all immediate action must take place under its rules—even if the *final* result should be a transformation of the whole scene, politics and all.

One leading scholar has suggested to me the parallel of the French Directoire. (He would not be implying the automatic succession of a Napoleon—if Napoleon had been killed at Arcola, Sieyès might have found a soldier more amenable to civilian control.) Still, we at least can make some comparison with the third-rate, faceless collective leadership, still in the Jacobin tradition, which held power in an increasingly nondescript society when their betters had driven each other out. The differences are equally obvious.

We need more "essentials" than any such particular parallels or analogies would allow us. In the Soviet Union, we must note the nature of the economy in a physical sense: a comparatively

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efficient but erratically modernized industrial base, supported by an incompetent agriculture, operating in a field of modern economic forces and moving, or trying to move, at modern economic tempos. We must also examine the society, *i.e.*, the human population considered under a number of significant aspects: a peasantry more or less permanently disgruntled with its position and kept in conditions which make no economic sense; peripheral nationalities amounting to a large section of the population and continually exhibiting petty signs of a potentially serious alienation; an industrial working class which has erupted here and there in strikes and riots; a large technical intelligentsia, indispensable yet only doubtfully assimilable to orthodoxy; a literary and academic "intelligentsia of ideas," largely disaffected from current orthodoxy and including or influencing a large student class; the *ofitserstvo* (military officer corps) with its own loyalties; the managerial *khozaistvenniki;* the *apparat* (taken in its broadest sense to encompass the entire vast political "class"), with its grip on the social machinery at every level—a basic political framework of highly-organized bureaucracy, strong and experienced but with little "give," at present sufficient to contain the social and economic forces, but not designed to cope with the unexpected; and finally, in the sphere of active politics, a few dozen or a few hundred people wielding as much social "weight" (owing to the leverage of the totalitarian structure) as is usual for whole social classes, and operating, as far as power and control are concerned, with methods comparable only to those used by past despotisms.

These are simply categories, though it should instantly be apparent how different their roles and attitudes are from those of their American or other counterparts. But the Soviet population has further, uncategorizable characteristics. In the first place, this is no generalized society. It is Russia, with all its idiosyncratic history, and the Russian periphery, with all its aspirations. And secondly, it is a society that has lived for fifty years under a regime which, by any standards other than its own, is an extraordinary aberration. The values and attitudes of the Communist period may not have "transformed human nature" as it was hoped they would; but they have certainly penetrated.

Nor is the *apparat* itself simply a machine for retaining power. It is a highly traditionalist body with a special set of closed ideas, a body no more amenable to certain arguments than any other institution of its type. How long can Russia afford the deadly drain of the collective farm system? But, on the other hand, how can the *apparat* ever be persuaded to abandon it?

Khrushchev was (as some of us remarked) a typical transitional ruler. He saw that there was something badly wrong with the system, and he took measures in a whole series of fields to try and find a solution. They were dramatic measures, but they were not radical. Looking back, I suppose we would now all agree that the spectacle was that of a leader grasping at a series of "bright ideas" not based on any profound analysis of the requirements and incapable, even in principle, of effecting a cure. They were symptoms rather than treatments.

The period of fever has been succeeded by one of coma, and we now have a moment—perhaps only a moment—in which we can take our eyes off the sickbed and consider more coolly the possible outcomes.

To begin with, any student of Soviet affairs must have modified considerably any Marxist or quasi-Marxist views he may originally have entertained about the effects of the economy upon politics. Stalin—refusing in this as in so many other things to accept the limitations hitherto set by supposed social, moral, or other laws—created a political mechanism powerful enough to take on and control the economic and social forces. Now it is possible for a true autocracy of this order to carry out basic reforms that are unpalatable to the main body of its supporters, its ruling class—as, for example, had occurred in Tsarist Russia with the emancipation of the serfs by Tsar Alexander II. And if Nicholas II had backed Stolypin's land reforms to the hilt, he might have created a fairly modern Russia. In fact, from Peter the Great on, this has been the formula for a good deal of Russian progress.

But today the Soviet party and state are led by men without either truly autocratic power or overwhelming prestige, and even if they recognize the necessity of truly radical changes, they are bound not to go beyond what is acceptable to the primitive collective mind of the *apparat* as a whole. Thanks to his prestige, Lenin could impose his will—though often with some difficulty—against the general party tendency, as at Brest-Litovsk or in the adoption of the NEP. Stalin could switch policies simply because he was the unchallenged autocrat. But it seems unlikely that the regime is any longer capable of producing—or at least of sustaining—either an accepted leader or a major despot. And even if it were to do so, it is doubtful that he would be a man who would see the necessity for radical change. Shelepin—if he is indeed a man of comparable determination and energy, and this remains to be seen—is more likely to be so in the style of Nicholas I than of Catherine the Great.

As Professor Brzezinski so effectively shows, the present situation is one in which there is a seepage of

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the grey goo of doctrinaire bureaucracy into the top political levels, which were hitherto partially exempt. If the final crisis of the Communist regime is to begin under the present leaders, I would expect it to come not as the result of any of their specific policies, but rather through unforeseen catastrophes with which their methods, and indeed their personalities, are not fitted to cope. They will soon have to face, in some form or other, a major dislocation which their present small-scale economies and conservation measures do not go very far to avert. The Soviet economy is *in principle* overextended. It cannot compete with the Western alliance in armaments and at the same time maintain and continually modernize the increasingly complex kind of industry that has now become necessary. Perhaps Stalin, with his single will and iron nerve, could have run an electronic-and-chemical economy in the same way that he ran a steel-and-coal one, but even that is highly doubtful. No modern-style economy has been successfully created without a high and reliable incentive system for the educated technical proletariat and the technical intelligentsia. How, then, can a Russia that is no richer than Western Europe have—even in principle—both this and rockets too? And, as techniques become more subtilized in every field, the problem increases yearly.

It will be obvious that this whole question must bedevil the relations between Soviet ideologists, military men, and administrators in various fashions, even to the point of shaking the entire structure of the state.

Without elaborating the details of the forces concerned—and it should be noted that this is even more a crisis of ideas than of economics—we can at least see that we are faced by an economy and a society whose inextinguishable tendencies run counter to the political integument at present hemming them in, thus creating the conditions of a classical Marxist prerevolutionary situation. The current regime has learned one lesson from Khrushchev—that random reforms within the system have not done any good. But the *immobilisme* to which they have instead retreated equally provides no solution. It therefore appears inevitable that the pressures will continue to build up. The question that remains to be answered is whether the political integument will be destroyed explosively or will erode away gently.

One possible course of future political evolution might be the gradual acceptance by the leadership—however reluctantly given—of genuine elections within the party and/or the gradual transformation of the perfectly adequate constitutional *forms* of the Soviet state into reality. There have at least been suggestions made lately (for example, at the Armenian Party Congress) that voters be given a choice between two candidates in elections instead of having to approve a single list. Both candidates would still be Communists, to be sure, but it would be a beginning. There is, however, no present sign of even such progress being accepted, though change might conceivably seep in through some such loophole.

On the whole, one does not see the current leadership taking anything like adequate measures in time. Nor does one see any sign of potential successors who might. Although there have been occasions in the past when obsolete political systems have been transformed without serious trouble, these instances have been comparatively uncommon. Moreover, such an evolution has usually been possible only when plenty of time was given for the principles of change to soak into every corner of the social mind. In the USSR today, one would not expect a great deal of time to be still available. Moreover, the blockage to the free spread of ideas, especially into the minds of the ruling party, is unprecedentedly strong—even though we should perhaps not underestimate the degree of erosion even there. But the greatest difficulty of all is a simple technical point: the machinery Stalin built is organizationally effective and ideologically disciplined to the extent that it can probably keep the political integument in being long past the stage at which other political forms would have failed. And this implies that the pressures, when they reach a critical point, will be very high indeed. One might, of course, argue from this that an explosion, if and when it comes, would very likely be violent, but that its very violence might destroy all remnants of the present political system so quickly as to make the change almost painless.

Prediction is after all limited to the adumbration of certain general possibilities. The ones I have sketched here hinge upon an analysis of the USSR as a country where the political system is radically and dangerously inappropriate to its social and economic dynamics. This is a formula for change—change which may be sudden and catastrophic, though not necessarily so. As M. Tatu says, there are a variety of possibilities, and the outcome depends on the accidents of history.

In the meantime, at least, we can watch the operative factors. We should be prepared for surprises over the next decade and should not fall into the temptation of believing the status quo to be as stable as it may appear to the superficial glance.

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Alternatives for Change

By Hans J. Morgenthau

Both the longevity and the precariousness of the Soviet regime derive from the ideology in whose name it governs. In this respect Communist totalitarianism differs from Fascist totalitarianism, which rose and fell with the charisma of the leader; when the leader's spectacular failures proved the charisma to be spurious, the regime collapsed. By contrast, the Soviet regime has survived three successions to supreme power, along with the denigration of two allegedly charismatic leaders. It has been able to do so because it derives its legitimacy from an ostensibly objective and scientific, indeed, the *only* objective and scientific, theory of man and society. Each time the political capital of its leaders was used up, the regime could fall back upon its doctrine, which provided stability and continuity. The erosion of that doctrine heralds the crisis of the regime.

Marxism as a living political philosophy—that is, as a rational guide to political action—has been undermined by two sets of contradictions: contradictions with historic reality and contradictions within itself. The former proved Marxism to be fallacious in a number of historic instances; the latter proved Marxism to be absurd altogether. Marxists could take the former failure in stride, even though the cumulative effect of erroneous predictions was bound to put into question the credibility of the doctrine. But Marxism as a living political philosophy could not survive the revelation of its inner contradictions, and therein lies its present crisis.

Marxism has suffered four major contradictions at the hands of historic experience during this century: World War I disproved the international solidarity of the proletariat; world revolution failed to materialize after the war; not only did fascism gain ascendency but, when it finally fell, communism failed to replace it; and finally, communism proved unable to guide internal economic production and distribution, especially in agriculture. This succession of disappointments undermined, but did not destroy, belief in the Marxist philosophy.

What did seriously damage the credibility of Marxism was Khrushchev's revelation in 1956 of Stalin's past crimes. When Khrushchev exposed Stalin as a bungling and murderous imposter, he not only ruined Stalin's reputation but cast doubt on the legitimacy of Soviet rule. A succession of Soviet leaders had claimed the right to rule by dint of their monopolistic possession of Marxist truth and virtue. Yet what was the moral and practical

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value of a principle of political selection, if it allowed a figure like Stalin to rule in its name for almost three decades? And what assurance was there that the rule of Stalin's successors would be any more "legitimate," in Marxist terms, than was his own?

Marxists in the Soviet Union and elsewhere had to conclude that Marxist legitimacy could not be taken for granted and that the claim to it must be subjected to rational scrutiny. The *a priori* identification of the supreme Soviet ruler with the monopoly of Marxist truth and virtue gave way to examination and challenge of the Soviet ruling elite, both at home and abroad.

Abroad, the result has been polycentrism—that is, the extension of the question of legitimacy to Stalin's successors and to the Soviet regime as a whole, and, in consequence, the reinterpretation of Marxist truth and virtue in terms of the particular interests of individual Communist movements and governments. Against this international disintegration, the Soviet government has been helpless. For once it was no longer credited with the monopoly of Marxist truth and virtue, its intellectual and moral influence became coterminous with the power of the Soviet state. The Soviet state used that power in 1956 in order to enforce Hungary's conformity. Yet the very extremity of the enforcement action put the seal upon the moral bankruptcy of the Soviet claim to international legitimacy; Moscow won a Pyrrhic victory, which in the nature of things could not be achieved more than once.

Domestically, the Soviet government has been able to control, but not to suppress, the challenge arising from the disintegration of its legitimacy. It could not have suppressed this challenge without falling back upon the methods of Stalinism, which its own attacks upon Stalinist legitimacy had deprived of moral foundation. It has only been able to control the challenge because it has had the power to set relatively narrow limits to open dissent.

When a totalitarian regime reaches a stage where it can afford neither to suppress dissent altogether nor to give it free reign, the tendency of the leadership is to fluctuate narrowly between relative permissiveness and relative oppression. It is perhaps indicative of philosophic ethnocentrism and political naiveté that Western public opinion tends to welcome any relaxation of totalitarian controls as the dawn of a liberal day and is shocked by each instance of hardening controls. Both expectation and shock are ill-founded. What is interesting is not that totalitarian rule thus fluctuates, but how long it can continue to maintain this uneasy truce between control and dissent, and how great is the chance that the regime will be forced either to revert to Stalinist methods in order to maintain itself, or else to destroy itself by submitting to competition for political power.

What, then, are the chances for the survival of the Soviet regime in the face of these difficulties and dilemmas? Four factors militate in its favor.

First, even though the credibility of Marxism and the principle of Soviet legitimacy have been seriously damaged, the creed is still accepted in a general, vague, and unenthusiastic way by large masses of the population. Some Soviet citizens will tell you that they do not believe in specific tenets of Marxism and that they are unconvinced and even repelled by the government's self-serving use of the doctrine; but they will still assert that they are Marxists and they believe in socialism, though a different kind from that practiced by the government. Skepticism and even cynicism coexist uneasily with a weakened faith that maintains itself precariously against reason and empirical evidence. This contradictory mood has its parallel in Western societies—for example in attitudes towards religion and democracy.

Second, the tendency to cling to the faith is strengthened by the patent absence of a viable alternative. Where should those disenchanted with Marxism turn for a more meaningful principle of legitimacy? Their dissatisfaction has no opportunity to find a new focus of allegiance, because there is none.

Third, even if there were such a focus, the regime's monopoly over the instruments of coercion would make a politically relevant transfer of allegiance impossible, at least so long as the rulers retain the loyalty of the armed forces and of the police. Given this condition, a modern government can take a good deal of popular dissatisfaction in its stride. What it must guard against is allowing discontent to become so deep and widespread that the military and police forces are themselves infected.

Fourth, and most important, ideological dissatisfaction may lead to grumbling and indifference, but it will not lead to political action as long as the government is able to satisfy the basic aspirations of the population at large. As long as these aspirations are met, it will matter little that segments of the intellectual elite are discontented.

Thus the "end of ideology" in the Soviet Union does not necessarily mean the end of the regime. As long as all or even some of these four factors operate, the Soviet regime has a chance of surviving the erosion of the Marxist principle of legitimacy. Again, Western experience bears out this analysis.

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On the other side of the coin, with the ideological basis of its legitimacy destroyed, the Soviet regime is exposed to three basic threatening possibilities.

First, persistent and spectacular failures at home and abroad, for which an elite of uninspiring technicians would be held responsible, could lead to the rise of a new Caesarism, civilian or military, which might base its rule on the charisma of a single leader, combined with promises of economic and social improvements in the name of socialism, and with appeals for the patriotic defense and promotion of Russia's interests.

Second, it is conceivable that social and economic interests might become diversified and crystallized as a consequence of decentralization. These interests might press for a direct and institutionalized part in the process of policy formation, competing for political power within the general ideological and institutional framework of the Soviet regime. The result would be a pluralistic system, in which various factions would operate in the name of Marxism. The differences among them would not be ideological but pragmatic. The American party system offers an analogy for such a development. Yet there would be a significant difference, in that such a pluralism would still be contained and limited through institutionalized totalitarianism, whereas American pluralism is kept within bounds by spontaneous conformism.

Thirdly, it is possible that the stresses arising under either of the preceding alternatives would cause such a degree of social, political, and moral disintegration that it could not be handled within the institutional framework of the regime. What has happened elsewhere in Asia, Africa and Latin America might then happen in the Soviet Union: the army—as the best organized, disciplined, and effective social force, with a claim to legitimacy deriving from its past vital services to the state—might take over the reins of government.

There is no rational basis for speculating as to which of these alternative developments is most likely to materialize. The responsible observer must content himself with being aware of the alternatives and watching for empirical evidence which indicates a trend in one direction or another.

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Moscow and Socialism in Egypt

By Jaan Pennar

Warm greetings to the people of the United Arab Republic, who are building an independent, national, democratic state and are struggling for the socialist development of their country! May the friendship and cooperation between the peoples of the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic develop and grow stronger! [1]

Such was the wording of one of the slogans approved by the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party for this year's traditional May Day celebrations in Moscow's Red Square. It was significant because on this occasion only the United Arab Republic, of all the non-Communist countries, was singled out as a nation "struggling for . . . socialist development"—a distinction which it had shared with Algeria in last year's May Day slogans, prior to the ouster of Ben Bella's left-leaning Algerian regime by a military coup d'état. Since then, Algeria and other socialist-oriented Asian and African countries have been referred to by Moscow as merely struggling for "social progress," placing them a step behind the UAR in the Kremlin's estimate of their advance towards eventual Marxism.

The important place occupied by the UAR in Soviet international strategic calculations had already been reemphasized by Anastas Mikoyan, then President of the USSR, in the following statement made during the visit of UAR President Gamal Abdel Nasser to the Soviet Union in August 1965:

The experience of the UAR [and] a number of other independent African and Asian countries, [which] in short historical periods established radical social-economic reforms, is attractive to those nations not as yet freed from the grip of neocolonialism. It shows [them] how they can achieve not only formal but real independence.[2]

Barely more than a decade ago, however, the Kremlin had held a completely different view of the Egyptian revolution. The attitude adopted by Moscow toward the infant Egyptian military regime was

[1] *Pravda* (Moscow), April 17, 1966.

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[2] *Ibid.*, Sept. 1, 1965. One result of Nasser's visit was UAR support of Soviet participation in the Second Afro-Asian Conference, scheduled to meet in Algeria in November 1965. The conference, however, never took place, mainly because of Chinese Communist objections to the inclusion of the USSR.

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even more unfriendly than the attitude it had taken toward the preceding Wafd government which the military leaders ousted. In 1954, a leading Soviet Egyptian expert, L. N. Vatolina, characterized the new Egyptian government as "madly reactionary, terrorist, anti-democratic [and] demagogic." [3]

It was largely due to practical considerations of international diplomacy that the Soviet Union in 1955 completely reappraised its stand toward the Egyptian revolutionary regime. Since that time, the Soviet Union has cultivated friendly relations with Nasser and his fellow officers, and more recently—roughly since the early 1960's—Soviet theoreticians have been engaged in trying to fit socialist-oriented measures of internal reform in Egypt into a Marxist mold. It is the purpose of this article to review the measures adopted by the UAR, and to determine what relation, if any, they bear to the Soviet example.

The Egyptian Communists

As a doctrine, communism is not new to Egypt. The Egyptian Communist Party was established in 1919. Its early membership, however, came mainly from racial minorities—the Greeks, Jews and Armenians—and even the native Egyptians among its adherents came from another minority group—the Coptic intelligentsia. As a result, the party was out of touch with the bulk of the Egyptian population; it was more like a club for intellectuals, isolated from the people. During the years 1925-30, moreover, it was the target of government repression, and by the end of that period—coinciding, incidentally, with Stalin's enunciation of the doctrine of "socialism in one country"—it had virtually been liquidated. It should also be noted that the party, in its early years, concentrated its attention on propagating class struggle rather than national liberation, thus neglecting a cause which would have been far more likely to fire the imagination of the mass of Egyptians.

It was not until 1940 that the Communists again became active in Egyptian politics, this time as the left wing of the Wafd Party, within whose ranks they remained until 1948. In the latter year, however, internal dissension caused them to split into several factions which remained at odds until 1954, when they regrouped to form their own political organization, the United Communist Party. In 1956 a party central committee was elected, the first to function since 1924. The party, however, remained composed largely of middle-class intellectuals. The trade-union movement in Egypt, about 400,000 strong in 1957, did not regard itself as proletarian since the average Egyptian industrial worker enjoyed many more privileges than the less fortunate fellah in the rural areas. As a consequence, the Communist Party continued to lack a mass base, although it had already abandoned its earlier emphasis on class struggle in favor of a line placing greater stress on the struggle for national liberation.

During 1959 and 1960, many hundreds of Egyptian Communists were imprisoned by Nasser's government. It has been suggested that this was an act of retaliation not so much against Communist activity in Egypt, which was largely ineffectual, as against Communist activities elsewhere in the Arab world.[4] There was an outcry of protest from Moscow at the time, and Khrushchev and Nasser traded accusations. It was Peking, however, which provided Khaled Bakdash, the dean of Arab Communists and General Secretary of the Syrian Communist Party, with a forum for a tirade against the Nasser regime. In the Chinese capital for the celebration of the 10th anniversary of the Chinese People's Republic, Bakdash delivered a speech (September 28, 1959) in which he denounced Nasser's government as a "terroristic, dictatorial regime which applies fascist tactics against all democratic national forces." Radio Peking broadcasted the speech to Arab audiences, while Moscow neither broadcasted it nor reported it in the press.[5]

The jailed Egyptian Communists, numbering about 600, were released from prison shortly before Khrushchev's May 1964 visit to Egypt. This figure represents the hard core of the Egyptian Communist Party and has been cited as such in Soviet publications.[6] The subsequent gradual modification of the government's attitude prompted a significant shift in the party's tactics in March 1965, when it formally disbanded and switched to united front tactics of pushing its members into President Nasser's Arab Socialist Union. Commenting on the "left-

[3] Quoted in Walter Z. Laqueur, *The Soviet Union and the Middle East*, New York, F. A. Praeger, 1959, p. 262.

[4] Peter Mansfield, *Nasser's Egypt*, Baltimore, Penguin Books, 1965, p. 93.

[5] See Donald Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-1961*, Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1962, pp. 261-62.

[6] *E.g.*, Jacques Coubard, "The Spectre of Communism in Egypt," *Aziya i Afrika segodnya*, No. 12, 1965, p. 41.

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ward shift" in UAR policies at the end of 1965, Georgy Mirsky, a leading Soviet authority on the Arab world, wrote:

All Communists have been released from jail, and instructions have been issued to find them jobs. Many of them have found employment in the civil service, others are working on newspapers. Books by Communists and Marxist classics are now on sale. A new progressive magazine *Al-Talia* (Vanguard) is being published. The influential *Akhbar el-Yom* newspaper has been taken over from its founders, the Amin brothers, known for their reactionary views.[7]

Mirsky also noted that former Prime Minister Ali Sabri and Khaled Mohieddin, a cousin of the present Premier, both regarded (according to Mirsky) as the most leftist-oriented among the leaders of the Free Officers group, were to help President Nasser in reconstructing the Arab Socialist Union with the purpose of "*creating within the Arab Socialist Union a vanguard Party, the political core of the Union.*" [8] Khaled Mohieddin, incidentally, had been appointed chairman of the board of *Al-Akhbar*, one of Cairo's three main newspapers, in 1964, but was relieved from this post in October 1965.[9] He nevertheless remains active in Egyptian politics and went to Havana early in 1966 as a delegate to the Communist-sponsored Tricontinental Solidarity Congress. A similar congress is scheduled to be held in Cairo in 1968 at the invitation of President Nasser.[10]

The troubles of the Egyptian Communists, however, are not over. Early in 1966, fourteen members of a Chinese-oriented "Arab Communist Party," led by Mustafa Agha, were brought to trial in Cairo on charges of plotting to overthrow the regime and set up an Egyptian "people's republic." The trial was held *in camera*, reportedly because members of the Chinese Communist Embassy in Cairo were implicated.[11] The Soviets quickly dissociated themselves from Mustafa Agha's radical Communist grouping, calling Agha himself a "counterfeiter" and a "political adventurer with shady contacts." [12]

The recent history of the Egyptian Communist movement would thus seem to indicate that its adherents are not necessarily in full agreement on the present united front approach. These tactics were, in fact, proscribed in December 1964 at a meeting of Arab Communist representatives in Vienna, in which Khaled Bakdash was a leading participant. Setting forth his views on this issue in a later article in *The World Marxist Review*, Bakdash maintained that while Communists recognize the role of revolutionary forces advocating socialism and call for unity among all these forces, "this unity cannot be based on the disbandment of Communist parties or their being dissolved in other parties." [13]

For his part, President Nasser has denied giving the Communists too important a role to play under his regime, especially in the press. "We are not handing over the press to the Communists," he was reported to have told a secret session of the Egyptian National Assembly early in 1965. His government, he added, has never been afraid of the Communists because their number was never significant.[14]

Moscow's Egyptian Policy

If Nasser views the Egyptian Communists as an insignificant threat, so has Moscow tended to regard them as too few and ineffectual to be a useful tool of Soviet interests. For this reason, Soviet theoreticians concerned with the Middle East instead began focusing their attention on Egypt's revolutionary officers and the socialist ideas toward which they seemed to be leaning. At first, however, ideological considerations took a back seat to practical foreign policy objectives in Moscow's attitude toward the Nasser regime. Thus, in a 1957 interview with Hassanein Heikal, editor-in-chief of *Al-Ahram*, Khrushchev stressed Soviet sympathy and support for Egypt's "national liberation movement" in the general context of the developing countries' efforts to achieve full economic as well as political independence, but had little to say about the question of internal socialist development.[15] The same theme was again dominant on the occasion of President Nasser's visit to the USSR in 1958.[16]

The practical rather than ideological emphasis in Moscow's policy towards Nasser was also evident in Soviet reactions to anti-Communist manifestations in Egypt. Thus, a *Pravda* article commenting on statements by Hassanein Heikal to the effect that communism as an ideology was not suited to condi-

[7] "United Arab Republic: New Stage," *New Times* (Moscow), December 1, 1965, p. 4.
[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5. (Italics in original.)
[9] See *The New York Times*, Oct. 17, 1965.
[10] *Pravda*, Jan. 8, 1966.
[11] *The Economist* (London), March 5, 1966, p. 889; *The New York Times*, Jan. 31, 1966.
[12] *Pravda*, Dec. 12, 1965.
[13] North American Edition (Toronto, Canada), December 1965, p. 19.
[14] *The New York Times*, March 14, 1965.
[15] *Pravda*, Nov. 26, 1957.
[16] *Cf. Ibid.*, May 16, 1958.

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tions in the Arab world placed major stress on the need for unity in the national liberation struggle:

How can there be talk of the national unity of an Arab state fighting for independence if the party of the working class—the most steadfast and consistent fighter against imperialism—is excluded from this unity. How can the tasks of the national liberation revolution be solved if the working class and working peasantry remain outside the pale? It is clear to all that unless the working masses are mobilized through their parties to carry out the national liberation revolution, this revolution runs the danger of becoming merely a revival of the old colonialist order under a new guise.[17]

Speaking at the 21st Party Congress in Moscow less than a month earlier, Khrushchev had made much the same point, adding: "We do not conceal the fact that we and some of the leaders of the United Arab Republic have divergent views in the sphere of ideology." [18]

Two years later, in July 1961, President Nasser's initiation of extensive social and economic reforms aroused new Soviet interest in Egyptian internal developments. Soviet comment on the reforms was expressed by two young specialists on the Middle East, R. Avakov and Georgy Mirsky, who hailed them as a step forward but felt that they remained within the framework of state capitalism:

Indisputably, these [nationalization] measures do not in themselves transcend the framework of state capitalism. The social base of the regime remains narrow, and the popular masses, as before, are not allowed to participate in deciding the country's fate. Nevertheless, this narrow base is not a base of bourgeois or, even less, of feudal rule.[19]

Soviet interest was further heightened in March 1964 when the Nasser regime promulgated a constitutional declaration making all nationalized enterprises the property of the people and affirming that the UAR was building socialism. This action and the Cairo government's simultaneous release of Egyptian Communists from prison were duly welcomed by Soviet commentators as "progressive" steps.[20] Shortly thereafter, Khrushchev paid his much-publicized visit to Egypt. Mercurial as usual, he generally overstated the case for Arab unity, yet on one occasion publicly admonished his hosts for construing this unity in narrow nationalistic fashion rather than in terms of working-class solidarity. He apparently also overstepped his authority in granting a loan of $277 million (252 million rubles) to the UAR and bestowing the order of "Hero of the Soviet Union" on President Nasser.[21] In one of his speeches, the Soviet leader pointedly credited Arab socialism with the gains the UAR had accomplished. "We Communists," he said, "are aware of what you have achieved and share your happiness as you follow the path of socialism." [22]

At this point, it may be useful to review Soviet economic assistance to the UAR. Khrushchev's Egyptian visit was timed to coincide with the completion of the first stage of the Soviet-supported Aswan Dam project, and the new loan extended by the Soviet leader during his stay further expanded Soviet aid over and above the construction of the dam and other earlier commitments. Altogether, between July 1954 and December 1964, the Soviet Union extended to the Nasser government a total of $833 million worth of aid in both loans and outright grants (as compared with US aid amounting to $907 million).[23] There has likewise been a substantial increase in Soviet-Egyptian trade in recent years, the annual trade volume for 1965 showing a rise of approximately 80 percent over the level of 1962.[24]

In a radio and television speech following his return from Cairo, Khrushchev felt impelled to defend his extension of Soviet aid commitments to the UAR on the ground that they would solidify Soviet-Arab "brotherhood":

Each of us well understands the meaning of the expression, "Better to have a hundred friends than a hundred rubles." The assistance we are giving to the peoples of the developing countries will be repaid a hundredfold. It will be the strongest cement for the brotherhood of the Soviet people and other peoples, in this case, the Soviet people and the people of the United Arab Republic.[25]

Other Soviet spokesmen have justified Soviet aid-and-trade policies in the "third world" in more con-

[17] *Ibid.*, Feb. 19, 1959.
[18] *Ibid.*, Jan. 28, 1959.
[19] "O klassovoy strukture v slaborazvitykh stranakh," *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, No. 4, 1962, pp. 68-82, cited in *The Third World in Soviet Perspective—Studies by Soviet Writers on the Developing Areas*, edited by Thomas Perry Thornton, Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1964.
[20] "The Neo-Colonial Course of the Imperialists and the Creation of Tension Spots," *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia* No. 7, 1964, p. 71.
[21] *Cf.* Uri Ra'anan, "Moscow and the Third World," *Problems of Communism*, January-February, 1965.
[22] *The New York Times*, May 12, 1964.
[23] Milton Kovner, "Soviet Trade and Aid," *Current History*, October 1965, p. 232.
[24] *Izvestia* (Moscow), Dec. 9, 1965.
[25] *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, May 28, 1964.

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crete and less emotional terms. For example, a Soviet economist observed:

With the help of the socialist countries, the developing countries are implementing planned programs of national revival and are speeding up the tempo of economic and social progress, thus preparing the basis for a gradual transition to a path which is free of capitalist exploitation.[26]

Interestingly enough, an Egyptian Marxist living in exile in Paris has expressed a contrary view of Soviet-bloc aid to Nasser, arguing that it "only prolongs the existence of a regime which is incapable of bringing about the objective conditions for a socialist path of development." [27]

Changing Soviet Theoretical View

Whatever doubts Egyptian Communists might have had, Soviet theoreticians during 1964 inclined more and more toward the view that the UAR was headed in the right direction—*i.e.*, towards eventual socialism. Writing in *Kommunist* (June 1964), I. Belyaev and V. Cheprakov argued that the character of the reforms instituted in the UAR pointed to the conclusion that the country was on a road of non-capitalist development—"not a third road, a cross between capitalism and socialism as the Western press is attempting to describe it today, but a road leading to socialism." Participants in a late 1964 Moscow symposium on political and social trends in developing countries generally took a similar view. As one of them put it,

The reforms now being carried out in the UAR are radically changing the social face of the country. The laws on nationalization and cooperation are objectively undermining the foundations of private ownership and preparing conditions for the liquidation of capitalist relations.[28]

Writing in early 1965, Georgy Mirsky voiced the opinion that developments in the UAR during 1964 had been keynoted by "the introduction of more profound social reforms as part of a new stage of the national democratic revolution." [29] These reforms, he added, not only assured a higher rate of economic growth but also eliminated "the social base of neo-colonialism," thus living up to the thesis of the "non-capitalist development of the national democratic revolution" enunciated at the 1960 Moscow conference of 81 Communist parties. In other words, Soviet theorists have fitted the UAR's military leaders into their concept of "patriotic revolutionary democrats."

More recently, Karen Brutens, a leading Soviet authority on the developing countries, wrote that the example and influence of the world socialist system and the socialist countries' all-out assistance to developing nations are playing a vital role in the present "epoch of transition from capitalism to socialism on a world scale." More specifically, she pointed out—apparently with the UAR in mind—that the Communist bloc has helped "revolutionary democrats" in developing countries, representing the viewpoint of "patriotic intellectuals and democratic army circles," to assume a non-capitalist position. The pattern of development does not necessarily follow that of the Communist bloc, she added, but "Lenin repeatedly emphasized that the oppressed nations would contribute something of their own to different forms of democracy, different forms of transition to socialism." [30]

It is significant that the role of the military has been receiving increased attention in Soviet theoretical discussions concerning developments in the emerging nations. Thus, a recent article by G. Mirsky and T. Pokatayeva pointed out:

The question of the place of the military intelligentsia—the officers—until now almost neglected in Soviet literature, deserves special study. This military intelligentsia often plays an independent political role and represents a force apart in all countries of the "third world," a force whose significance is ever increasing.[31]

The thought that the authors evidently meant to convey was that in countries where Marxist parties are not strong or influential enough to be effective instruments, the only channel for spreading socialist ideology is the revolutionary intelligentsia—in the case of the UAR, the military officer corps.

Soviet theorists admit that the Free Officers organization, when it first assumed power in Egypt, had only hazy ideas of the aims of the revolution. They view the subsequent course of the revolution, however, as "progressive" and—in the words of

[26] E. Utkin, "The Economy of the Developing Countries," *Planovoye khozyaistvo* No. 6, June 1965, p. 81.
[27] Hassan Riad, *L'Egypte Nasserienne*, Paris, 1964, p. 225.
[28] *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, No. 6, 1964, p. 75.
[29] G. Mirsky, "Basic Trends in the Arab World," *New Times*, Feb. 10, 1965, p. 3.
[30] K. Brutens, "The Developing Countries and the Breakup of the Colonial System," *International Affairs* (Moscow), January 1966, pp. 68-76, *passim*.
[31] "Classes and Class Struggle in Developing Countries," *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, No. 2, 1966, p. 49.

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K. Ivanov—as confirming "the Marxist thesis that armies formed by the exploiters and colonialists for suppressing a people can, in certain circumstances, become the core of patriotic resistance." Today, Ivanov notes, "the army revolutionary councils in the UAR and Burma are tackling the difficult task of organizing progressive political parties." [32] Ivanov no doubt had reference to the same development noted by Mirsky in his earlier-cited article—*i.e.*, the projected establishment within the Arab Socialist Union of a "vanguard party" sparked by the leftist-oriented Free Officers.[33]

Reservations and Obstacles

While confident that the UAR is moving along a "progressive" non-capitalist path, Soviet theorists are careful to recognize a distinction between the ideology of the UAR leadership and Soviet-style socialism, as well as the existence of certain obstacles to further socialist development. On the first point, V. Tyagunenko cautions:

When we speak of the socialist concepts that are spreading in liberated countries, we mean, of course, not the Marxist-Leninist scientific brand of socialism, but the doctrines of representatives of non-proletarian elements.[34]

On the second point, E. Primakov pointed out in a *Pravda* article (Nov. 25, 1965) that it would be hard to expect a country like the UAR to break away easily from its long-established economic ties and relations and to overcome its economic backwardness without difficulties and mistakes. He added, however:

The main thing today is not the fact that these difficulties and mistakes have been discovered, but that the UAR is not giving up its firmly-chosen socialist path.

The theorists acknowledge the presence of other problems as well. One sore point is the UAR leadership's cherished slogan of Arab unity, which—as Khrushchev complained during his Egyptian tour—seems to place exclusive stress on nationalism. This question, however, appears to have been resolved, at least for the time being, by construing the concept to mean unity based on a non-capitalist path leading to eventual socialism.[35] The existence in the UAR of a civil-servant corps composed in its upper levels of members of the old privileged social classes is regarded as another major obstacle to further socialist development.[36]

Finally, there is the problem of Islam. Tyagunenko argues, rather ingeniously, that religion can help to unite the popular masses since certain social demands can take on a religious aspect, and that therefore "the proclamation of Islam as the state religion of the UAR does not, at the present stage, hinder the development of the country along the non-capitalist path." [37] Other Soviet specialists, however, take a more pessimistic view. In a book published in 1965 under the auspices of the USSR Academy of Sciences, for example, L. I. Klimovich assailed the teachings of Islam as fundamentally opposed to social progress:

The Koran lowers the dignity of man, his mind, his nobility, his creative forces, which are boundless in their capacity for development. No matter how he tries, man cannot create anything worthwhile on the basis of the Koran. The Koran depicts life and human pursuits as illusory and vain.[38]

Arab vs. Soviet Socialism

Despite these problems, Soviet policy towards the UAR and the theoretical line advanced to justify it continue to view the Nasser regime as led by "revolutionary democrats" moving in the direction of socialism. The 23rd Congress of the CPSU, held last March, brought forth no new theoretical formulations affecting this line or the national liberation movement in general, and Premier Kosygin's subsequent visit to the UAR in May merely reaffirmed Moscow's intent to pursue friendly collaboration with Nasser. Soviet-UAR relations, Kosygin declared during his visit, have gone beyond the framework of peaceful coexistence to "a new type imbued with the spirit of mutual trust and based on widespread cooperation in all fields." [39]

The Soviet attempt to fit the developments of the

[32] "The National Liberation Movement and the Non-Capitalist Path of Development," *International Affairs* (Moscow), May 1965, pp. 60.
[33] See footnote 7.
[34] "The Socialist Doctrines of Social Development in Liberated Countries," *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia,* No. 8, 1965, p. 80.
[35] *E.g.*, see O. Tuganova, "The Arab Movement for Unity," *International Affairs,* No. 1, 1965, p. 35.
[36] See previously cited article by G. Mirsky and T. Pokatayeva (footnote 31), p. 42.
[37] V. Tyagunenko, *loc. cit.* (footnote 34), p. 84.
[38] *Islam,* Moscow, 1965, p. 75.
[39] *Pravda,* May 12, 1966.

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UAR's revolution into a Marxist—or at least a Marxist-oriented—mold poses the question of just where so-called "Arab socialism" stands in relation to Soviet-style communism. For the most part, Western scholarship has been disinclined to view "socialist" developments in the UAR as Soviet-oriented. George Lenczowski holds that Arab socialism does not follow any old-fashioned, rigid theories and aims primarily at expanding the base of national wealth rather than at its redistribution.[40] William E. Griffith takes the view that Arab socialism has stripped communism of most of its gospel and substituted a much more effective ideology of its own.[41] Some other scholars see in Nasser's socialism strong elements of Titoism.[42]

President Nasser himself, while admitting to having studied Marxism "with sympathy" in his youth, has been quite explicit in stating his own differences with communism. He has indicated, in the first place, that as a good Muslim he could not accept Communist atheism; and, in the second place, that he rejected communism because it meant a certain degree of control from Moscow. To these two objections Nasser added a third in a December 1961 speech in which he stated that "we do not accept the dictatorship of the proletariat . . . because this also means the domination of a small group."[43] He has since reaffirmed these differences in a speech before the UAR National Assembly in February 1965.[44]

Arab socialism, according to Nasser, is scientific, but at the same time non-Marxist, non-atheistic, and non-materialistic. As he put it in 1964:

Everyone must employ scientific methods . . . if we want true socialism, pure and successful, it must follow scientific lines. The opposite of the scientific method is anarchy. Therefore, our socialism is scientific socialism. . . . It is [however] not at all a materialistic socialism. We have not said that our socialism is Marxist; we have not said that we are atheistic. . . .[45]

It is quite evident from this statement that the "scientific socialism" of Nasser differs considerably from "scientific socialism" as defined in Marxist-Leninist terms. Nevertheless, in an interview published in *Pravda* early this year (February 6), the UAR leader declared categorically that "we are now in a transitional stage from capitalism to socialism," and that there would be no turning away from this path, which is laid down in the Charter of the UAR. At the same time, it should be noted that the Charter states that "real solutions to the problems of one people cannot be imported from the experiences of another," and that "social freedom, namely socialism, does not mean observing rigid theories which have not arisen out of the nature of national experience."[46]

Thus, while there is no denying that Soviet influence in the UAR is considerable, both ideologically and in terms of economic and military assistance, President Nasser has been able to steer an independent course and seems determined to continue doing so in the future. Nasser and his colleagues have repeatedly asserted that they have no wish to replace one form of imperialism (capitalist) with another (Communist). Their concept of Arab socialism, as the preceding discussion indicates, is all their own and likely to remain so, barring events beyond their control.

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[40] "The Objects and Methods of Nasserism," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. XIX, No. 1, 1965, pp. 69-70.

[41] "Communist Polycentrism and the Underdeveloped Areas," in *New Nations in a Divided World—the International Relations of the Afro-Asian States*, edited by Kurt London, New York, F. A. Praeger, 1963, pp. 281-82.

[42] *E.g.*, Charles D. Cremeans, *The Arabs and the World—Nasser's Arab Nationalist Policy*, New York, F. A. Praeger, 1963, p. 277; Charles Issawi, *Egypt in Revolution—An Economic Analysis*, London, Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 311; Mansfield *op. cit.* (footnote 4), p. 132.

[43] Mansfield, *op. cit.*, pp. 194, 93.

[44] *The New York Times*, Feb. 27, 1965.

[45] *Al-Ahram*, Nov. 13, 1964.

[46] "The Charter," Information Department, Cairo, p. 36.

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Ten Years That Shook the World: I

EDITORS' NOTE: In the aftermath of the dramatic events that rocked the Communist world in 1956, it became clear that the international Communist movement was undergoing a crisis of major proportions. Yet not even the most gifted of prophets could then have foreseen the enormity and complexity of the developments that have taken place in the decade since, vitally altering the power relations within the Communist movement and the complexion of communism itself. The articles below, though they range in focus from broad to narrow aspects of the current scene, all deal with phenomena that in some degree are an outgrowth of the 1956 upheaval. Mr. Devlin gives us a kaleidoscopic view of the shifting currents within communism in various parts of the globe, pleading the need for new comparative methods of analysis and study on the part of non-Communist observers. Mr. Croan broadly reviews the dynamic changes going on in Eastern Europe, stressing the resurgence of traditional diversity in the area and the emergence of new relationships with Moscow. Mr. Bromke's discussion is confined to a single aspect of the Polish scene, the recent debate between advocates of "realism" and champions of a romantic nationalist view of Poland's history—a debate which on either side underscores the ideological bankruptcy of the 1956-born Gomulka regime. Further articles in the November-December issue will continue to assess the effects of this crucial decade of Communist development.

A Movement Transformed:
Some Consequences and Lessons

By Kevin Devlin

Ten years ago the centralized (and fundamentally anachronistic) world system which Stalin bequeathed to international communism was undergoing its first major crisis: a profound crisis of authority, the full significance of which was at the time largely lost as much upon Communists themselves as upon non-Communist observers. Successive tremors shook that precariously monolithic structure—Khrushchev's fateful demolition of the Stalin myth, and the Soviet endorsement of different roads to socialism at the 20th CPSU Congress; the Poznan riots and the "Polish October"; the Soviet repression of the Hungarian revolution, accompanied by Chinese intervention and followed

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by the defection of thousands of disillusioned Western Communists; the collapse of the first Soviet-Yugoslav *rapprochement.*

By the fall of 1957 the crisis seemed to have passed. The solidarity of the ruling parties, under Soviet leadership, was apparently confirmed by the joint declaration issued after the November conference in Moscow;[1] the Gomulka regime was beginning to whittle down the liberties won in October, and in East Germany the revisionist Harich had been sentenced to ten years' imprisonment; in the West, Communist leaders had recovered from the wave of "Hungarian" defections, and were again proclaiming their loyality to the Fatherland of All Toilers. There were obvious reasons for this recovery. Despite the successive shocks of 1956, the habit of disciplined solidarity and of acceptance of Soviet directives was still strong, and the polarizing influence of the Cold War also helped to tighten the ranks. Moreover, while differences had already arisen between the Russians and the Chinese on certain ideological issues, the Sino-Soviet conflict had not yet developed to provide an alternative center of leadership and influence for the smaller parties. Finally, the leaders of these minor parties had not grasped the significance of the changes that had taken place in the international movement, and of the further radical changes that had become inevitable.

However, even if actors and onlookers failed to realize it, the crisis of 1956-57 had laid bare some of the fundamental ideological and organizational contradictions on which the Stalinist world system was based; and, when the crisis passed, the old order in its classical form had also passed—although a semblance of it would persist for some years, giving way only gradually to a new and still developing structure of inter-party relationships.

The Sino-Soviet conflict has been the central feature of this decade of divergence; and it has also been the most important single factor in the process of differentiation and polycentric development which is still transforming the Communist world. The death of Stalin was followed by the gradual emergence of sectional interests and the concomitant loosening of organizational and doctrinal bonds, but from 1963 on the open Chinese challenge to Soviet hegemony accelerated these changes. Led by the Rumanian party inside the bloc and the Italian party outside it, even parties classified as "pro-Soviet" began to respond to local problems and opportunities as never before, ready on occasion to put their own interests before the demands of proletarian internationalism as interpreted by the Kremlin. The outcome of the Moscow "consultative conference" of March 1965—in effect, a posthumous triumph for Togliatti—demonstrated the profound change that had come about in inter-party relations. Now the Italian Communist Party no longer needs to fight for its formula of "unity in diversity and autonomy": a looser, more permissive set-up has become a fact of international Communist life, recognized and exploited by an increasing number of parties; and where the CPSU used to direct subordinates it must now sometimes persuade allies—and not always with success. On the other side of the ideological battle-lines, the shifting attitudes of the Vietnamese, Korean and Japanese parties have taught the Chinese the bitter lesson that today's Marxist-Leninist ally may be tomorrow's independent neutral, prepared to cooperate with the revisionist traitors if the conditions are right.

Basic Changes

A brief glance at developments in the Communist world during the first half of this year will give some measure of the extent and significance of the transformation. How many of the following items would have been conceivable even five years ago, let alone ten?

1). The 23rd Congress of the CPSU (March 29-April 8, 1966) was itself very much a product of the changed times. On the one hand it showed the gains made by the new Soviet leadership in the Sino-Soviet conflict—only the Albanian, New Zealand and Japanese CPs, with the proscribed and Chinese-dominated parties of Burma, Malaya and Thailand, followed Peking's lead in boycotting the congress. On the other hand, the Russians won and retained this support by asking relatively little in return. Thus, there were no embarrassing calls for a showdown: a tone of reasonableness and restraint pervaded the three paragraphs which Brezhnev devoted to the conflict with the Chinese, whom the

[1] Only six years later did the Chinese reveal the controversy and compromises that lay behind the "unanimous" Declaration of 1957. See "The Origin and Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves," *People's Daily/Red Flag*, Peking, Sept. 6, 1963.

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Russians were virtuously ready to meet at any time for a discussion of differences (but not for ideological compromises).[2] Avoiding controversial questions, the congress safely emphasized anti-imperialist unity—among equals. Not only did Brezhnev reaffirm the autonomy of each party and condemn "hegemonic trends" in the world movement: he modestly described the great party of Lenin as being simply "a component part, one of the detachments of the international Communist movement."

2). True to their tradition of intransigent voluntarism, the Chinese have responded to reverses by raising exaltation of Mao's thought to new levels of universal relevance, explicitly claiming leadership of the world revolution, and insisting on the necessity for worldwide political, ideological and organizational "demarcation" between Marxist-Leninists and revisionists.[3]

3). While the North Korean and North Vietnamese regimes, formerly aligned with Peking, have been strengthening their neutralist positions (as shown by their attendance at the 23rd Congress), the Japanese Communist Party has begun moving cautiously in the same direction. On February 4 of this year a major article in the party daily, *Akahata*, criticized Soviet revisionism (and particularly Soviet factionalist intervention in Japan), but departed from the Chinese line by arguing that Communist "lack of solidarity" was having such a harmful effect on the Vietnamese struggle that "it is not possible to put off international joint action . . . until the complete overcoming of modern revisionism is attained." Scretary-General Miyamoto's subsequent visits to Hanoi and Pyongyang produced notably neutralist joint communiqués, while his stay in Peking produced no communiqué at all. The JCP Central Committee plenum held in late April brought further evidence that Miyamoto's "independent" faction was now dominant. An *Akahata* editorial on the plenum (May 11) attacked not only revisionists but "sectarians," who were guilty of "unconditionally revering the leadership of foreign parties"—that is, the Chinese. These rebels, it revealed, had actually formed a splinter-party on the Left, the "Japanese CP (Liberation Front)," to balance the secessionist "Japanese CP (Voice of Japan)," founded in December 1964, on the Right. In mid-June a JCP delegation ended a 25-day visit to Rumania by signing a markedly neutralist communiqué; and a few days later, on the occasion of a visit to Tokyo by the Soviet trade union leader, Viktor Grishin, the JCP reopened inter-party contacts with the CPSU.

4). While other East European regimes try to cope with uncoordinated economic reforms, the Rumanians continue to emphasize and exploit the independence proclaimed in their historic statement of April 1964—resisting Soviet moves to strengthen the Warsaw Pact, and even recalling past Soviet wrongs against Rumania (see Ceausescu's speech of May 17); developing ties with the West and refusing to join in a bloc condemnation of "revanchist" West Germany; welcoming Tito, Brezhnev and Chou En-lai in succession to Bucharest, without making significant concessions to any of their very different positions.

5). Like Rumania, Cuba is *sui generis*. Castro began 1966 by publicizing his rift with Communist China. At the Havana Tricontinental Congress which followed he attempted to establish special relations with the Guatemalan Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) and other representatives of the Latin American "Jacobin Left." Chafing under the economic bonds which tie him to the USSR, he allowed his delegate to the 23rd Congress, Armando Hart

[2] The ostentatious restraint shown by the Russians at the 23rd Congress takes on added significance when one refers to the letter which the CPSU sent to other Communist parties shortly before the congress (having reached the West through an East German source, it was published by *Die Welt* of Hamburg on March 21). This document criticized in detail the "hegemonic" and factionalist activities of the Chinese, contrasting this with the patient responsibility displayed by the Russians in repeated but vain approaches to Peking; clearly, its purpose was to isolate the Chinese. (See box on p. 57).

[3] This call for global "demarcation," elaborated in the *People's Daily/Red Flag* editorial of Nov. 11, 1965, was taken up by the Albanian and New Zealand CPs and by the secessionist parties of Australia, Ceylon, Belgium, Peru, Colombia and Brazil—but not, significantly, by the Vietnamese, Korean or Japanese parties.

The New Dialectic

There are things that divide us and nothing that unites us, things that are antagonistic and nothing that is common. . . . The antagonism between Marxism-Leninism and Khrushchev revisionism is a class antagonism between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. . . . It is an irreconcilable antagonism.

—"Refutation of the New Leaders of the CPSU on 'United Action,'" Peking Review, Nov. 12, 1965.

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Davalos, to chide the Russians, indirectly but obviously, for not "assuming any necessary risks" to turn North Vietnam into a "graveyard for American aircraft."[4] In his May 1 speech Castro continued this indirect criticism, referring sourly to unnamed regimes which attempt to "build communism in a single country without productive forces and technology being first built up in other underdeveloped countries," and adding waspishly that Cubans would not trust their defense to others—"especially when we see what is happening in Vietnam." There was no lack of other targets: during this period the Cuban leader also launched bitter attacks against Yugoslavia (*Granma*, February 13), the Trotskyist movement (in his speech at the Tricontinental Congress), and the "so-called governments" of Latin America, whom he denounced collectively as "traitors" in his February letter to U Thant.

6). Meanwhile, the West European Communist Parties (or at least the legal ones) continue on their revisionist, regional road. The most significant development here has been the strengthening of the new friendship between the French and Italian parties—the *rapprochment* effected at the Longo-Rochet talks in Geneva in May 1965 having been converted into a formal alliance at the meeting in Rome last November.[5] This alliance was made possible largely by the French party's shift over the past year to more flexible, revisionist positions—a change manifested in its attitudes to the Catholics as well as to the non-Communist Left, and in the decisive March Central Committee meetings.[6] It is significant that the conference of West European Communist parties, held in Vienna early in May,[7] was preceded by two-day talks between the Italian and French party leaders at San Remo. The PCI-PCF alliance—emphasizing opportunistic attempts to work *within* the framework of Western institutions, notably the Common Market, and to win the tactical cooperation of non-Communist forces—will be a decisive factor in the further evolution of communism in Western Europe. The primarily revisionist character of that evolution was exemplified by the chorus of criticism with which most West European Communist parties met the Siniavski-Daniel verdict.[8]

This brief outline of recent Communist developments is not only sketchy but arbitrarily incomplete. One might add other items—for example, the interestingly varied reactions of other parties to the catastrophe suffered by the Indonesian CP last fall; the complex jockeying for electoral positions now going on between the rival Indian Communist parties (each divided into sub-factions), and the discreet Soviet attempts to intervene; the entry of the Finnish CP into the Government, following concessions made to the revisionist wing at the recent congress; and so forth. Nevertheless, the outline has served its purpose if it has established the contrast with 1956, and pointed to the profound changes which have occurred in the international movement during this decade.

Such radical changes in world communism call for corresponding changes in Communist studies. In particular, the process of differentiation and polycentric development, touched upon earlier, demands, first, that we pay greater attention to sections of the world movement that have been neglected in the past; and, secondly, that we make systematic attempts to develop new, *comparative* approaches to the study of communism. Before elaborating this suggestion, however, it will be useful to examine more closely the nature of these complex changes which have taken place in the Communist world.

Loyalties: Bygone and New

In general, the transformation of international communism has been characterized by the erosion of doctrinal and organizational bonds, both in the

[4] *Pravda*, April 2, 1966. In this speech Hart also implicitly criticized the Latin American Communist party leaderships (and the CPSU) by declaring that "the ideas, tactics and methods developed in the 20-year [postwar] period have proved outdated": Castroist revolutionary violence was the only way ahead for the continent.

[5] The *Protocole d'Accord* negotiated at this meeting—a major event in the history of West European communism—was not published until February 11. It called for collaboration and consultation not only between the two parties but between the CGT and CGIL labor federations, through a permanent joint committee.

[6] See the special number of *Cahiers du communisme*, May-June 1966.

[7] Previous conferences of West European Communist parties had been held in Rome in November 1959 and in Brussels in June 1965. The British, Dutch, Icelandic, Irish and Portuguese parties were not represented in Vienna; and the absence of the first two was significant, as showing their present reluctance to become involved in inter-party affairs (both had attended the Brussels meeting, although the Dutch had refused to sign the common statements). The communiqué adopted in Vienna was redolent of revisionist regionalism (*L'Humanité*, May 13). At a press conference afterwards the Austrian CP spokesman, Franz Marek, stated that the Sino-Soviet dispute had *not* been discussed, and that the results of the meeting would *not* be communicated to East European parties (*Volksstimme*, May 13.)

[8] *Cf.* K. Devlin, "Echoes of the Tertz Affair," *The New Leader*, March 28, 1966.

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movement as a whole and within individual parties, and by the strengthening of sectional interests formerly restrained by the demands of proletarian internationalism—which, in practice, meant the interests of the Soviet regime. During the past three years even the most insignificant Communist parties have begun to devote primary attention to their own local problems and opportunities. During the same period factional struggles of one kind or another have developed inside the great majority of non-ruling Communist parties (the ruling parties, operating through totalitarian regimes, can usually suppress such struggles, or at least the evidence of them).

Nevertheless, despite this general loosening of bonds, and the polycentric tendency for national parties to follow their own paths in their own ways, there are strong counterforces making for solidarity —if of a different type. The international movement remains recognizably a movement, even if its members no longer march in step. There are a number of reasons for this.

First, there is the doctrinal basis of communism and its universal, absolute claims: ideological and organizational erosion is accompanied, inevitably, by ideological rationalization, often in the name of "creative Marxism." *Plus ça change, plus ça doît être la même chose.*

Secondly, the tradition of disciplined solidarity has deep roots, which are further strengthened by self-interest: the global community is a unique political asset which any Communist party will be reluctant to dissipate. This applies also to the "revisionist" parties in the industrial West, which are set apart from the Social Democratic parties—whose reformist positions they have in large measure adopted, justifying Bernstein's analysis—by their membership in the international "revolutionary" movement. (There are, of course, other characteristics, notably the retention of "democratic centralism," which distinguish the most revisionist Communist parties from the Social Democrats.) Incidentally, this is one reason why there are significant limitations to the critical attitudes which these parties occasionally adopt toward Communist regime policy and practice.[9]

Thirdly, the post-Khrushchev leadership of the CPSU has clearly accepted (and is, indeed, exploiting, in shrewd and successful response to the Chinese challenge) this looser structure of inter-party relations. For, despite Brezhnev's modest disclaimer, the CPSU remains and must remain first among equals. And as such—as the experienced, responsible and powerful elder brother—it can use its prestige, its material resources and the habit of loyalty to assert leadership of a new kind: counsel replacing command, and influence replacing instruction (with various methods of traditional pressure still available in appropriate cases). The remarkably mild Soviet reaction to West European Communist criticism of the Siniavski-Daniel trial fits into this new pattern, as do the cautious Soviet efforts to mediate between the rival Indian Communist parties.

In this complex process of change one can, then, discern conflicting forces at work—on the one hand, making for differentiation, or even fragmentation; on the other hand, tending to maintain solidarity, even though of a different type. But the action of these conflicting groups of forces (as well as the interaction between them) is not subject to precise, quantitative analysis: one can only bear them in mind, and observe their effect in particular situations. These situations will be at once dissimilar and comparable; and here again we are brought back to the need for a new, global approach to the study of international communism.

Another development has also drawn attention to that need. This is the growth of regional communism—the tendency for parties operating in similar conditions and facing similar problems to develop along similar political and ideological lines, often through bilateral and multilateral consultation and communication. This tendency is even becoming institutionalized: the CPSU has given its explicit approval to regional conferences such as those that have taken place between the West European, Middle Eastern, Central American and Latin American Communist parties. Here, again, the need for a comparative approach is obvious, if one would wish to assess, for example, the attitudes of Middle Eastern parties toward the Nasser regime, of West European parties toward Social Democracy, or of Latin American parties toward revolutionary violence.

However, the study of regional communism must take account of regional diversity. This is not merely a matter of the obvious and basic differences between, say, the legal and clandestine parties in Western Europe and Latin America. Parties which seem to share much the same operating conditions, problems and opportunities may take very different positions, for reasons which can be explained only in terms of local factors, considered in detail. Thus,

[9] *Cf.* K. Devlin, "What Price Autonomy?", *Problems of Communism*, Sept.-Oct., 1965.

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the Swedish CP refused to attend the Brussels conference of West European parties in June 1965, and the Dutch CP attended only to bring the meeting to the verge of collapse through its intransigent independence and its refusal to draft or sign common documents. In contrast, the Swedish CP's Norwegian neighbor and the Dutch CP's Belgian neighbor—working in similar conditions, with similar problems—attended the conference and duly played the cooperative roles expected of them. This contrast must be explained through detailed reference to the ultra-revisionist line which C. H. Hermansson has established in Swedish communism since he took over from Hilding Hagberg in January 1964, and to the unique complex of positions [10] that, since the party congress of Easter 1964, has set the Dutch CP apart from its regional brothers.

A more complex and important example of regional diversity is provided by the French and Italian Communist parties. The differences and even friction between them over the years are well-known; and the traditional (and oversimplified) picture—with the PCI cast in the boldly revisionist role, and the PCF regarded as dogmatist, authoritarian and pro-Soviet—seemed to be supported by their respective reactions to the loss of Thorez and Togliatti in 1964. The new alliance between them, mentioned earlier, has obviously altered that familiar picture of PCI-PCF rivalry; but other changes which both parties have undergone in the recent past may not be so obvious. The PCI, which had reacted with bold flexibility to the loss of Togliatti (as in its publication of the Yalta Memorandum and its stand on the conference issue), subsequently entered upon a period of internal maneuvering—culminating at the 11th Congress (January 1966) in the triumph of the Longo-led "centrists," the voluntary quiescence of Amendola and the isolation of Ingrao—which in fact seems to mask a failure to adapt to new challenges, notably the persistence of the Center-Left and the impending reunification of the Socialists and Social Democrats.[11] The "sclerotic" French, on the other hand, have recently been reacting with a new vigor and imagination to the challenge of Gaullism, taking the lead in the search for a new alliance of the Left, based on a common program. In the process (responding in part to the wary demands of the Federation of the Democratic and Socialist Left), the PCF has been revising its political and ideological positions with remarkable speed, so that it now stands committed to a multiparty approach to pluralist socialism, with bourgeois rights guaranteed, including those of cultural and religious freedom. The March Central Committee meeting—with its emphasis on cultural revisionism and a meaningful dialogue with the Catholics, the charitable treatment of dissenters like Althusser, and the subsequent publication of divergent views in *L'Humanité*, *France Nouvelle* and *Cahiers du communisme*—was a milestone in the party's history.[12]

Such developments (however one interprets them) are of more than national or even regional significance, given the stature of the French and Italian Communist parties, and the part each plays in the international movement. However, the same observation may apply, if to a lesser extent, to smaller parties: membership and local political importance are not the only criteria of significance. The fact is that Communist parties, large and small, now influence and affect one another to an unprecedented degree. One sign of this change has been the marked increase in bilateral consultations between "minor" parties, which are thus enabled to exchange experiences and promote new alignments on particular issues as never before; the resulting joint communiqués offer an interesting field for comparative analysis.

[10] These Dutch positions include vigorous emphasis on independence, some criticism of the Russians (and even of "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev"), condemnation of Chinese positions combined with refusal to take part in an anti-Chinese showdown, a special interest in Titoist Yugoslavia, occasional neo-Stalinist severity toward dissidents combined with attempts to balance conflicting tendencies, and a modified united-front approach in domestic policies. Add the strange personality of Chairman Paul de Groot, and the result defies classification.

[11] Like some other judgments advanced in this essay, this conclusion cannot be supported here by detailed argument. However, the shifting positions taken during 1965 by leading figures in the PCI's debate over such questions as the *partito unico* make it clear that a struggle for personal influence lay behind the controversy. In this respect the speeches made by various party leaders at the October 1965 Central Committee meeting and at the 11th Congress are instructive.

[12] The PCF has also stressed its autonomy, noting that it can and does differ from the CPSU on certain questions (Waldeck Rochet interview in *L'Humanité*, March 9, 1966). At the same time, the party still clings to its now diluted version of the doctrine of the dictatorship of the proleteriat, holding that a Socialist France would have the right to prevent the "dispossessed classes" from regaining power (Waldeck Rochet in the same interview)—unlike the Italian, Austrian and Swedish Communist parties, which have theoretically admitted the possibility that a parliamentary Socialist regime may be voted out of power.

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Apart from these formal encounters, certain Communist parties exert significant ideological and political influence on others; and this is another factor to be fitted into the changing mosaic of international communism. One thinks, for instance, of the effect that Italian Communist thought and practice has had on the Communists of Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, Scandinavia, Chile and (in this case, up to 1965, appealing to dissident revisionists) France—not to speak of the Japanese Socialists. Again, there is the notable influence that the revisionist policies of the Swedish CP leader, C. H. Hermansson, have had on the other Scandinavian Communist parties (and even non-Communist parties, in view of his approaches to the Socialist People's Parties in Denmark and Norway). On the other hand, interaction sometimes results in a conflict of interests or a muted controversy; thus, the Italian CP, ever mindful of its public image, recently gave sympathetic attention to the views of the disgraced East German revisionist, Robert Havemann, and refuted the reply by a group of orthodox East German scholars.[13]

Within this new and more complex framework of inter-party relations, the statements and actions of minor Communist parties and even factions can sometimes throw useful light on the positions of those major ruling parties that have long been the primary concern of Western scholars. For example, it was the Belgian secessionist organ, *La Voix du Peuple*, which in July 1965 gave the first clear warning of the impending Sino-Cuban rift by criticizing Castro.[14] At times the "clues" are not so obvious. Thus, an extremely revisionist article on "Problems of West European Communist Parties" by Franz Marek in the November 1965 issue of the Austrian CP organ, *Weg und Ziel*—looking forward to multi-party socialism with organized opposition and the possibility of having the government ousted through elections, castigating "vulgar atheists" and dismissing the "misleading" doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat—gains greatly in interest and significance through a quiet footnote revealing that this is the text of a lecture which the Austrian theorist delivered before the Soviet Academy of Sciences: the implications of this seem worth pondering.

Occasionally the link is direct and clearly significant. For example, recent developments in the Israeli and Paraguayan Communist movements cast a revealing light on the CPSU's role (and its conception of that role) in the changed world movement. In August 1965 the Israeli Communists split into two rival parties—not, however, along the usual Sino-Soviet lines, but over the issues of Zionism and Arab anti-imperialism. The embarrassed CPSU has made repeated but vain attempts to reunite them; meanwhile, it remains on fraternal terms with both factions, recognizing each as representing *the* Communist Party of Israel—and thereby undermining its own Leninist principle that there can be only one legitimate Communist party in each country.[15] In the case of the clandestine Paraguayan Communist party, Moscow has given clear support to the at-

[13] See Prof. L. Lombardo-Radice's laudatory review of the Italian edition of Havemann's *Dialectic Without Dogma* in *L'Unità* of Jan. 5, 1966, and the critical letter of seven members of the East German Academy of Sciences, published with an editorial reply in *L'Unità* of April 5—four days after *Neues Deutschland* announced Havemann's expulsion from the Academy.

[14] *La Voix du Peuple* (Brussels), July 2, 1965.

[15] The Israeli factions are often referred to as the "Jewish" and "Arab" parties. In fact, while the faction led by Secretary-General Shmuel Mikunis is almost entirely Jewish, a third of the leadership of the other party, including the Secretary of the Politburo, Meir Wilner, consists of anti-Zionist Jews; however, it was Arab support which gave Wilner's party its three-to-one victory over its rival in the *Knesset* elections of November 1956. Both factions sent delegations to the 23rd Congress (although *Pravda* noted only that *the* Communist Party of Israel was represented). *Cf.* J. Kahn, "Les communistes israeliens à Moscou," *Est et Ouest* (Paris), Feb. 1-15, 1966.



A pro-Chinese View of Tito's Place in International Communism.

—From La voix du peuple (Brussels), April 1, 1966.

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tempt by a "Commission for the Defense and Reorganization of the PCP" to oust the veteran Secretary-General, Oscar Creydt, for "anti-Leninist" activities and alleged contacts with the Chinese. The commission's claim to have deposed Creydt, issued in August 1965, was approvingly publicized not only by the neighboring Argentine, Chilean and Uruguayan Communist parties, but also by Moscow's *Radio Paz y Progreso*. Subsequent developments were no less interesting: the January 1966 issue of *World Marxist Review* carried an article by two leading rebels;[16] the Paraguayan delegations to the Havana Tricontinental Congress and to the 23rd CPSU Congress were composed of anti-Creydt members, and the April 8 issue of *Pravda* reported the message of greeting in which they denounced the "former" Secretary-General. However, Creydt, announcing counter-excommunications, has maintained that he is still the legitimate leader of the PCP, has denied any links with the Chinese and, in a communiqué issued at the end of December 1965, has charged that the plot against him was instigated by a certain "European Socialist Party"—obviously the CPSU.[17] The situation remains obscure, but what is clear is that a Soviet *diktat* no longer suffices to effect a change in the leadership of even a small and ineffectual Communist party (one thinks, in contrast, of the way Stalin treated, or mistreated, the leaderships of certain East European parties in the late 1930's). Furthermore, although it has given *de facto* recognition to the rebels, the CPSU has not officially and explicitly announced that it considers Creydt to have been deposed. Changed times, indeed.

Sino-Soviet Reverberations

Both the Paraguayan factional struggle and the Israeli split are exceptions, however. One of the most important features of world communism in the present transitional phase is the polarizing effect of the Sino-Soviet conflict; and the internal struggles which have developed in so many non-ruling parties tend more usually to find expression in Sino-Soviet terms—partly, but not entirely, because of the determined campaign of worldwide factionalism which the Chinese have been conducting since 1963. Nevertheless, these local struggles almost always have demonstrably local roots, in local issues—tactics and strategy, personal conflicts, the party's attitude toward the non-Communist left or toward the government, and so on. Sino-Soviet polarization is therefore often not complete—here India offers an outstanding but very complex example [18]—and is not necessarily lasting (the future of pro-Chinese factions in non-revolutionary areas like Western Europe, for example, raises some intriguing questions). In some countries—France, Denmark, Mexico and Burma, for example—one finds, too, in addition to this polarization, surviving patterns of factionalism which predate the Sino-Soviet conflict. Moreover, in ironic obedience to the law of the dialectic, the phenomenon of splits within splits has already made its appearance. Thus in Italy the faction represented by the monthly *Nuova Unità* has for more than a year now been challenged by the rival grouping of *Il Comunista*, and similar splits have occurred in the pro-Chinese movements of Ceylon, England, and Belgium (in Holland, the two main pro-Chinese groups have never managed to unite in the first place).

The fact is that the picture of worldwide dichotomy conjured up by the Chinese insistence on global "demarcation" does not correspond to the much more complex reality. The key parties of North Vietnam, North Korea and Japan have already shown that they will put their own interests before allegiance to Peking's puritanical version of Marxism-Leninism (which is itself largely based, ultimately, upon a rationalization of state and party interests); and, before the bloody repression which followed the abortive *Gestapu* coup, the Indonesian

[16] A. Mora and V. Alonso, "Communists of Paraguay Prepare for Congress," *World Marxist Review*, January 1966.

[17] Since the Paraguayan Communists operate in clandestinity or in exile, it is difficult to assess the truth of their conflicting claims. The situation is complicated by the existence of an earlier anti-Creydt faction, the "Leninist Communist Party," which Creydt denounced in a *Pravda* article of June 9, 1964. For the ambiguous relations between the Leninist CP and the anti-Creydt "Commission," see the former group's "Open Letter" in the Montevideo daily *Epoca* of Sept. 12, 1965. *Cf.* W. McLaughlin, "'Leninist Reconstruction' in Paraguay," Radio Free Europe research paper, Munich, March 22, 1966.

[18] Another, and rather amusing, example is found in Switzerland. The tiny Swiss CP (PCS), founded in September 1963 by Gérard Bulliard as a pro-Chinese rival to the Swiss Labor (Communist) Party, evidently proved an embarrassment to the Chinese and the Bern Embassy. In May 1964 a rival anti-revisionist organization, the "Lenin Center," published the first number of its monthly organ, *Octobre;* dedicated to "the organic reconstitution . . . of a [Swiss] Marxist-Leninist party," it clearly enjoyed Chinese support. In wounded reaction, Bulliard proclaimed his neutrality in the Sino-Soviet conflict, and in the fall of 1965 he announced the formation of an "International Front of Revolutionary Solidarity," appealing grandiosely but without apparent success to "all revolutionary tendencies, whether they are 'pro-Chinese,' 'pro-Soviet,' unaligned, Trotskyist, anarchist, etc." (communiqué dated "September-October 1965").

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CP combined vigorously pro-Chinese positions with opportunistic revisionism in domestic affairs.

Anti-party factions and splinter-parties have at present more reason for proclaiming full loyalty to the Chinese evangelists of world revolution, who can give them increased prestige as well as propagandistic and sometimes material assistance. But here, too, the pressures of local interests and local realities can be discerned. The designation "pro-Chinese" as applied to, say, the Progressive Labor Party and the New England Party of Labor in the United States needs considerable qualification. In their letter sent to some other Communist parties before the 23rd Congress the Russians complained that "the Chinese leaders have established factional groups in approximately 30 countries."[19] If they were referring to factions and splinter-parties which were formed as a result of direct Chinese intervention, the figure was much too high; if they were referring to anti-party groups which have identified themselves, more or less, with Chinese positions, it was too low.

If this brief survey of some of the current characteristics of the changed and changing international Communist movement conveys a picture of bewildering complexity, one can only add that the reality is still more complex. Many other elements have been ignored—for example, the greatly increased sensitivity of both ruling and non-ruling parties to public opinion; the interaction of communism and nationalism in many countries; the conflict between technocratic and totalitarian pressures in Eastern Europe; the jolting contribution made by the writings of ideologists like Adam Schaff in the East and Roger Garaudy in the West; and so on.

Furthermore, the student of communism must also take account of the non-Communist forces and phenomena with which the movement and its constituent parties are inescapably involved. Some of these are of mainly local interest—for example, the Socialist parties of Japan and Chile, the Murba Party in Indonesia, Axel Larsen's Socialist People's Party in Denmark, the PSIUP in Italy, or the "New Left" in the United States. Others are of regional relevance. Thus, any study of West European communism, whatever its scope and thematic basis, would have to devote considerable attention to the history and changing positions of the Social Democratic parties; just as studies of African or Middle Eastern communism would probably involve consideration of the various brands of "African socialism" and "Arab socialism." Similarly, the student of Latin American communism must now pay increasing attention to the non-Communist and even non-Marxist revolutionary movements which have been proliferating so remarkably in recent years.[20]

Other relevant non-Communist forces are international in character. Religion is an important example: the relationship between Communist parties and religious movements—particularly Islam, the Catholics of the *aggiornamento*,[21] and the autocephalous Orthodox churches—seems to call for more systematic analysis than it has yet received. Then there is Trotskyism. The Sons of the Prophet Outcast are even more divided over his ideological heritage than the Communists are over that of Lenin;[22] and their scattered and squabbling groups have little influence or effect on local Communist parties (except in Bolivia, the United States, Guatemala and Ceylon). Nevertheless, the Sino-Soviet dispute has given a new vigor and ideological relevance to Trotskyism. The various groupings of the movement see different aspects of their doctrines justified by the revisionist (anti-Stalinist) wing of the pro-Soviet camp and by the Chinese emphasis on revolutionary violence; and they have made repeated efforts, with little success, to become involved in the ideological struggle. Isaac Deutscher's three-volume biography of Trotsky offers a monumental survey of the origins and early years of the movement, but there

[19] *Die Welt* (Hamburg), March 21; *New York Times*, March 24, 1966.

[20] In Peru, for example, one finds—in addition to the pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese Communist parties—the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), the Revolutionary Leftist Front (FIR), the Trotskyist Revolutionary Workers' Party (POR), the May 15 Group and the left-wing Catholic PSDC. The line between non-Communist and non-Marxist revolutionary movements (like some other lines) sometimes becomes blurred in Latin America.

[21] *Cf.* K. Devlin, "The Catholic-Communist 'Dialogue'," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1966.

[22] At present one can distinguish four main groupings in Trotskyism—the "Unified Secretariat" of the Fourth International, formed at a "Reunification Congress" in June 1963; the International Committee, representing most of the factions and parties which broke away from the old International Secretariat in 1953-54; the "Marxist-Revolutionary Tendency of the IV International," led by Michel Pablo, who broke with the Unified Secretariat in the fall of 1965; and the International Secretariat (an outgrowth of the former "Latin American Bureau"), led by Juan Posadas of Argentina. To these may be added the LSSP and MEP parties in Ceylon, expelled by the Unified Secretariat in 1964 after they entered Mrs. Bandaranaike's coalition.

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When Comrades Fall Out

EDITORS' NOTE: The following is taken from a letter sent by the CPSU Central Committee to several "fraternal parties" (see pp. 50, 56, in the article by Kevin Devlin). CPC stands for Communist Party of China, and CPR for Chinese People's Republic.

Since the October plenum of 1964, the Central Committee of the CPSU has done everything within its power to normalize the relationship with the CPC and to secure unity of action in the struggle against the common imperialist enemy in spite of existing differences of opinion. In so doing, we have considered the circumstance, that with continued differences of opinion the interests of the socialist camp and of the entire Communist movement would be made to suffer. . . .

We submitted a far-reaching program for the normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations at both party and government levels. This program contained suggestions for holding joint meetings of delegations of the CPSU and CPC at the highest level, for the mutual cessation of polemics, for the expansion of Sino-Soviet trade, for scientific, technical and cultural collaboration, and finally for coordination of the foreign policy activities of the CPR and the Soviet Union.

But our efforts did not only find no understanding, but met with the most stubborn resistance of the Chinese leaders. The Central Committee of the CPC completely ignored this suggestion about meetings of both sides at the highest level. The leadership of the CPC also did not agree to an expansion of economic, technical and cultural collaboration, but on the contrary even undertook further steps for their curtailment. In April 1965, the government of the CPR officially rejected collaboration with the Soviet Union in the construction of a number of industrial enterprises, as provided for by the Soviet-Chinese agreement of 1961. At the beginning of July 1965, the CPR resigned from the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research. The government of China rejected the Soviet proposal relating to collaboration of the CPR with other socialist countries in the work for the exploration and utilization of cosmic space.

All this shows that the leadership of the CPC was aiming for a further worsening of the relations between the CPR and the USSR. The Chinese leadership declares ever more frequently that the CPC is conducting a political battle against the Soviet Union. Contrary to healthy common sense, they claim that it is a struggle of the state of the proletariat against the state of the bourgeoisie.

The anti-Soviet course has now become an integral part of the entire ideological work of the CPC both within China and outside of its borders. The Chinese people are being indoctrinated with the concept that the Soviet Union is one of its principal enemies. In the public offices and enterprises (factories) of China, meetings are held in which each participant is obliged to present a criticism of the Soviet Union. . . .

. . . . Radio Peking broadcasts articles and materials to the Soviet Union which attempt to arouse contradictions among the various levels of the Soviet people, to damage the friendship between the peoples of the USSR, and to undermine confidence in the party and Soviet activists. . . .

Peking's propaganda is spreading inventions that the CPSU is creating and developing a new system of exploitation, is educating and coddling a new bourgeoisie, and is accelerating the tempo of the restoration of capitalism. In this absurd propaganda of the Chinese leadership, we see not only a malicious slandering of the CPSU and the Soviet people, but also an activity which harms the entire world Communist movement, since it attempts to deny the victory of socialism and its further development toward communism in the USSR. . . .

The leading functionaries of the CPR are ever more stubbornly propagating the thesis of the possibility of military collisions between China and the Soviet Union. At a press conference on September 29th, 1965, Ch'en Yi, the Foreign Minister of the CPR, Deputy Prime Minister and Politburo member, perpetrated the monstrous lie of the possibility of a coordination of actions by the Soviet Union in North China with aggressive war by the United States against the Chinese People's Republic. Moreover, the secretary of the Northwest Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC, Kao K'e-lin, speaking at a conference of the People's Militia on November 11th, 1965, in Lanchow, declared:

We must be prepared at any time to repel a unified attack by American imperialism, modern revisionism and reactionary circles of various countries. If they dare to force a war upon us, we will fight them until the end and drown them in the sea of the People's War. . . .

The slanderous nature of all these speeches is self-evident, but it is important to note another fact: the idea that it is necessary to prepare for a military conflict with the USSR is stubbornly being inculcated in the population of the CPR. The Central Committee of the CPSU has already informed the fraternal parties that the Chinese side is provoking border conflicts. In recent months these conflicts have once again become more frequent.

We would also like to inform you that the Chinese government refuses to renew the negotiations about the demarcation of the border which were broken off in May 1964. Apparently, the Chinese prefer to leave this question unsettled. At the same time, claims are being spread that the Soviet Union supposedly possesses Chinese territory in the Far East. The official Chinese representation in the bilateral confrontations on border questions directly threatened that the authorities in the CPR were going to think "about other avenues" for the solution of the territorial question and declared: "It is not impossible that we will attempt to reestablish historical rights." However, the CPR does not have any "historical rights." The territories of which the leadership of the CPC now speaks have never belonged to China. The present Soviet-Chinese boundary has a firm international juridical basis, having been confirmed in treaties which were signed by the governments of both states.

—Translated by Klaus H. Pringsheim from the German text as published in* Ost-Probleme *(Bonn), No. 8, 1966.

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has been very little published work by independent scholars on the postwar development of Trotskyism, with its successive splits and scholastic controversies. The result is that to trace more than the barest outlines of that development one must hunt through the periodicals and journals of a divided movement, some of which are difficult to obtain. Trotskyism remains a marginal phenomenon, but one of considerable ideological (and, in a few countries, organizational) interest—and one which has been neglected by students of international communism.

Comparative Studies

During the past decade, as we have seen, international communism—like international affairs in general—has moved far from the Manichaean simplicities of Stalin's last years (which were, indeed, never quite so simple as they appeared). As suggested earlier, these radical and far-reaching changes call for corresponding changes in Communist studies. This increasingly obvious need accounts for the new interest which some academic and non-academic circles are now showing in comparative approaches (the plural is inevitable) to these studies.

Such interest, one hopes, will eventually find practical expression in new research programs and academic courses. If so, those concerned will have to tackle some important questions which cannot be discussed in any detail within the already strained confines of this essay. What precise methods and methodologies should be adopted by centers of comparative Communist studies? What working relationships should be established between comparative studies (of whatever kind) and the existing area or party studies? What techniques of analysis and evaluation from existing disciplines should be used or developed? How much emphasis should be given to ruling and non-ruling parties, respectively? These are some of the basic questions which will inevitably arise.

Indeed, they have *already* arisen; for this is not, of course, completely unbroken ground. The comparative approach to communism, in one form or another, is not new. On the conceptually simplest level—which is certainly not to say the least valuable level—we have the juxtaposition of area or party studies within a geographical or thematic framework. From the explicitly comparative viewpoint, the analytical value of such composite works depends, first, on the individual area specialist's awareness of wider patterns in which "his" party takes its place and, secondly, on the skill, knowledge and insight of the editor who coordinates the various contributions and presumably adds an introductory essay or synthesizing epilogue.[23] On a different level of comparison, contrast and generalization we have what may be termed the thematic approach, which in turn can take various forms, employing different techniques of analysis and synthesis. On still another level the techniques of "model-building" may be applied—provided, in this author's opinion, that the scope of inquiry is limited (say, to the East European regimes or some legal parties of Western Europe) and that the model, whether "static" or "dynamic," is descriptive rather than predictive.

However, these methodological questions are perhaps superseded by the institutional, organizational and human problems involved—that is, by the need to train scholars whose experience, knowledge, analytical insight and linguistic abilities could be usefully applied to the study of the vast quantity of relevant material already available.

The compilation, classification and evaluation of this mass of information in research centers is a basic problem, and an uncommonly tough one;[24] but it has been aggravated by a general failure to think in comparative terms, to initiate co-ordinated, long-term programs of comparative studies, and to make adequate use of such ancillary techniques as microfilming and xerography. To be sure, no individual can consult every possible source of relevant material; no institution can subscribe to every potentially relevant publication. But this problem can be eased at least to some extent by organizational measures, by resorting to the traditional fraternity of scholarship and by the systematic use of some relatively neglected

[23] The combination of such editorial contributions with specialized studies, to which they add value and from which they derive value, surely represents a distinct and profitable form of comparative Communist studies. Among recent examples one might mention R. A. Scalapino's essay in the symposium, *The Communist Revolution in Asia* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice Hall, 1965); W. E. Griffith's prefaces to the first two volumes of the series, *Communism in Europe* (Cambridge, Mass., M.I.T. Press, 1964 and 1966); and C. E. Black's introduction and epilogue to the symposium, *Communism and Revolution* (Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1964).

[24] Although daunting, the problem of assimilating a significant portion of this *embarras de richesses* is not intractable. Dr. William E. Griffith, for one, has given an eminent example of what can be done in his documented surveys of Communist developments (*Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift*, 1963; *The Sino-Soviet Rift*, 1964; and *Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-1965*, in the Jan.-March 1966 issue of *The China Quarterly*—shortly to be published in book form by the MIT Press).

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sources, such as the Joint Publications Research Service's series of *Translations on International Communist Developments* (Washington, DC).

One useful contribution which the "comparativist" can make is to emphasize the importance of trying to view the new, articulated world movement as a whole, while noting the interdependence and interaction of its constituent parts. To do so, it would perhaps be necessary to correct a still-lingering bias—or predisposition to concentrate largely on the Communist regimes, particularly those of the Soviet Union, China and Eastern Europe, and to more-or-less neglect the non-ruling parties. These parties represent an important segment, or segments, of the world movement; and, if "comparative communism" neglects them, it is comparative part-communism. The indications are that most if not all of the non-ruling parties will remain just that, and it is as such that they demand analytical attention on a comparative basis. If only on the level of political self-interest, it is clearly of importance for non-Communist scholars —and policy-makers—to examine systematically the reasons why these parties have failed to advance on the promised road to power.

Moreover, the looser structure of inter-party relations, the greater freedom of action that has come with the spread of polycentrism and the new emphasis on bilateral relations have given these parties a significance and a weight in the international movement that they did not enjoy in the past. Times had clearly changed when, *e.g.*, such a small and locally ineffective party as the Norwegian CP could declare its neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute as early as October 1963. Whether pro-Soviet, pro-Chinese or neutralist, the non-ruling parties constitute the overwhelming majority of those which make up the divided world movement; and, if the Russians and the Chinese are paying close attention to them, non-Communist observers can do no less. Admittedly their memberships are generally small, but numerical strength is far from being the only criterion of interest. The British CP has only 33,000 members and has little national political influence except, marginally, in the trade unions; but the stand that it took on the conference issue early in 1964 was of considerable importance to the evolution of the Sino-Soviet conflict. The issues raised in recent years by the Swedish CP (about 25,000 members), the Dutch CP (about 12,000), the rival Israeli parties (less than 2,000 altogether) and the New Zealand CP (less than 500) are of equal significance, and other examples could be given.

Small or large, in power or out of power, revolutionary or reformist, all of the world's Communist parties have been affected in varying degrees by the processes of change considered in this essay. A decade after the watershed year of 1956 these processes have developed an autonomous momentum which apparently rules out the possibility of a reversion to the organizational patterns of the past. The events of these ten years have taught us one basic lesson—that it is unwise to make confident predictions. Still, the transformation of international communism will surely continue in the years ahead; and it will be a matter of vital self-interest for the non-Communist world to assess that continuing transformation with accuracy, and respond to it with wisdom.

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Moscow and Eastern Europe

By Melvin Croan

A decade has elapsed since the major political upheavals in Poland and Hungary that threatened the very foundations of Communist rule throughout Eastern Europe. At the height of the 1956 crisis it momentarily looked as if the Soviet Union's control over the entire East European region was coming to an ignominious end. When Moscow suppressed the Hungarian Revolution by brute military force, however, the immediate outlook altered radically. Indeed, for a number of years after the tragedy of Hungary, the overwhelming preponderance of Soviet power in Eastern Europe seemed to blot out any realistic prospects for national self-assertion on the part of the bloc countries. Even the most attentive students of East European affairs—diligent though they doubtless were throughout the late 1950's and early 1960's in calling attention to the novel lines along which Moscow's hegemony was being recast—failed to anticipate anything like Rumania's recent, studied, nationalistic defiance of Soviet tutelage. Neither did they really expect the gradual erosion of the Soviet Union's political authority throughout Eastern Europe, which is so evident in retrospect today.

The present moment is far from ideal for overall stock-taking, due to the accelerated tempo and still partially obscure character of many of the most recent developments in Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, it seems fitting to mark the tenth anniversary of the 1956 crisis by taking note of the decline of the Soviet Union's once absolute supremacy, reviewing some of the major domestic changes in Eastern Europe that have accompanied this decline, and examining the complex and problematic international relationships that presently obtain in the region.

For a reliable introduction to all these themes, those previously uninitiated in Soviet bloc affairs can turn to J. F. Brown's *The New Eastern Europe*,[1] which is as timely in appearance as it is felicitous in choice of title. Mr. Brown, a political analyst for Radio Free Europe in Munich, has succeeded in reducing the undoubted wealth of materials at his disposal to bare-boned essentials. His book presents a matter-of-fact survey of domestic and international developments and offers a succinct summary of the many contradictory trends in both spheres. It carefully sidesteps generalizations, except for two of the broadest sort. They are, quite simply, that Eastern Europe has reverted from an earlier superficial uniformity to its traditional diversity, and that the "Soviet Empire" has been transformed into an "alliance."

Khrushchev's Policies

Nothing would be more misleading than to read into Mr. Brown's numbered words of tribute to Khrushchev the faintest suggestion that the former

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[1] J. F. Brown, *The New Eastern Europe: The Khrushchev Era and After*, New York, F. A. Praeger, 1966.

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Soviet leader ever consciously intended to preside over the liquidation of the Soviet empire. His failure to create a truly viable Communist international system may be attributed in part to the peculiarities of his personal style and outlook (including some serious, ideologically-rooted misconceptions), but it was due in far greater measure to political forces which were probably beyond his or anybody else's effective control.

Concerning Eastern Europe, Khrushchev started out with an unerring recognition that the disastrous, forced-draft Stalinist drive toward "socialist construction" required relaxation, and that the politically primitive imperial system bequeathed by Stalin stood in need of change. What he did not foresee, of course, was that various measures of piecemeal reform in the satellites, together with his rapprochement with Tito and the great impact of the 20th CPSU ("de-Stalinization") Congress, would set in motion the forces that culminated in the near-disaster of 1956. That unwelcome experience partially disabused Khrushchev of his earlier, naively optimistic belief in the cohesive properties of a common ideology. It certainly convinced him of the pressing need to mobilize shared ideological conviction and, wherever possible, to supplement it by integrative organizational devices.

For a time, during the late 1950's, the first objective was effectively attained through the renewed exclusion of Tito and the concomitant campaign against "revisionism." Still later, as Sino-Soviet differences grew, Khrushchev sought, with considerably less success, to redirect flagging East European ideological energies against Mao's "dogmatism and sectarianism" and at the same time against the Albanians, who had performed the unprecedented feat of substituting Peking's tutelage for that of Moscow.

Paradoxically, these successive Soviet efforts at ideological mobilization, far from facilitating attempts at organizational integration, probably retarded them. For initially, the superficial effectiveness of the anti-revisionist campaign in countering centrifugal currents in Eastern Europe made it easier for Khrushchev temporarily to content himself with formal acknowledgments of Soviet leadership over the socialist camp and to accept the restrained exercise of Soviet authority through an irregular series of multilateral meetings. To be sure, even in the 1950's Khrushchev evidenced considerable interest in organizing much stronger economic ties between the Soviet Union and East Europe. Under his active patronage, Comecon, which had remained a dead-letter in Stalin's lifetime, displayed real vitality. As this international economic agency developed a highly sophisticated infrastructure, its member-states began to think seriously about programs of economic specialization and coordination. Over these activities there loomed the prospect for a lasting political integration of East Europe under Soviet aegis, to be fostered through measures of permanent economic interdependence.

But, increasingly preoccupied by his conflict with China as well as by other foreign and domestic Soviet concerns, Khrushchev was slow to follow up his own initiatives in the economic sphere. Only in 1962 did he unveil his grandiose proposal to transform Comecon into a supranational planning agency. It is now common knowledge that this proposal was brought to grief because of Rumania's unyielding rejection of it, an act of national defiance which, as Mr. Brown stresses, would have been inconceivable except for the Sino-Soviet dispute and the room it provided for diplomatic maneuver. Thus frustrated on various fronts, Khrushchev's last months in office found him ruminating about the expediency of establishing a purely political agency to check the disintegrative trends in East Europe. Unfortunately for the Soviet leadership, these trends had already gone so far as to preclude the establishment of anything vaguely reminiscent of the powerful Cominform of the past.

Looking back to 1956, it is clear that Khrushchev's readiness to accept a large degree of domestic autonomy in Eastern Europe represented an irreversible commitment, with deeply disruptive implications. Bent upon internal reforms in the East European countries and, above all, desirous that their Communist regimes should acquire genuine popular support, Moscow could hardly have gone back on its initial grant of autonomy. Somehow, however, it overlooked the possibility that, to the degree to which the East European Communist regimes attained the domestic stability and popular acceptance held desirable for them, they would be the more susceptible to nationalist infection, which under the circumstances was bound to damage Soviet interests. Reminiscing in 1964, Khrushchev tried to write off his earlier view that there would not be "a single hitch" in relations among socialist states as having been mere "ideological conjecture"; yet it was doubtless this view that accounted in large part for the Soviet failure to face up to the problem of nationalism in Eastern Europe.

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Khrushchev himself had always conceived the issue of domestic autonomy in rather different terms, as was apparent from his adamant insistence upon one cardinal principle: no Communist state, excepting perhaps the Soviet Union, was to presume to declare any of its own distinctive internal practices as valid for the others. This, in the Soviet leader's view, had constituted a large measure of what had been wrong with Yugoslavia's participation in Soviet bloc politics during 1955-56. In his eyes, it was not the least of the besetting sins of the Chinese Communist leadership. It is entirely indicative of how much things have changed in the Communist world that this one issue which so exercised Khrushchev should have lost so much of its topicality. Today the national elites in Eastern Europe have scant interest in patterning their own domestic development after elaborate foreign Communist models. Indeed, Moscow itself has quietly had to forego pressing its earlier claims about the particular relevance of Soviet precept and example.

Differences and Similarities

The diversity which has thus become the hallmark of Eastern Europe's internal development has witnessed some unexpected paradoxes in the character of domestic policy in specific countries. On the one hand, the high hopes of 1956 for liberalization in Poland have been sorely disappointed. One of the special merits of Mr. Brown's study is his unvarnished account of how the Polish October has fallen victim to Gomulka's narrow-minded authoritarianism. Startling though it may seem, his contention that regime controls over the intellectual sphere are now even stricter in Poland than in East Germany probably represents a depressingly valid comparison (though since the completion of Mr. Brown's book, the stalwart dogmatists around Ulbricht have once again cracked down on East Germany's creative spirits). On the other hand, the worst fears of 1956 with regard to repression in Hungary did not materialize either. In Mr. Brown's view and that of most other present-day observers, Kadar's program of reconstruction and "reconciliation" has transformed his regime into one of the more tolerant Communist dictatorships in Eastern Europe and has correspondingly rendered life in Hungary that much more endurable than elsewhere in the region.

Limitations of space preclude any recapitulation of the situation in the other Eastern European countries. Suffice it to note that Mr. Brown's study offers a panoramic view of internal developments throughout the area, pointing up many special problems—such as the resurgence of Slovak nationalism and intellectual unrest in Czechoslovakia, the inherent weakness of the Zhivkov leadership in Bulgaria, and the like. His survey of domestic affairs excludes only Yugoslavia and Albania (though each of these countries' roles in Communist international politics is covered in some detail). Considering the domestic scene in Eastern Europe as a whole, Mr. Brown rightly chooses to emphasize the growing preoccupation with matters of economic progress and reform. With the partial exception of Rumania, whose leaders have not been overly anxious to tamper with the arrangements under which their national economy has experienced its remarkable growth rate of recent years, all the East European countries have embarked on what will inevitably be a long, drawn-out process of overhauling planning and management practices. These innovations point toward thoroughgoing economic reform and also carry far-reaching political implications in both the international and the domestic spheres.

On the international level, the present flux adds yet another, quite practical obstacle to any meaningful progress toward regional integration through Comecon. Eastern European leaders are now generally agreed that future steps in this direction must await the area-wide reform of pricing and cost-accounting procedures. And they are a long way from predicting that once the reforms become effective, regional economic integration will be just around the corner. Moreover, the pioneering role in economic reform of the industrially-advanced East European countries has done much to heighten the self-confidence and self-concern of their technical elites and administrative cadres. In the future this may well contribute to greater self-assertion *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union on the part of the political leaderships. The more secure their entrenchment at home, the more likely does the prospect for such self-assertion appear.

It must be added, too, that the present economic reforms, despite inevitable dislocations and privations at the outset, promise rising living standards, and thus may contribute to a further diminution of popular dissatisfaction with Communist rule. Still, it would be rash to predict greater domestic political stability throughout Eastern Europe on the basis of this one factor alone. In fact, the essentially pragmatic character of the program of economic reform, and the empiricist spirit which it fosters, may harbor a serious challenge to stability. Certainly these characteristics present an additional threat to the

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already eroded ideological foundations that are meant to support the legitimacy of all Communist dictatorships.

In thinking about the large prospects for domestic stability and political viability, it is necessary to go beyond matters of specific policy and to inquire into questions of institutional structure and political process. The latter questions have increasingly engaged the attention of scholars concerned with "political development" in other geographic regions. For his part, Mr. Brown has elected to use the phrase "political development" as the title of his first chapter, but his discussion therein amounts to little more than a survey of recent political history on a country-by-country basis.

For a much more pointed approach to the problem, one may wish to consult H. Gordon Skilling's *The Governments of Communist East Europe*.[2] Professor Skilling's book, designed as a text in comparative government, is strictly topical in presentation. His detailed coverage of such major topics as the pattern and holders of power, the process of governing, and the implementation of decisions, manages to convey a clear appreciation of the contrasts and similarities among specific countries, along with a sure sense of dynamic change in Eastern Europe as a whole. The author also provides much material for speculation on the possibilities of a transformation of various East European regimes from bureaucratic dictatorships into more pluralistic and better institutionalized political systems. While he cautions against any misplaced optimism concerning the eventual emergence of genuinely constitutional governments, he also calls attention to the rise of distinct interest groups, the enhancement of the role of experts and administrators, and the consequent change in the role of the party. How well the various East European institutional structures adjust to these new social forces will bear the closest watching. For their ability or inability to do so may largely determine the ultimate viability of political systems cast increasingly adrift from their once secure ideological moorings.

The New "Alliance"

If the prospects for individual East European countries are hard to predict, it is difficult even to find a label for the present international system in the area, let alone conjecture on its future. Mr. Brown speaks of the present system as an alliance "that reveals the tensions and problems typical of all alliances in history." Professor Skilling strikes much the same note by observing that "as in all other alliances, centrifugal and centripedal forces operate and the interests of the dominant power may conflict with those of the subordinate associates." All well and good, provided it is acknowledged that the analytical value and predictive power of the "alliance" concept leave much to be desired. In one sense, the word alliance itself is so broad as to be virtually synonymous with international politics in general. In this sense, it only serves to beg the knotty question of how the traditional nature and function of alliances, familiar to historians from Thucydides on, may have changed thanks to such novel 20th-century factors as, say, nuclear power. It is precisely at this point, however, that the perspectives for general analysis become unclear. Nuclear power, to stick to that one example, was once thought to be a factor contributing to the rigidity of the post-World War II bipolarity, but it has turned out to play a distinctly disruptive role in both East and West. (Quite apart from the respective cases of Gaullist France and Communist China, it is highly significant that, according to recent reports, Rumania should have raised the issue of "annihilation without representation," while Czechoslovakia has broached the possibility of an East European multilateral nuclear force, both no doubt to the considerable discomfort of the Soviet Union.)

When all this has been said, however, it remains true that Khrushchev's successors have sought to shore up what Brezhnev likes to call "the positions of the socialist commonwealth in Europe" by appealing more to military and economic mutual self-interest than to ideological bonds. More especially, the present Soviet leadership has repeatedly called for the strengthening of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and a close coordination of foreign policy among its member-states. Moscow has had to go to great lengths to justify its case in terms of the persistence of NATO's ostensibly "aggressive aims" and the particular menace of West German "militarism and revanchism." Indeed, so loud has been the propaganda din on the latter theme that after the 1965 meeting of the Warsaw Treaty Organization's Political Consultative Committee, Soviet commentators felt obliged to denounce as Western "fabrications" any notion that "the threat of the nuclear rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany" was merely being manipulated "as a

[2] H. Gordon Skilling, *The Governments of Communist East Europe*, New York, Thomas Y. Crowell, 1965.

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pretext for the consolidation of the socialist countries."

One need not belittle genuine Soviet apprehension concerning a nuclear West Germany to note that, to the extent Moscow may in fact have counted on this one issue to rally all the East European countries, it has only succeeded in revealing the differences of national interest and the scope for independent action among them. Broadly speaking, these differences can be delineated along geographic lines. For this purpose, the distinction between a northern and a southern tier of East European states —a concept employed by Mr. Brown, with attribution to the late Prof. David Dallin—is highly suggestive. The northern tier, comprising East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland is strategically, militarily, and economically the more important of the two for the Soviet Union, and in the main the Soviet position has held firm there, thanks in large measure to shared geopolitical interests against West Germany. To be sure, Moscow has had to pay a price for this cohesion in the rather special role it accorded to post-1956 Poland and formally reconfirmed in the 1965 Soviet-Polish Treaty. It is also true that there have been important differences of nuance between Moscow and Prague on questions concerning European security, including the German problem, and evident friction between the two capitals on other matters as well. But all this pales by comparison with the southern tier in the Balkans. Apart from the special problems posed by Yugoslavia and Albania, Rumania's national self-assertion has greatly complicated Soviet relations with each and every East European state, whether of the northern or the southern tier. Moreover, Rumania stands as an example which others may seek to emulate in their own way. Of late even Bulgaria, once abjectly subservient to Moscow, seems to have begun to contemplate cautious foreign policy initiatives of its own.

The Broad Prospects

Considering the evolution of the international system throughout Eastern Europe as a whole, it is well to be reminded by Mr. Brown that economic dependence upon the Soviet Union is still very great, and to have that reminder tempered by the further observation that economic dependence is no longer a guarantee of effective Soviet political control. In the absence of such control, the present fluidity can present unprecedented opportunities for the pursuit of national self-interest. A case in point is Hungary's recent demonstrative support for all Soviet positions, evidenced in Kadar's surprisingly strong pronouncements, at the 23rd CPSU Congress and after, concerning the impossibility of "anti-Soviet communism," and in the thinly veiled diatribes of his regime's spokesmen against Rumanian options. Behind such professions of loyalty there may well lie the expectation of Soviet concessions, including, in the case of Hungary, the withdrawal of the Soviet troops still stationed on its territory.

Still, it is premature to say the very least, to expect the existing military and economic structures in Eastern Europe to fall apart entirely. International neutrality may well represent a deep-seated aspiration in many East European countries. Nowhere is it attainable, however, without a system of international guarantees which would constitute a transformation of Europe's postwar political contours far more radical than anything yet immediately visible. In this respect the future would seem to hang more on Western policy and on Soviet-Western relations than on the Soviet leaders' own ability to muster the talents necessary for "crisis management" in the East European area.

One final note on the role of nationalism is appropriate. The remarkable stridency with which Rumania's leaders have been insisting upon the primacy of the nation-state represents only the most egregious symptom of a much more widespread infirmity of Marxist-Leninist internationalism in the East European area. Resurgent nationalism has unquestionably damaged the Soviet position. Still, Mr. Brown, for one, cautions that should the Soviet Union determine to play upon traditional national animosities to retain its sway, there might be plenty of opportunities for it to do so successfully. This warning should prompt a more general *caveat*. For exaggerated nationalism either in reaction to the internationalism previously enforced from Moscow, or as a source of domestic support for authoritarian regimes, or both, can only be a divisive force. Such nationalism may or may not be susceptible to tactical manipulation by the Soviet Union; in either case, the deliberate exacerbation of national antagonisms will inevitably bode ill for any genuine future international order in Eastern Europe.

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History and Politics in Poland

By Adam Bromke

Ten years ago, during the "peaceful revolution" of October 1956, the Polish scene was characterized by feverish political activity, enthusiasm and high hopes. Today apoliticalism, apathy and frustration are the dominant moods in the country. This vast change in atmosphere is in large part a reaction to the doctrinaire Communist leadership of Wladyslaw Gomulka, coupled with general resignation over the difficulty of Poland's geopolitical position.

Yet not all political debate has ceased in Poland. Beneath the surface a lively controversy still goes on—expressed outwardly in discussion that is conducted not in Communist terms of reference, but rather in the form of traditional historical argumentation. The Poles have always shown a strong addiction to historicism. They have been interested in the study of history not as an end in itself, but as a means of finding answers to contemporary questions. If short, they have great respect for the maxim, *historia est magistra vitae*.

The historicism of the Poles has stemmed partly from their inability to ventilate political issues openly. Centuries of rule by the Germans and the Russians taught Polish political writers to evade foreign censorship by presenting their arguments veiled in an Aesopian language of historical analogies. To Polish readers, well versed in their history, drawing parallels between the past and present, *de te fabula narratur*, posed little difficulty. But Polish historicism also had deeper roots: the ceaseless, desperate struggle for national survival made the Poles introspective. They searched in history for the errors which had brought about their defeats and sufferings. They also looked to the past for national glory, which helped them to preserve their self-respect and inspired them with hope for a better future.

One of the most persistent disputes in Polish historiography has been carried on between writers who took a pragmatic or realistic view of Poland's past and those who held an idealist or romantic view of its history. Followers of the realist school blamed the Poles themselves for their afflictions. They denounced past generations for ignoring the realities of power relationships between Poland and its neighbors, and thereby inviting disastrous military and political consequences. They believed in reason as the greatest national virtue. Supporters of the romantic school took exactly the opposite stand. They attributed Poland's misfortunes to the wickedness of its neighbors. They also hailed the Poles' repeated efforts to shake off the foreign yoke by insurrections regardless of the cost. Heroism was the highest national virtue which they espoused.

The historiographic debate always had considerable practical significance. The arguments advanced by both schools were widely used to support contemporary political programs. On the one side, the realist interpretation of history was employed to justify seeking a *modus vivendi* with the occupying

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powers while developing the internal strength of the nation. On the other side, the romantic picture of Poland's past was used to vindicate a continued struggle for national independence, relying on assistance from the Western powers.[1] In this way historiography and politics became largely interwoven. Political debates in Poland were traditionally conducted in the esoteric language of historical arguments.

The addiction of the Poles to historicism has stayed with them until this day. In the past decade several political debates have remained concealed under the guise of historical arguments. Despite their esoteric nature they have shed important light on the political atmosphere prevailing in Gomulka's Poland.

History's "Fools"

After Gomulka's return to power in 1956 the Polish United Workers' Party came close to officially endorsing the realist tradition. Gomulka himself took a critical view of Polish history. In June 1957, in a speech to the Poznan workers (the same who a year before had revolted against the Communist regime), he blamed Poland's past misfortunes on the Poles themselves:

The reasons for our national tragedies should not be sought in the activities of foreign states. They were also rooted, perhaps even mainly, in the weaknesses of Poland . . . caused by its disastrous domestic and foreign policies.[2]

The major target of Gomulka's criticism was Poland's policy in the interwar period and during World War II. He bitterly denounced the prewar Polish course of relying on the country's own military power, augmented by alliances with distant France and Britain. This, he held, had failed to deter Germany from attack and had brought about Poland's crushing defeat in 1939. Yet basically the same policy had been continued by the Government-in-Exile in London. The result was new tragedies, notably the disastrous Warsaw uprising in 1944. These policies, concluded Gomulka, had failed because they ignored the essential reality of Poland's position. They had not been based on alliance with the Soviet Union, which was just as indispensable for Poland's survival as "breathing is necessary for life." [3]

Gomulka repeatedly warned the Poles against the danger of nurturing continued hostility against the Soviet Union while placing hope in assistance from the West. In January 1957 the theoretical journal of the Communist party, *Nowe drogi*, openly cautioned the Poles against counting on United States intervention in the event of an armed uprising. In a broadcast on the eve of the elections a few weeks later, Gomulka restated the same argument in a more dramatic fashion:

The enemies of People's Poland would like to push our country into an abyss of chaos and anarchy . . . they are well aware that only a socialist Poland can remain on the map of Europe.[4]

Gomulka's appeal to the realist tradition struck a responsive chord among the Poles. In the late 1950's the memories of their defeats and suffering in World War II, followed by the West's failure to help them in upholding their independence from Russia, were still fresh in the minds of the Polish people. A bitter emotional reaction against the romantic tradition spread throughout the country. The Poles followed Gomulka's advice; they abstained from revolution, and in the elections of January 1957, *faute de mieux*, they endorsed the program of the Polish United Workers' Party. They also turned with vengeance against Poland's past history. The military tradition was subjected to shattering criticism. The soldierly virtue of heroism was derided in the satirical theaters in Warsaw. Audiences applauded as pathetic lancers charged to meet their death on the stage of the popular cabaret, "Stodola." The hopelessness of the Polish military effort in the campaign of 1939 and in the Warsaw uprising of 1944 was vividly depicted in highly successful films by an able young producer, Andrzej Wajda. The readiness to sacrifice one's life in defense of the country was sneered at in the press. "Our predecessors," declared an article written by two young writers in 1959, "used to die willingly and deftly for the homeland. They were stupid and ridiculous fools." [5]

Gomulka succeeded in winning the Poles away from the romantic tradition; he failed, however,

[1] For a more thorough discussion of the split between political realism and political idealism, see this author's "Political Realism in Poland," *Survey* (London) April 1964, and "Communism and Political Realism in Poland," *Journal of International Affairs* (New York), Winter 1966.

[2] *Przemowenia, 1956-1957* (Speeches), Ksiazka i Wiedza, Warsaw, 1957, p. 384.

[3] *Przemowienia, 1960*, Warsaw, 1961, p. 97.

[4] *Przemowienia, 1956-1957*, p. 213.

[5] Anna Bratkowska, and Ryszard Turki, "Mit na karuzeli," *Przeglad kulturalny*, Oct. 19, 1959.

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to make them accept his own political program. His hope that the widespread adoption of political realism would lead to acceptance of communism proved to be unfounded. Political realism resulted rather in a general depolitization of Polish society. The Poles, especially the younger generation, turned away from all politics and sought refuge in private life. They began focussing on down-to-earth concerns, above all on the material aspects of their own lives. A Communist writer observed in 1959:

The attitude of the youth toward life adheres to the principle of concreteness. Each motive and each action is evaluated in the light of its results. Only the facts count . . . the youth is preoccupied with work and studies, television and motorcycle, refrigerator, and a snack.[6]

Such people, of course, were hardly susceptible to ideology of any sort—and in particular, after the depreciation of its high-sounding slogans during the Stalinist years, the Communist ideology.

Indeed, while communism failed to take hold of the Polish society at large, political realism spread widely among the rank and file of the Polish Communists. In the late 1950's there was a marked decline in the ideological fervor of the Polish United Workers' Party. A critic of this state of affairs complained in 1959 that the activities of local party organizations were reduced to a mere routine. "At the party gatherings," he wrote, "there is no political discussion. Everything is clear to everybody." All that was required was purely formal adherence to the organization: "attendance at the meetings, paying the dues, etc." Outside the meetings the Communists would not stand up for their ideology. "In private life, when they are not 'on active duty,' they are hardly distinguishable from anybody else." [7]

Motives for belonging to the Polish United Workers' Party ranged from political realism to sheer opportunism. At one end, as the Communist weekly *Polityka* reported, there were people who joined the Communist party in order "to support Gomulka." They believed that "since no other alternative exists, to cooperate with the USSR is the only feasible course." [8] At the other end, according to the same paper, there were many members who linked "their entire work in the party with their own interests." [9] In general, the trend among Communists in the late 1950's was toward widespread disillusionment with all political activity and, along with other Poles, toward a retreat into private life. This situation was well summed up by a review in the party organ, *Trybuna ludu:*

We are under pressure not so much from bourgeois as *petit* bourgeois ideology. This is manifested in a specific mentality and specific attitude toward life: in narrowing one's horizons to the problems of family and housing, in abstaining from the hardships of struggle, in brushing off any broad social objectives.[10]

Seven Deadly Sins

The unforeseen consequences of the hold of political realism on the Polish people, and—even more significant—on party members, soon became a source of concern to the Communist leaders. In the late 1950's and early 1960's they proceeded to voice their misgivings in public. A particularly strong attack was launched from the ranks of the "partisans' " faction in the Communist party, a group that had been close to Gomulka ever since the days of World War II and that gained increasing prominence after his rise to power. The partisans had two reasons to dislike the realist tradition. As convinced Communists they opposed the attitude of turning away from politics and retreating into private life. As men who had made their careers in the wartime underground, they resented the deprecation of military struggle. As their influence in the Polish United Workers' Party grew, the partisans' onslaught against the realist tradition became more insistent.

The most articulate attack against the realist tradition came from a young army officer, Colonel Zbigniew Zaluski, in a book published in 1962 under the provocative title *The Seven Polish Deadly Sins.*[11] Zaluski traced the roots of widespread apathy to the impact of the realist interpretation of Poland's history. Using the maxim "*historia est magistra vitae*" as his springboard, he asserted that history "represents a powerful moral weapon." "The tendencies toward an aversion to ideology and to social passivity are undoubtedly stimulated . . . by jeering and scoffing

[6] Zbigniew Zaluski, *Siedom polskich grezechow glownych* (The Seven Polish Deadly Sins), Czytelnik, Warsaw, 1962, pp. 191-92. Some parts of this study were published earlier as articles—hence the reference to the 1959 date.
[7] Zdzislaw Dabrowski, "Goraco popieram," *Polityka,* Oct. 10, 1959.
[8] *Ibid.*
[9] Mieczyslaw Lipiec, "Ideowosc na codzien," *Polityka,* Oct. 10, 1959.
[10] J. Wroclawek, *Trybuna ludu,* Oct. 31, 1958.
[11] Zaluski, *op. cit.*

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at almost all the significant and military episodes of our history." The existing situation, he continued, is deeply damaging to the program of communism. "By scoffing at the efforts of all past generations, one will not educate socialist man—the man who is to be the driving force of history."

In order to revive interest in broad political and social objectives, argued Zaluski, the Polish people must be presented with a more inspiring picture of their history. "It is essential," he stressed, "not to disparage the role of individual bravery and sacrifice, boldness of thought and heroism of action." Thus the objective of his book was to take issue with the critics of the Polish past and, in the author's own words, to defend Poland's "romantic history—which was often difficult, stormy, but certainly not stupid."

Toward this end, Zaluski presented seven case studies of past Polish military undertakings. The events he chose were not of major political or military importance; in fact, they involved specific battles rather than campaigns. The author admitted that he had selected them for discussion merely because they had been repeatedly censured by the exponents of the critical view of Poland's history—hence his title, "the seven Polish deadly sins." In reviving these episodes Zaluski convincingly demonstrated that the critics, guided by a desire to prove that "it all made no sense," frequently went beyond the limits of objectivity—ignoring relevant historical evidence. For instance, he effectively disposed of widely circulated but groundless stories to the effect that the Polish cavalry had made desperate charges against German tanks in 1939.

Having proved his point, the author proceeded to make general observations about Polish historiography. He divided Polish historians into two groups: those in favor and those against military action. Calling himself a supporter of the former group, he declared:

In spite of their defeats, the positive influence of insurrections has been conclusively proven long ago. [Insurrections have contributed to] the growth of national consciousness, the continuance of the Polish question in the international forum, and the evolution of . . . modern Polish society.

The Eighth Sin

The appearance of Zaluski's book was something of a sensation in intellectual circles in Poland. Its first edition of 10,000 copies was sold out in no time. A lively controversy lasting for several months ensued in the press. "The widespread and prolonged concern with this book," exclaimed one of the commentators, "is amazing. It undoubtedly reflects in some way the intellectual and ideological climate of our life." [12] Zaluski, observed another participant in a debate, touched upon the essential dichotomy of Polish politics. "Despite the prevailing opinion about [Polish] individualism, we are actually divided only into two groups, the opponents and supporters of the cult of heroism." [13]

The most articulate denunciation of Zaluski's book, carried out in the vein of the realist tradition, was made by a well-known journalist, Kazimierz Kozniewski, writing in the Communist weekly *Polityka*.[14] In an article entitled, "The Eighth Sin: Lack of Objectivity," Kozniewski conceded that the spread of social passivity could be attributed, at least in part, to the criticism of Poland's past.

If one demonstrates the senselessness and even harmful effects of some political and military acts, one must also anticipate that this will bring about certain reactions along the lines of bourgeois materialist egoism.

Nevertheless, he argued, the continued denunciation of the romantic tradition was useful and indeed necessary, since the predominant weakness of the Poles was not passivity but rather a continued proclivity for insurrections:

There are nations whose aversion to military action . . . has advanced so far that they need a "rearmament" treatment; but our nation does not need it. If anything exactly the opposite is true.

Kozniewski thus emphatically disagreed with Zaluski that in order to educate a new socialist man it was necessary to discontinue the criticism of Poland's past. On the contrary, he believed that such a course would be detrimental to the cause of socialism, for it would likely stimulate the resurgence of reactionary, nationalist political views.

Other critics of Zaluski went still further, accusing him of trying to revert to the prewar romantic tradition. In an article sarcastically entitled "The Galloping Colonel," one writer posed the question whether Zaluski would like to revive the "militarism, cult of the armed forces, and super-patriotism" of the prewar period.[15] Another

[12] Krzysztof Teodor Toepliz, "Tradycja za tradycje," *Przeglad kulturalny*, Jan. 30, 1963.
[13] Andrzej Kijowski, "Poklonmy sie ideom martwym," *Przeglad kulturalny*, Feb. 6, 1963.
[14] "Grzech osmy: bezkrytycyzm," *Polityka*, Dec. 8, 1962.
[15] Dominik Horodynski, "Galopujacy pulkownik," *Nowa kultura*, Sept. 30, 1962.

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critic, using as the title of his article the old battle cry, "Poles! Fix Bayonets! Charge!," pointed out the similarity between the views of Zaluski and those which had led the Poles to their bloodbaths in World War II. "We have been through it all!" he exclaimed.[16]

The debate over Zaluski's book was brought to an end only after intervention by the leadership of the Polish United Workers' Party. In April 1963 a lengthy, unsigned article (indicating its authoritative character) appeared in the party organ, *Trybuna ludu*, summing up the entire discussion and expounding the official Communist line.[17] The article clearly indicated that the Communist leaders were faced with a painful dilemma. On the one hand, they were in sympathy with Zaluski's goal of overcoming political passivity among the people. On the other hand, they could not accept Zaluski's method of attaining that objective through the revival of the romantic tradition. Therefore they tried to take a middle course.

Trybuna ludu drew a distinction between the end and the means advocated by Zaluski. The author, the article declared, had rightly recognized "the need for educating society, and especially the younger generation . . . in the spirit of readiness for action and sacrifice in the name of high ideals." Zaluski had also correctly observed that merely sneering at the nation's history was harmful, for this hindered the educating of socialist man. In this respect it was Kozniewski who, in deprecating the value of high ideals, had gone wrong. Zaluski, however, had been carried away by his argument and as a result had also reached conclusions which were "superficial and at times false." Above all, while praising heroism, he had failed to provide an answer to the question "why, so frequently, the heroism of a Polish insurgent and soldier proved to be futile, lonely and tragic." Without answering this crucial question, one could hardly expect Poland's "history to become *magistra vitae*."

Having chided both Kozniewski and Zaluski, the *Trybuna ludu* article proceeded to expound its own version of Poland's past. Clearly it wanted to have the best of both worlds: it clung to Gomulka's realist position, but strove to escape the negative consequences. This it tried to do by introducing a distinction between two different types of military struggles. On the one side, there had been insurrections such as those of 1863 and 1944, led by people who had been unfavorably disposed toward "the progressive forces in Russia, and who looked for inspiration to the West. And there [they] could not find, and in fact did not find, a salvation." On the other side, there had been the struggle led by the Polish Communists during World War II. It had been altogether different from previous insurrections:

It was no longer a struggle in vain. It was no longer a futile sacrifice. It was no more a desperate battle. It was a struggle guided not only by faith, but also by realistic, sober calculations of the constellation of forces on the international scene. There was a perspective of the liberation of Poland as a socialist state by a victorious Soviet army.

Sifting the Ashes

The interpretation of history offered by *Trybuna ludu* in 1963 apparently did not still all doubts among the Poles, for two years later the dispute between the supporters of realist and romantic traditions flared up anew. This time the debate was sparked by a new film produced by Andrzej Wajda, *The Ashes*. The movie was based on an early 20th-century novel by a famous writer, Stefan Zeromski, depicting Polish participation in the Napoleonic wars. In filming it, Wajda eliminated some episodes of the book and emphasized others. Thus one aspect of the debate over *The Ashes* was the question to what extent the screen version had succeeded in capturing the spirit of Zeromski's masterpiece. Soon, however, this issue was pushed into the background. Some participants in the discussion openly admitted that they had neither seen the movie nor remembered the novel well; what they were interested in was simply Poland's history in the Napoleonic period.

The Napoleonic era has traditionally occupied a very special place in Poland's history. It was in that period that the classic romantic tradition actually originated. In the hope that the French emperor would recreate their state, the Poles fought on Napoleon's side in all his major campaigns. Although in the end the military struggle proved to be in vain, its legend survived, inspiring succeeding generations with a will to fight and with a hope of assistance from the West. The Polish struggle during World War II largely fell into the same tradi-

[16] Zygmunt Bukowinski, "Hej, kto Polak na bagnety," *Polityka*, Feb. 6, 1963.
[17] "Spor o idealy wychowawcze socjalizmu," *Trybuna ludu*, April 20, 1963.

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tion. *The Ashes* thus served as a pretext for the Poles to review once again their contemporary experiences, as one participant confirmed:

Every thoughtful movie-goer compares those tragic events with his own tragedies: September 1939, underground, emigration, Warsaw uprising. . . . The movie is unimportant. What is important is that through the glass of history we look at ourselves. We seek in history the approval or the denial of our own attitudes.[18]

The picture of Poland's history painted by Wajda in *The Ashes* adhered strictly to the realist tradition. The producer deliberately presented the military episodes in such a way that "it all did not make sense." Long scenes depicted the Poles in Napoleon's service, fighting in faraway places: suppressing the Negroes' rebellion in Santo Domingo in 1802, and slaughtering the Spaniards during the siege of Saragossa in 1808. Above all the last scene, significantly missing in the original novel, portrayed the retreat of the battered and demoralized remnants of the Polish army from Russia in the winter of 1812. *The Ashes*, according to Andrzej Jarecki, writing in the Communist youth weekly *Sztandar mlodych*, "exposes mercilessly the myth of Napoleon." There is on the screen "the sight of fruitlessness and sterility . . . the ocean of pain suffered in the name of an absent, incomprehensible Poland." The message of the film, concluded Jarecki, is clear:

Look, this is how we are—cruel, stupid but faithful! . . . A nation without brains, without politicians, thoughtlessly marching to its destruction, to its death . . . a nation supplied only with hearts and heavy fists to strike.[19]

The Ashes met with resounding success in Poland. Within the first two months the movie was seen by about one and a half million people. In some cities it was shown on non-workdays continuously throughout the day, the first show starting at 6:30 a.m. Within five weeks the entire cost of its production was recovered. At the same time lively debate continued in the press, radio and television. "There has been nothing like it," commented one observer, "since the memorable controversy over Zaluski's book a few years ago." [20]

Zaluski himself, incidentally, was one of the first to denounce *The Ashes*. Writing in the Warsaw weekly, *Stolica*, he undertook the defense of the Polish participation in the Napoleonic wars.[21] He denied that there was no political purpose in it. The Poles fought for Napoleon, he argued,

. . . in return for Poland. Perhaps this was a childish idea, a naive one, but highly pragmatic, "commercial," far removed from the cult of action for the sake of action.

Their participation in Santo Domingo and the Spanish campaigns was "a bloody price . . . for [the establishment by Napoleon in 1809 of] the Duchy of Warsaw." And even though in the end the Poles were militarily defeated, their sacrifices were not in vain:

The patriotic effort did succeed in forming the basic elements of a modern Polish nation—its national consciousness and organizational forms of life.

To distort the truth and present a monstrous picture of the Poles as a nation of political simpletons, he concluded, is to play into the hands of the enemies of Poland: The argument that "a nation like this does not deserve independence" was used "to support the partition of Poland at the Vienna Congress and at Versailles. And in more recent times within living memory."

Zaluski's position received strong support from Jan Gajewski. The writer expressed his amazement that after the debate over Zaluski's book, there was still any need to explain to Poles "the historical necessity to rise in arms against occupying power." What other way was there open for the Poles, he asked, to demonstrate their "will to freedom and independence, other than by military action, insurrection, [and participation in] struggle against occupying powers wherever they were opposed with force." To fail to perceive this and to praise passivity, asserted Gajewski, is deeply damaging to Poland:

Poor is the nation that does not care about its dignity . . . and that does not derive its inspiration from the memories of heroism and sacrifice.[22]

The opposite point of view, praising *The Ashes*, was also strongly represented in the debate. The well-known writer Wojciech Zukrowski, claimed that Wajda's intentions were misunderstood by his

[18] Andrzej Mozolowski, "Popiol i . . . diament," *Kurier polski*, Oct. 28, 1965.
[19] Andrzej Jarecki, "Iskra z popiolow," *Sztandar mlodych*, Sept. 28, 1965.
[20] Ryszard Kosinski, "Strzelam w film polski," *Zycie literackie*, Nov. 14, 1965.
[21] *Stolica*, Oct. 17, 1965.
[22] Jan Gajewski, "Wyrzecz, ze nie nadaremnie," *Prawo i zycie*, Nov. 21, 1965.

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critics. In the film Wajda could not deal with all the complex problems of the Napoleonic era. He did not concern himself primarily with military action, nor its long-term effects. What Wajda wanted to suggest, argued Zukrowski, was:

Be prepared, think, do not expect that your problems will be resolved for you by some leader, take good care of your homeland. . . . Play an active part in shaping the course of history or else you will be reduced to its mere object.[23]

Another defender of Wajda's film, Professor Kazimierz Wyka, went to the very heart of the controversy. He supported Wajda's decision, widely criticized as a proof of his tendentiousness, to add to the movie an episode depicting Napoleon's defeat in Russia. The ending to the film, in Wyka's opinion, was both artistically and politically apt. It emphasized that in history one cannot evade the consequence of one's action. In this respect, argued Wyka, Wajda's version of *The Ashes* was even superior to that of Zeromski. Zeromski's novel was not carried to the logical conclusion, for it ended with the gay scene of Napoleonic armies departing from Poland for Russia in the summer of 1812, confident of an easy victory there. How could one end the film in such a manner? What would be its message? "Beat the Muscovites?—No thanks!" Wyka exclaimed.[24]

The Communist's Dilemma

The long debate between the supporters of realist and romantic traditions vividly testifies to the ideological bankruptcy of the Polish United Workers' Party. Communism has little appeal among the Poles. It has to be buttressed with arguments borrowed from national traditions. This poses a painful dilemma for the Communist leaders. For by turning to either realism or romanticism they are likely to impair their position .

Gomulka's attempt in the 1950's to exploit the realist tradition for his own ends had no result except to stimulate the depolitization of Polish society, even penetrating into the ranks of the party itself. As Zaluski correctly observed, a continuation along this course will not win the Poles over to communism, but rather will accelerate the spread of *petit bourgeois* mentality. Gomulka, of course, is aware of this danger and has tried to cope with it by a renewed emphasis on Communist indoctrination. At a meeting of the Central Committee in July 1963, and again at the Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party in June 1964, he declared the need "to mobilize the whole party in intensified efforts on the ideological front."[25] It is doubtful, however, that Gomulka's ideological offensive can succeed in overcoming the existing climate of apathy. Indeed, the artificial whipping up of enthusiasm for communism—as in the Stalinist years—might well accelerate the trend among the Poles to seek refuge in private life.

Unfortunately for the Communists, if they adopt the remedy proposed by Zaluski, they are unlikely to fare much better. As Zaluski's critics rightly pointed out, the turning to romantic tradition would not remove, and might even aggravate, the difficulties with which the Communist party is faced. Merely emphasizing the struggle of the Communists during World War II would be fruitless, for—as any Pole is well aware—their wartime military effort was insignificant compared with that of the non-Communists. Certainly it does not provide a suitable basis for an heroic legend from which political capital could be derived. If, however, the Communists were to rehabilitate the entire insurrectionist tradition, they would open a Pandora's box from which a host of problems, greater than those they now confront, could well arise. For the classic romantic tradition has always advocated the struggle against Russia, with assistance from the Western powers. Reviving the tradition might overcome political apathy among the Poles, but only at the price of awakening their aspiration for complete independence from the Soviet Union and the restoration of Poland's bonds with the West.

The Polish Communists are thus caught up in a dilemma from which there is no apparent escape. The intense debate in their ranks indicates that they do not find their present position comfortable; but there is also no easy way out of the predicament. As long as the Communists cling to their ideology and try to use national traditions for their own ends, no matter what they do, they are likely to find themselves faced with ever more serious crises. To win popular support in the country the Communists would have to appeal to the Poles in the language they understand—which is not the language of communism but that of Poland's national history.

[23] Wojciech Zukrowski, "'Popioly' ale Andrzeja Wajdy," *Kino*, January 1966.

[24] Kazimierz Wyka, "'Popioly' ogladane i dyskutowane," *Polityka*, Nov. 13, 1965.

[25] *Nowe drogi*, August 1963, p. 42.

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Reviews in Brief

Politics and Economics in China

FRANKLIN W. HOUN: *Chinese Political Traditions.* Washington, D.C., Public Affairs Press, 1965.

IN THIS COLLECTION of essays, Professor Houn directs his attention to the broad and controversial question of the relationship between Chinese political tradition and the political system of Communist China. The four essays, totalling slightly over one hundred pages, explore what the author terms sociopolitical pluralism, the maintenance of a unitary state, the Chinese monarch and limits on royal power, and intellectual eclecticism and Confucianism. While conceding that instances of continuity between the old China and the new can be found, the author argues strongly that the differences are profound. He tries to demonstrate that the success of the Chinese Communist regime cannot be explained by, and does not stem from, any significant affinity between the contemporary and traditional systems. Since some scholars have suggested an opposite view, his discussion is both timely and provocative.

Three main points support the argument that the monolithic and totalitarian system of Communist China does not derive from traditional patterns. First, in both theory and practice, traditional Chinese society had many loci of power in addition to the imperial structure itself, so that the state as such did not monopolize political power. Second, the unitary nature of the imperial administration was maintained by a variety of wise and efficacious techniques rather than by the full use of repressive power; moreover, within the governmental structure were many checks and balances that significantly limited the exercise of royal power. Third, Chinese political tradition tolerated "diverse schools of thought" and permitted a good deal of intellectual freedom and debate. In developing these points, the author marshals considerable evidence drawn from the Chinese classics, dynastic histories, and modern scholarship on China.

Professor Houn's basic argument concerning the important qualitative differences between the traditional and Communist systems of government is convincing. He has also done a commendable job of introducing the issues and presenting relevant material with respect to a number of specific points raised in his argument. Nevertheless, the essays fall short of resolving debate on these points. Although the documentation is consistently thorough, the author's interpretation sometimes seems to go beyond the evidence. For example, his bland picture of the relative painlessness of dynastic changes (pp. 37-38) and of the heavy predominance of periods of peace and order is rather difficult to reconcile with his description of the centrifugal forces at work in nearly every dynasty (pp. 45-48). Moreover, since the analysis is almost entirely concentrated on the traditional system, the comparative dimension of the book suffers from rather superficial generalizations, explicit or implicit, about the Communist system. For instance, one can discern in the present regime a good many "checks and balances" not greatly different from some of those noted by the author in traditional China.

Finally, though this obviously is not a criticism of Professor Houn's essays, it might be appropriate to note the extraordinary difficulty of trying to define the precise influence of a tradition extending over two thousand years on a regime that has been in power scarcely more than fifteen. How could Communist China possibly reflect the entire tradition to which scholars so persistently compare it? And how could the Chinese Communists be expected to mirror the "pure" tradition of olden times when they were most deeply influenced by the evils to which that tradition succumbed in modern times?

KENNETH R. WALKER: *Planning in Chinese Agriculture: Socialization and the Private Sector, 1956-1962.* Chicago, Aldine Publishing Company, 1965.

IN THIS REFRESHINGLY brief (109 pp.) and unpretentious study, Professor Walker examines in detail the Chinese Communist regime's policy toward peasants' "private plots" in the years between 1956 and 1962. Though the subject is specialized, its significance is substantial. The author argues (p. xvii) that the status of the private plot is "probably the most important single barometer of political and economic stability in the countryside." As such, it reveals a good deal about the overall successes and failures of agricultural socialization in China and, in a broader realm, has important implications for the general benefits of sociali-

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zation to agricultural development in Asian societies. Walker's conclusions indicate that the retention of at least a minimal private sector in agriculture has powerful psychological and economic benefits for the peasantry, casting serious doubts on the wisdom of rapid and total agricultural socialization.

The study consists of three parts. Part One provides a brief summary of the development of rural collectivization up to the formation of the communes in 1958; Part Two discusses the significance of the private sector from both the peasants' and the government's points of view; and Part Three, the most detailed section, analyzes policy changes with respect to private plots from 1956 through 1962. Numerous tables give succinct capitulations of the questions raised. As the author freely acknowledges, data on some points are fragmentary or inconclusive, but his conclusions about the importance of the private plots and the government's reluctant recognition of this fact are convincing.

In the period covered, private plots generally took up less than five percent of China's arable land but accounted for much higher percentages of the peasants' food intake and personal income. Since they are mainly devoted to vegetable-farming and pig-raising, the private plots are a source of particularly important dietary supplements and, in addition, provide perhaps the most important source of fertilizer (pig manure) in China.

On two occasions—in 1956 and again in 1958-60—the Chinese Communist regime tried to reduce or eliminate the private plots. In both cases, it was obliged to restore them because of peasant dissatisfaction and economic losses, especially a serious reduction of manure supplies resulting from a decline in the pig population. The restoration of private plots in 1961, however distasteful it may have been to the Chinese leadership for ideological reasons, probably represents a long-term concession, the author suggests, since the private sector will remain crucial until the widespread use of chemical fertilizer reduces peasant worry about food production and eases governmental concern about the availability of animal fertilizer.

Professor Walker's study sheds light on two broader aspects of Chinese politics. One is the conflict between ideological fanaticism and pragmatic experimentation in the outlook of the Chinese leaders. The leaders' assumptions about the superiority of a collectivized economy twice led to attacks on the small remaining private sector despite evidence that the results would be unfavorable; yet in both cases they were eventually willing to backtrack. The other aspect is the problem of translating central directives into concrete and uniform action at the local level. The history of the private plots reveals significant local deviations from the orders and wishes of the central government.

More monographs like this one, offering careful analysis of critical policies and institutions, would be a welcome addition to the growing body of literature on Communist China and would serve to put many commonly asserted but loosely supported generalizations on a firmer basis.

James R. Townsend

YUAN LI-WU: *The Economy of Communist China: An Introduction.* New York, F. A. Praeger, 1965.

THE PREFACE and flyleaf describe this book variously as a general survey for the beginning student and as a "pioneering study of . . . the broad structure and programs of the Chinese economy." The plan of the book is simple. The first half describes Communist China's national economic goals, the institutional organization, and the strategies governing resource allocation, while the second half examines the success of these plans and mechanisms in the various economic sectors. The outline is admirably adapted either to serve as the framework for a basic survey of the Chinese economy or, through an institutional analysis, to shed light on the recent development of the economy in the face of a blackout of official Chinese data.

The prolific and energetic Dr. Wu has earned much merit in the past by virtue of his great facility for assembling and compiling vast amounts of information on particular industries and sectors of the Chinese economy. Unfortunately, however, this book requires a different approach: namely, the isolation and rigorous interconnecting of the key economic factors. It involves a pruning rather than a compiling task, and for this sort of exercise the author apparently lacks the knack or the necessary patience. Instead, the book offers a potpourri of observations which are not necessarily connected, explained, or analyzed.

The author's survey of the post-1960 course of the economy is particularly confusing. After describing a labored economic recovery in the 1961-65 "readjustment" period under the handicaps of reduced access to foreign technology and unbalanced pre-1960 industrial growth, he presents estimates to show that, after a brief recession in 1961, there was a substantial recovery in industrial output in 1962, when gross domestic investment reportedly rebounded to an extremely high rate of 33 percent. It may be that Dr. Wu believes that over the past four years China has had the paradox of a high-investment yet stagnant economy, but if so, he sees no obligation to explain its operation.

The same confusion, in reverse, is found in the discussion of farm output. Here the author presents the most dismal grain output estimates this reviewer has seen, showing an almost zero rate of long-term growth, a steadily mounting consumption "deficit" under the impact of population growth, and an astronomical deficit of 67 million tons of grain annually in the 1959-62 period. In spite of this, Dr. Wu's discussion suggests that these estimates do not imply greatly increased personal hardships as reflected in mortality rates, or any significant interference with the rapid recovery of industrial output and investment. Indeed, the author is not sure that Peking is really convinced of the need to shift from an exploitative to a developmental approach towards agriculture. His concluding statement in the chapter on agriculture ("It is entirely conceivable that . . . success in agricultural recovery may become a prerequisite of economic growth in general") suggests that he himself is not fully convinced that farm output is a critical limiting factor at the present time. Possibly Dr. Wu believes that there has been a margin in Chinese farm output which enables Peking to copy Stalin in developing industry without concern for farm output trends, but if so, he has not chosen to identify and argue this view—which would be a unique one.

Having taught a seminar on the Chinese economy, this reviewer is acutely aware of the paucity of basic texts and hence reluctant wholly to condemn this one. The first half of the book is descriptive and reasonably well

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done, and except for the section on agriculture, the reviewer has few complaints over the author's handling of pre-1960 developments. While the post-1960 material is confusing and sometimes even misleading, the desperate instructor might kill two birds with one stone by assigning as term papers the rewriting of the chapters in the latter half of the book.

Edwin F. Jones

CHENG CHU-YUAN: *Scientific and Engineering Manpower in Communist China, 1949-1963.* Washington, National Science Foundation, 1965.

ONE OF THE PRIMARY goals of the Chinese Communist regime has been to build a powerful, modern nation, and there is no more important prerequisite for this than the development of a large and competent professional manpower force. When the regime came into being in 1949, it had at its disposal only a small nucleus of professionals and has since then made every effort to swell the size of this group. In 1956, the leadership fixed as its initial goal a force of several million highly-trained specialists by 1967.

Dr. Cheng's book is a detailed study not only of the regime's efforts to train a new body of scientific and engineering specialists, but also of the manner in which it has endeavored to utilize the pre-existing group of older professional men. These older men have clearly presented a special problem for the regime: they are predominantly non-Communists whose political loyalty to the new order is uncertain, but whose skills are vitally needed in every area of development, including the training of a new generation of specialists. While the author concedes that some of these older professionals have been able to do outstanding work under the Communists, he nevertheless paints a bleak overall picture of careers hampered by political harassment and the imposition of manifold extraneous responsibilities. Furthermore, although the older scientists, for example, have been well paid by Chinese standards, they have at times been demoralized and socially degraded, while a new generation of "peasant scientists" has been lauded as the wave of the future.

Nor does Dr. Cheng share the Chinese Communists' optimism regarding future prospects. Not only is the top echelon of China's scientific and technical community made up largely of elderly men, but also most of the well-trained middle-aged professionals have chosen not to live in Communist China. As for the new generation of specialists, the author holds that they are under-educated, inexperienced, and less numerous than had been hoped. China's isolation from the West—and recently from Soviet Russia—obviously has not helped the situation, and the country is now forced to rely almost entirely on its own human as well as material resources. Dr. Cheng estimates that it will take Communist China twenty or thirty years to reach the professional manpower goals that were originally set for next year.

Notwithstanding its title, Dr. Cheng's study is by no means limited only to scientists and engineers. Among the other professionals and academic specialists covered, social scientists are given special scrutiny. It is this group, of course, which has had the most difficulty in finding a place in the new China. The author characterizes the fifty thousand "old" social scientists as "a humiliated and disappointed group whose plight continues to decline." He further believes that since the Hundred Flowers débâcle they have "vowed an end to sincere cooperation with the Communist government."

An impressive quantity of hitherto widely-scattered data has been assembled in this volume and summarized in 57 tables, twelve charts, and four appendices. One of the appendices lists 1,200 professional people, giving background information and details of their current status. While the study is admittedly only a beginning, it certainly contributes a great deal toward an understanding of this complex and important field.

James D. Seymour

Reviewers

JAMES R. TOWNSEND—Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, and student of Chinese Communist affairs.

EDWIN F. JONES—Specialist in Chinese Communist economic affairs; presently engaged in a research project for the Social Science Research Council.

JAMES D. SEYMOUR—An American student of Communist China, currently doing research at the East Asian Institute, Columbia University, New York.

BORIS SCHWARZ—Professor of Music at Queens College, City University of New York. He has written extensively on Soviet music and last appeared in this journal with "The Vicissitudes of Soviet Music" (November-December 1965).

JOSEPH ROTHSCHILD—Presently with the Department of Public Law and Government and the Russian Institute at Columbia University, New York; author of *Communist Eastern Europe* (New York, Walker, 1964).

LEON M. HERMAN—American specialist on Soviet economic affairs and frequent contributor to this as well as other journals.

Music in Russia

FRED K. PRIEBERG: *Musik in der Sowjetunion.* Köln, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1965.

FRED K. PRIEBERG is a young West German author whose competence in the field of modern music in general

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(see his *Lexikon der Neuen Musik*, 1959) is matched by his firsthand knowledge of the musical scene in the USSR. His book, however, which attempts to present a panoramic view of Soviet music from the turbulent 1920's through the dark decades of Stalinism to the modest liberalization under Khrushchev, leaves something to be desired. The information, on the whole, is reliable, but the organization of material is somewhat diffuse, and interpretation and analysis tend to become buried under an avalanche of dates, names, figures and statistics.

At the same time, Mr. Prieberg warns his readers against taking Soviet official statistics too seriously: some of the glowing reports, he points out, are merely "a reflection of an almost simple-minded . . . provincial kind of patriotism fanned by an inferiority complex that is historically founded but objectively hard to understand" (p. 252). While conceding the great accomplishments of Soviet music, and particularly the musico-educational system for gifted youth, he nevertheless points to certain shortcomings—*e.g.*, inadequate classroom space, shortages of educational materials, the need for more and better musical instruments, and—in the provinces—a lack of qualified teachers. He also points out the strong reliance upon entertainment (*estradnaia*) music and, for a country as large as the USSR, the relatively small number of symphony orchestras.

On the political side, Prieberg finds that the Union of Soviet Composers is no longer as monolithic as it has been in the past, and that it lacks the authority to "forbid" atonal experiments. Yet it can still wield considerable power simply by ostracizing the more audacious and recalcitrant young composers. He also notes that musical criticism in the Soviet Union, though in the hands of competent professionals, is invariably given a political slant, and he raises the "painful" question which, he feels, must be answered some day by Soviet musicologists—the disturbing analogies between certain musical policies of the Soviet and Nazi regimes (p. 208). It is curious indeed that the "Kultur-Bolschewisten" persecuted by Goebbels are identical with the "bourgeois decadents" castigated by Zhdanov in 1948. To be sure, "Zhdanovism" is dead, but its echoes still linger on in the official insistence on the esthetics of Socialist Realism.

A rather weak chapter is devoted to "The Late Prokofiev." His last twenty years—when he was torn between conformity and conviction—require an analysis in depth that Prieberg fails to provide. The author seems to be caught in a contradiction: on the one hand he observes a "concession" in Prokofiev's late style, and on the other hand he endorses Ehrenburg's obituary of the composer as a man "without compromise." Certainly, Prieberg ought to have given more attention to the 6th Symphony, which is a true challenge to conformity. It is naive to assume that Prokofiev would "disappear" from Western concert programs "upon the discovery that he was a Soviet composer" (p. 154).

In the last chapter, *Epilogue*, Prieberg probes the musical taste of Soviet audiences. Strangely enough, he finds it to be prevailingly *petit bourgeois*, old-fashioned, and none too different from that in bourgeois countries. Far from combating this trend, the Soviet authorities encourage it by the "*retrograde* musical esthetics" that form the basis for Socialist Realism (p. 367). As long as Soviet music is tied to "partyness" (especially in the field of opera), international recognition will be hampered (p. 377).

Prieberg's well-documented book lacks a bibliography, which is a regrettable omission and diminishes its value to experts. His ample footnotes refer mostly to articles in journals (both Russian and German), less often to books. Disturbing too, are the pedantic transliterations of well-known names such as Mejrchol'd, Ejsenschtejn, Rubinschtejn, Prokof'ew. A few minor errors may be mentioned in passing: Piatigorsky is of course a cellist, not a violinist (p. 30); the première of Shostakovich's *Katerina Ismailova* took place on December 26, 1962 (not January 8, 1963). I was present at the première, an event known in advance to Moscow's intelligentsia; yet the placards in front of the theatre announced blandly *The Barber of Seville*, and the change to *Katerina Ismailova* was made public by yellow stickers the morning of the performance. Speaking of A. Blok's poem *The Twelve*, Prieberg says that the final stanza with Jesus Christ as leader of the procession was often omitted, "but not in the ballet *The Twelve* by Boris Tishchenko" (p. 310). He neglects to mention that the ending was eliminated prior to the Leningrad première, perhaps because the young composer chose to close the work with a twelve-tone chorale (cf. *Musical America*, New York, July 1965). One last query: on p. 311 appears the reproduction of a page from Shostakovich's 13th Symphony, with indications on the top in German ("nicht zu schnell . . ."). Is this an unauthorized edition printed in Germany? To my knowledge, no Russian score of this controversial work has been made available in the West.

Boris Schwarz

Communism in Poland

HANSJAKOB STEHLE: *The Independent Satellite: Society and Politics in Poland since 1945*. New York, F. A. Praeger, 1965.

THIS BOOK—rich in content, lucid in argumentation, cosmopolitan in breadth—is rendered particularly remarkable by the nationality of its author. Seldom, if ever, has a German journalist written about Poland with such sympathy and so genuine a historical awareness unadulterated by either casuistry or sentimentality.

These qualities emerge most saliently in Stehle's analysis of contemporary church-state (*i.e.*, Catholic-Communist) frictions in Poland. Instead of the conventional version of ferocious Communist wolves seeking to devour the innocent Christian lambs, we get a picture of a relatively even confrontation between two hierarchically organized, ideologically illiberal, intellectually regressive, and politically expansionist movements which are forced by unusual circumstances, and to their mutual chagrin, into a real, albeit condescending and frustrating, *modus vivendi* with each other. "Polish Catholicism," the author asserts (p. 61), "still clings, theologically and in its pastoral practice, so closely to tradition that it has been less open to the modern, outward-looking trends within the Church than Catholicism in any other European country. . . . The knowledge that the nation was in its hands for a thousand years before the Communists arrived sustains the self-confidence of the Polish Church. This makes it both stronger and less tolerant than in the secularized but pro-clerical states in the West. At the same time, it also exacerbates the Communists' complexes and encourages their tendency to use force and petty provocation."

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One of the ironic aspects of this Catholic-Communist confrontation in Poland is that the two chief protagonists, Cardinal Wyszynski and party First Secretary Gomulka, are in many ways similar personalities: stubborn, courageous, nationalistic, philistine, unfriendly toward modernism and revisionism within their respective spheres, and *au fond* mistrustful of intellectuals. The future must answer the increasingly pertinent question of how Wyszynski and Gomulka—or, rather, Polish Catholicism and communism—will seek to cope with the spiritual challenge of an expanding and increasingly secular urban industrial society—a challenge directed at both of them.

The author also deserves praise for dispelling certain illusions entertained in the West during and immediately after the "Polish October" of 1956. He makes it clear that Gomulka was carried to power on a revolutionary wave which, with the true Communist's aversion to the spontaneity of the masses, he successfully sought to break and harness; and that the tightened discipline which he imposed after 1958 was not the result of Soviet pressure, but an expression of Gomulka's own urges.

At the same time, Gomulka remains a Pole and as such refuses to impose police-state terrorism on his nation or to collectivize its peasants. There is hardly any rhetoric about "class struggle" or "dictatorship of the proletariat" in Poland. Gomulka tolerates an amazing degree of coolness between the *pays légal* and the *pays réel*. His regime appears to be reconciled to the apolitical apathy of the country's youth. Strange? Perhaps. But then, given the West German government's refusal to acknowledge the Oder-Neisse line and the tactless saber-rattling in which it permits the expellee groups on its territory to indulge, the Polish Communist government, in its turn, scarcely needs ideology to keep its people politically faithful. Geography has thus become an adequate substitute for ideology.

The book contains a few typographical errors (*e.g.*, in translating the original German text of the book into English, the primary names of such localities as Gniezno and Ljubljana should have been substituted for the German versions Gnesen and Laibach; the town of Kutno is misspelled, as are the names of the periodical *Tworczosc* and of the politician Minc, etc.) More importantly, is it legitimate for the author to refer throughout his book to PAX as a "left" Catholic organization? PAX is consistently (and often demagogically) pro-Soviet and "Stalinist," and its leader may well be something of a Soviet agent—but that, in the reviewer's opinion, is hardly the same thing as being "leftist." Finally, is Stehle realistic in maintaining that the "Partisan" faction within the Polish United Workers' Party has now been rendered impotent? In the reviewer's judgment, this is hardly the case, although again it is a question that only the future can answer.

Joseph Rothschild

Economic Problems

CYRIL A. ZEBOT: *The Economics of Competitive Coexistence*, New York, F. A. Praeger, 1964.

DESPITE THE FACT that the author requires only 150 pages to develop his main thesis (the *Appendix* and *Notes* take up the rest of the book's 262 pages), this is clearly an ambitious work of economic analysis. Professor Zebot undertakes to isolate and examine what he considers to be the "root problems" of economic development around the world, and to present, at the end of his examination, his own "judgment concerning the future evolution of the tripartite economic structure of the world."

There is no serious quarrel with the analytical scheme chosen by the author for viewing the international economy of our times—that is, in terms of three major subdivisions: the industrially developed, the newly-developing, and the Communist-ruled nations. There are many useful precedents, as well as a number of valid substantive reasons, for such an approach. The use of these three broad groupings of national economies has, by now, become standard pratice with the specialized agencies of the United Nations engaged in the dissemination of international economic statistics. Professor Zebot is therefore treading on tested ground when he adopts these categories in his search for the most conspicuous problems that have emerged in recent years in the world economy.

There are, however, grounds on which some readers will take issue with the author's judgment as to precisely what constitutes the "root problem" of economic development in each of the three groupings of national economies. Professor Zebot assuredly has cogent reasons for his selection of the single most critical problem which, in his view, obstructs the road to further economic progress in each grouping, and he uniformly argues his case with quiet persuasiveness. Nevertheless, not all readers will agree, for instance, that the "root problem" faced by the newly-developing nations is the development of "their scarcest resource," namely, the human skills required by modern technology. By the same token, some readers would be inclined to question his view that the greatest hindrance to the industrially developed nations' efforts to achieve continued economic growth is the threat of inflation. Nor is everyone likely to be convinced by his argument that the Communist-ruled countries will be unable to achieve a viable economic order unless their elitist leaders reconcile themselves to the idea of "socialist participation" by the people as a whole in all decisions affecting the national welfare.

What this reviewer finds most difficult to accept is the author's all too sanguine but not very convincing forecast not only that all three subdivisions of the world economy will succeed in resolving their own specific root problems of economic development, but also that the decades to come will witness "a basic convergence of the world's economy toward certain common characteristics," leading to the predominance in all three groupings of "largely pluralistic" forms of economic organization and processes of decision-making.

Whether one agrees with it or not, however, this is an intriguing thesis, and readers of Professor Zebot's book will be amply rewarded with an abundant flow of suggestive ideas and generalizations that help to illuminate the course of recent economic history and to keep in focus the basic human purposes of economic growth and technical progress.

Leon M. Herman

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NOTES & VIEWS

Economics and Politics: V

Reforms in Eastern Europe: Report on a Conference

By Hans Jörg Pommer

Symposia with participants from both East and West are not unique these days, but they still attract and deserve special attention. Within the last two or three years, there have been meetings in Austria, Belgium, West Germany, and Italy, among other countries, where scientists, philosophers, and economists from the two parts of the world have met and exchanged views, establishing contacts across the ideological chasm.

In early May of this year, Switzerland took its first turn as host to such a gathering. On the invitation of the student body of St. Gall College for the Economic and Social Sciences (Hochschule St. Gallen für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften), representatives from five East European countries met with Swiss economists to discuss economic problems of both East and West. Of nearly 60 participants, 17 came from behind the Iron Curtain; among them were such prominent economists as Imre Vajda (Budapest), Zygmunt Wyrozembski (Warsaw), Josef Goldmann (Prague), A. Orthaber (Ljubljana), and Dynko Tozheff (Sofia)—names familiar to all students of East European economic affairs.

Understandably, the main focus of interest in most of the lectures and discussions at the symposium was the course and implication of the recent economic reforms in Eastern Europe. The present article will therefore omit mention of the talks that dealt with specifically "Western" problems, confining itself to the introductory lecture and to subsequent topics of particular interest touched upon by the East European economists.

The opening lecture of the seminar, by Professor Rolf Dubs (St. Gall), was devoted to the recent controversial theory that foresees the convergence of the two basic economic systems, the Western market economy and the Eastern centrally planned economy. Since J. Tinbergen's famous article of 1963, the convergence theory has been widely discussed and disputed, especially among Western economists. In his article, Tinbergen had argued that, on one hand, the introduction of several forms of "planification" (indicative planning on a nationwide scale) in some West European countries, and on the other hand, the intention of reform economists in Eastern Europe to combine market elements (rentability, profit, management responsibility, more elastic pricing, etc.) with the centrally-planned economy, would eventually lead to a certain similarity in the two systems—the major remaining differ-

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ence being the legal framework and form of property (state and collective ownership of the means of production in the East, and private property in the West).

As Professor Dubs pointed out, economists who believe in the convergence theory have cited three main trends in each system to support their views. In the West these trends are: (1) the growing importance of the public sector in various economies; (2) the increase of tendencies that cut back free competition and encourage stronger intervention in economic affairs by the state; and (3) the aforementioned development of new ideas of indicative nationwide economic planning. In the East the trends cited are: (1) the withering away of originally stable dogmas—*e.g.*, displacement of the concept of equal wages by increasing emphasis on salary scales and material incentives, rehabilitation of the factor of "interest" (formerly considered a hallmark of capitalism), and retreat from the notion of self-sufficiency toward the concept of an international division of labor—with capitalist countries included; (2) the search for "market-injections" into the system of planned economy, reflected in the abandonment of planning in terms of quantity alone, the greater orientation of the economy towards the consumer, the introduction of marketing, etc.; (3) the slow but steady adoption of new planning methods, mainly with the help of econometrics, leading toward a rationalization of the system.

Explanations for the structural changes going on in the East have been found in the increasingly dominant role of polycentrism, and, at least in the developed Communist countries, the gradual approach of a certain degree of economic saturation. The new trends in the Western economies, as Galbraith and Kohr among others have suggested, have grown out of problems of economic wealth and the correct use of welfare.

In his lecture, Professor Dubs expressed the view that however valid this line of argument might prove to be, the above-mentioned trends could lead to a merely formal, or superficial, convergence of capitalism and communism. There would remain a fundamental difference not only between the legal forms of property but between basic ideas and ideologies. Essentially, the similarity of systems would be confined to economic techniques.

While the present writer agrees wholly with these conclusions, one thought might be appended—namely, if the present dynamic trend in the East European economies toward logical solutions and away from dogma were to continue, it would in the long run have a strong impact on fields other than economics.

Among the East Europeans present at the symposium, the convergence theory found an emphatic opponent in the well-known Czechoslovak economist, Dr. Josef Goldmann. In his lecture on "Basic Parallels and Differences between Two Economic and Social Systems" and in the discussions which followed, Dr. Goldmann denied that capitalism and socialism could ever achieve meaningful similarity. He did, however, emphasize that while "socialism cannot copy Western economic experience, [it] might learn a lot from capitalism, since nothing is perfect, and there is success and failure even in socialism."

Dr. Goldmann's other remarks included some interesting views. The most important problem in the reform discussions in Czechoslovakia, he said, is the process of freeing socialist economic theory from its old Stalinist dogmas. He asserted the necessity of returning to the starting point of Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP, 1921-28), which was devised, he claimed, not as a short-term political instrument for the improvement of the chaotic Soviet economy, but as the "logical continuation" of the principles of socialism, a conscious adaptation of market mechanisms to the planned economy, a clear and intentional combination of "market and plan."

It is, however, debatable whether or not Lenin's NEP was in fact the origin of an economic theory of socialism. Neither Marx, Engels, nor Lenin ever undertook the effort of developing a real theory of socialist economics; Marx's *Kapital* was simply a critique of the capitalist economy, though a brilliant one for its time in history. The founding fathers preached that the abolition of private property alone would bring about social justice and enable the building up of a Socialist and later a Communist society. Therefore socialist economics has been understood by Soviet leaders exclusively as an antithesis to capitalism.

It is true, however, that Lenin's NEP contained certain theoretical aspects that could have been further elaborated. These, unfortunately, were nipped in the bud by Stalin's dogmatic, politically-oriented economic theories. Thus no one would argue with Dr. Goldmann's statement that as a result of Stalinism, there has been "a scientific sterility in socialist economics since the 1920's." He went on to express his firm view that the recent reform in the system of economic planning and managing in Czechoslovakia would overcome this sterility, carrying all Stalinist dogmas and their remnants onto the "scrap-heap" of history. In support of this view, he asserted that the reforms, at least in Czechoslovakia, are not restricted to the "instrumental sphere"—*i.e.*, to technical mechanisms—but will also affect important elements of the system itself (in this connection he appears to this writer to be somewhat optimistic).

Goldmann alluded to the fact that there is still important conflict going on between party officials

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and scientists, particularly in the field of economics, because some Communist party groups are afraid of losing their influence. But scientists can and will prove that a dogmatic approach to the modern industrialized economy does not lead to the required efficiency and rentability of socialist production. Dogmatists, for instance, have always claimed validity for the law proclaiming that socialist economics will produce a steady growth of national income and national production. Goldmann flatly asserted that there is no such law; instead there have been—at least in the Czechoslovak economy—"marked fluctuations" in economic growth rates during the last few years, mainly because of the "steady deterioration of the input-output ratio." The same, he said, is true of other Communist countries, but has been "noticed rather late."

Concerning the dominant problem of industrial prices, Goldmann expressed the hope that the present price reform—which is based on computer analysis—would be "the last one organized from the center." He maintained that even computer analysis could not be substituted for those "market signals" so necessary for the formation of correct economic prices. Criticizing computer fanatics among economists in his and other Communist countries, who believe that all irrational consumer-decisions in the commodity and money circulation of a modern national economy, as well as the complex market mechanism of supply and demand, can be simulated by large computer units, he ironically remarked that "the computer is the fig leaf which ought to cover the shame of the centralized planning system."

Concerning consumer goods in the widest sense, Goldmann said there must be a market in order to obtain a correct pricing that also reflects the various cost factors involved. In heavy industry, however — where there is still a direct and centralized allocation of capital and material investments—he felt that no market is necessary. Yet since he had previously denied the so-called "objective socialist economic law" of a more rapid growth of producer goods than of consumer goods, his demand for a "free" market for consumer goods goes far beyond the present official policy on economic reform.

Concluding his review of contemporary economic problems in Czechoslovakia, Goldmann declared that one of the main tasks of the new system of planning and managing the economy in his country is the development of a "functional mechanism" that combines the interest of society with that of industrial and agricultural enterprises, while providing absolute priority for the latter. Another equally important task he cited is "strengthening workers' identification with the enterprises in which they work," since the introduction of the socialist system in Czechoslovakia has "not abolished alienation" but on the contrary has deepened it to a certain extent.

A third speaker who aroused great interest at the seminar was Professor Zygmunt Wyrozembski of the Polish Academy of Sciences, who delivered a highly theoretical lecture on "Investment and Efficiency Calculation in the Socialist Economy, with Special Reference to Poland." The ideas Wyrozembski put forward would have been brand new to most Polish economists, had they been present. He tried to draft an econometric model of investment efficiency, based on the productivity of labor and the productivity of capital. This approach, he felt, could be substituted for the present investment methods practiced in Poland, which he described as insufficient. His model seemed to imply the adaptation of some elements of Western standard cost analysis to macroeconomic planning, although, asked whether this were in fact possible, he denied the implication.

Wyrozembski made some other astonishing remarks in the course of the seminar. For example, in one of the discussions on the so-called "objective economic laws of socialism," he stated that no economist in Poland accepts the "law" proclaiming the necessity of a more rapid growth of producer goods than of consumer goods. Even officially, he said, this thesis is no longer considered a dogma, adding that, after all, the economic laws of socialism "were never dogmas"—what is involved is simply "a question of interests."

Again, speaking about the Marxist theory of the disintegration of capitalism, Wyrozembski declared that Marx's predictions had been justified up to the end of World War II, but that thereafter the capitalist system had changed. He went on to add that any economic and social system "has the right to exist as long as its productive forces are developing." Capitalism could expand its frontiers by changes in the structure of property (for example, collective property in joint-stock companies) and by new theoretical and practical approaches towards the planned economy as a social system. Moreover, the decisive criterion today is not "the question of how the means of production are actually owned but of social and public control over the process of accumulation of capital."

Like Goldmann, Wyrozembski mentioned the rift between officials who "still worship pragmatism" in the field of economic planning and economists who consider planning as "scientific fixing of optimum input-output ratios and rationalization of economic processes." In every Communist country, he said, this rift is somewhat a problem of generations.

The noted Hungarian economist, Professor Imre Vajda, concentrated his attention on more practical issues. His lecture on "Motives and Possibilities of Expand-

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ing the Foreign Trade of Socialist Countries with the West" offered an excellent review of contemporary problems in East-West trade as seen from the East, although he restricted himself mainly to the situation of Hungary. Whereas 50 percent of the country's exports to the West consists of agricultural products, 80 percent of its exports to the member-states of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or Comecon) is made up of machinery and other industrial products. Vajda saw the reason for this unequal export structure in "Hungary's technical and industrial backwardness [in comparison with neighboring Western states] and its lack of modern industrial goods" which meet Western demand. Thus, he said, Hungary intends to shift its foreign trade structure with the West so as to increase imports of technical know-how and modern technology (for example, via licensing).

On the whole, according to Vajda, "pure market relations" in East-West trade as well as in Comecon intra-bloc trade have no future; they should be regarded only as a segment of East-West trade. The future, he said, lies in industrial cooperation carried on exclusively between enterprises in different countries, without involving state authorities or foreign trade organizations. The time for continually expanding trade in the conventional sense "is past for both sides."

Vajda dealt in detail with the problem of the lessening dependence of East European countries on the Soviet Union. He warned Western nations not to urge the East European "people's democracies" to choose between them and the Soviet Union. This, he said, would have no useful effect—in fact the West would be gambling away great economic as well as political chances to establish closer contacts with Eastern Europe. Moreover, any attempt to force a choice would threaten the people in Hungary and other Eastern European countries who are doing their best to strengthen economic and political relations with the West, since they would face the "danger of political denunciation from within their own ranks."

Aside from these considerations, the Soviet market is, in Vajda's view, of "very great importance for the people's democracies," and they would be unwise to turn away from the Soviet Union. He asserted that Hungary, whose foreign trade was traditionally oriented to Germany and the West before the war, "owes her industrialization exclusively to the USSR," and that even though the "price was high and many grave mistakes were made in the past, the chosen way was right." This Soviet help has determined the orientation of Hungary's foreign trade since the war; for the future, however, Hungary and several of the smaller Communist countries are "looking for a synthesis between East and West."

Discussing the economic reform in Hungary, Vajda said that "we are not starting from zero but have inherited a mortgage from the old [Stalinist] system, which we cannot throw overboard in a day." In the same connection, he produced a new interpretation of the Communist phenomenon of a state monopoly of foreign trade. Vajda saw a clear trend toward the removal of minor monopolies (state foreign trade organizations) within the comprehensive state monopoly, and toward the practical organization of imports and exports directly by producing and selling enterprises. Explaining this trend in ideological terms, he stated that the doctrine of state monopoly merely implies that "no private capital accumulation is possible and no private import-export companies [can] exist"; within these bounds direct dealings between enterprises would be entirely practicable. As a first result of the new trend (which also includes internal commerce) Vajda mentioned the Hungarian "stock markets" for surplus goods, which are already being traded under conditions of free pricing on the basis of supply and demand.

To round out this report, two other lectures perhaps deserve mention. Interesting for experts, though not particularly spectacular, were some remarks by Professor A. I. Orthaber on "Problems of Planning Optimal Quantitative Structures of Production," which showed that in Yugoslavia, too, econometrics and decision theory are being increasingly adopted. In contrast to Orthaber, the lecture by Professor Dynko Tozheff of Sofia University, on "Cooperation of Socialist and Capitalist Enterprises in Coproduction," introduced no new ideas and clearly represented the official Bulgarian party and government line. In the discussion periods also, Tozheff held closely to traditional Communist political economics.

To sum up, this report is necessarily general. Many of the problems and questions that were raised at the Swiss seminar cannot—due to limited space—be discussed in detail or even mentioned. But it can be said in conclusion that the symposium led to fruitful and stimulating talks on both sides in a practical and friendly atmosphere—and without polemics. Many of the remarks in open and private discussion were fascinating and sometimes even sensational. Of course, most of the East European economists represented neither their regimes nor official economic policies, and therefore significant variations from the party line, particularly in the cases of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary, were expressed. No one yet knows to what extent these men can influence and bring about changes in the economic and social systems of East Europe; yet the very fact of their presence, not to mention their ability and willingness to exchange views with Westerners and with one another, is a hopeful sign for the future.

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